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The literature on the World Bank in neoliberal governance tends to assume that its 
strategies are largely shaped by the objectives of the US. The hegemony of neoliberalism as a 
political paradigm in the US is conventionally considered to be expressed in the Bank as the 
‘Washington Consensus’. The structural adjustment loan is the medium through which the 
Washington Consensus is extended to the realm of ‘development’. Yet structural adjustment 
lending was developed before the neoliberal paradigm became hegemonic in the US, in the 
service of Bank policy objectives which did not express the tenets of the Washington 
Consensus. The tendency of critical accounts to ignore this disjuncture and adopt the 
Washington Consensus narrative suggests that they take the Bank’s capacity to enact US 
objectives for granted. My central claim in response to this is that the Bank has never been a 
passive recipient of the American hegemonic agenda. 
I articulate this argument at two levels of analysis. Firstly, I draw upon Constructivist 
accounts in arguing that the agency of management was crucial in creating an organisational 
structure which allowed the Bank to meet the imperatives associated with the development 
of its operations. The process of developing a viable organisational structure allowed 
management to carve out a proprietary terrain in which their agency is decisive in 
constructing the tools and strategies of governance. However, I move beyond the 
Constructivist tendency to de-contextualise managerial agency, by arguing that 
management’s strategic choices are socially anchored in the infrastructure of American 
financial capital. 
Secondly, I argue that the social basis of the Bank in private American finance means 
its relationship with the US is defined by its imperative as an institution: is to secure access to 
the uniquely deeply capitalised US financial system. In pursuing this institutional imperative, 
the Bank’s agenda has become increasingly intertwined with US objectives. However, the 
parameters of its capacity to act are set by the basis of its operations in private US finance.  
On this basis, I offer a revisionist history of development of Bank’s structure and 
lending practices at four critical moments from the 1930s to 1980s, which leads me to cast 
the turn to neoliberal governance in a new light. Firstly, I explore the enlistment of US 
financiers in support of the Bank at Bretton Woods. Secondly I illustrate how the Bank’s 
imperative of capitalisation crystallised as it began lending. Thirdly, I demonstrate how 
management’s pragmatic negotiation of the Bank’s institutional imperative shaped the 
technology of governance during the Bretton Woods era. Finally, I present the origins of 
structural adjustment lending in McNamara’s strategic renovation of the Bank’s institutional 
structure and lending practices in order to render pro-poor lending strategy legible to US 
financiers. Structural adjustment was not an artefact of American power, but was rooted in 
management’s pragmatic negotiation of the imperatives which followed from the social 
anchoring of the Bretton Woods order in the unique infrastructure of American finance. 
 Ultimately I will show that American hegemony cannot be understood without the 
agency of the Bank.  
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Introduction 
 
More than three decades on from the 1982 debt crisis, scholarship on the role of the 
World Bank in global governance still frames the institution in terms of its relationship to the 
Washington Consensus. As a set of policies, the term is seen to reflect the extension of 
neoliberalism into the realm of development. The neoliberal agenda was to roll back the state 
– de-regulating financial services and promoting the free international movement of capital, 
liberalising the international trade regime, and controlling inflation. Debtor states were to 
undertake massive retrenchment, privatising state-owned enterprises, reducing public-sector 
pay and making civil service bureaucracies smaller and cheaper. Social spending was to be 
limited and cost recovery in health and education was to be deployed to keep expenditures 
down. These were the type of conditions attached to structural adjustment loans – which have 
become synonymous with the term ‘Washington Consensus’, and by extension, with 
‘neoliberalism’. 
This is seen as a major shift away from the Bank’s policy in the 1970s. According to 
conventional wisdom, Robert McNamara oversaw the Bank’s most progressive moment – the 
orientation of the lending programme towards rural farmers and ‘basic needs’ investment in 
education and social spending.1 This is often seen as the culmination of the era of Bretton 
Woods’ association of Keynesian macro-management and state intervention with 
‘development’.2 Yet by 1981, the Bank had made a significant change away from these 
sophisticated applications of modernisation theory. The Bank’s 1981 report, Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (often known as ‘the Berg Report’), in considering the 
‘tragedy of low growth’ in African economies in 1981, argued that post-independence trade 
and exchange rate policies had over-protected industry, and overextended the public sector3. 
As a remedy, state involvement should be rolled back, and the private sector should be 
incentivised to take on the task of creating growth.4 Further, with the appointment of Anne 
Krueger to the position of Chief Economist, the Bank had taken on a leading intellectual light of 
neoliberal New Political Economy who had published treatises on the perverse incentives and 
                                                          
1 Morawetz, D., Twenty-Five Years of Economic Development, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1977.  
2 Leys, C., The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, James Currey, London. 1996 
3 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. Pg.4-5 
4 Ibid. Pg.37-42 
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wastefulness flowing from government economic controls,5 and considered development 
economics to be a betrayal of the basic tenets of economics as a positive science.6 
The shift from the ideas of ‘basic needs’ to the Berg Report seemed to many to go 
against the Bank’s inclinations. In considering this issue, scholarship on the Bank turns to the 
power of the US state in search of an explanation. The shift was the outcome of the US’ 
response to a dual crisis of the Bretton Woods order and the Keynesian economic paradigm 
which underpinned it. The neoclassical economic paradigm was waiting ‘in the wings’ and 
attained hegemony as an intellectual and political paradigm simultaneously. The US 
transmitted the monetarist agenda to the international order through interventions to attack 
inflation and remove barriers to international capital movements and trade. Three examples 
are often cited to support this thesis. Firstly, in 1981 under President Reagan, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker raised interest rates significantly driving up the cost of debt held by less 
developed countries. The impact of this was to bring numerous borrowers to the point of 
default and to worsen terms of trade. Secondly, Alden W. Clausen was appointed to replace 
McNamara as president of the Bank. Clausen brought Anne Krueger in as his chief economist in 
1982, bringing monetarism to the Bank. Thirdly, three years after the debt crisis, in 1985, the 
‘Baker Plan’ was introduced. Proposed by US Treasury Secretary Baker, any transfers of new 
monies from the international financial institutions to defaulted debtors were made 
conditional upon entry into a standby agreement with the Fund, before the Bank’s structural 
adjustment loans could be accessed. This did not only provide new liquidity. By insisting that 
lending was conditional upon agreement with private creditors, the Bank and Fund maintained 
financial discipline, and by appending further conditions to the loans, they promoted the US 
agenda of removing public bodies from their involvement in the business of development. 
The shift from the paradigm underpinning Bretton Woods to that which underpinned 
the Washington Consensus is predominantly explained as a response to a crisis. In this radical 
epochal break, the strategies and tools of governance were made as new as the neoliberal 
vision of the good society was old – to fit the US’ hegemonic strategy.  
However, it is clear that the practices which came to be known as ‘structural 
adjustment’ were discussed, experimented with, and deployed for some time before they 
were enshrined in the Washington Consensus through the Baker Plan in 1985. In their path-
breaking 1991 study Aid and Power, John Toye, Paul Mosley, and Jane Harrigan emphasise that 
conditional programme lending was deployed between 1973 and 1975 in Kenya, Zambia, and 
                                                          
5 Krueger, A., ‘The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society’, American Economic Review, 64, 1974. 
Pg.302 
6 Krueger, A., ‘Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn’, NBER Working Paper No.5896, 
January 1997. 
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Tanzania. Most importantly although they acknowledge that “...it quickly began to be seen as 
the instrument which could exert pressure on developing countries to follow orthodox liberal 
economic prescriptions of price reform and privatisation”7, they make the crucial observation 
that ‘structural adjustment’ was not an invention made in response to the second OPEC price 
hike of 1979, or the election of conservative governments with neoliberal policy programmes 
in the OECD. Likewise, Patrick Sharma has illustrated that the Bank’s traditional mode of 
lending was ill-suited to the political economic context of the 1970s – and that discussions 
internal to the Bank were conducted around new techniques for speeding up lending before 
the crisis of 1979-82.8  
The fact that the practice of structural adjustment preceded the Baker Plan is not a 
controversial observation in itself. But it is an essential starting point in illustrating the 
importance of the agency of the Bank. It follows that the political paradigm of the US and the 
strategy and practice of the Bank are not only linked through the exercise of direct political 
power. As I will show, the key mechanism by which the lending programme which revitalised 
the Bank as an institution of governance in the later 1970s was translated to financiers was a 
specifically American management technique, and the epistemological underpinning of the 
lending programme was provided by a positivist economics rooted in American academe. Yet 
neither bespeaks a specifically neoliberal intellectual programme. The Bank developed the 
capacities upon which the shift to neoliberal governance would be predicated in response to 
an earlier impasse. The neoliberal turn was built upon foundations which were laid during the 
McNamara era. 
Further, traditional accounts of the Washington Consensus underestimate the agency 
of management in the creation of the tools of neoliberal governance which Sharma and Toye 
et al point towards. The Bank does not figure in these accounts as an agent in its own right, but 
as an enforcer of the power of the US state: it is unequivocally a tool of US strategy in response 
to the crisis, with the objective of defending the US financial system and the dollar itself. In 
Williamson’s article coining the term, he argues that through ‘conditionality’ on their structural 
adjustment loans policies of privatisation and trade-liberalisation have ‘duly’ been enforced 
among applicants by the IMF and the World Bank9, following Baker’s statement that 
“Adjustment programs must be agreed before additional funds are made available, and should 
                                                          
7 Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., and Toye, J., Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending – 
Volume 1, Analysis and Policy Proposals, Routledge, London, 1991. Pg. 38 
8 Sharma, P., ‘Bureaucratic Imperatives and Policy Outcomes: the Origins of World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Lending’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol.20, No. 4, 2013. Pg.670 
9 Williamson, J., What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in Williamson, J. (ed), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much has Happened?, Institute for International Economics, U.S., 1990. 
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be implemented as those funds are disbursed.”10 Reproducing this analysis depicts structural 
adjustment as a simple tool of neoliberal power, an off-the-shelf technical fix for market 
failures caused by the bad policy of ignorant Southern bureaucrats and corrupt politicians. 
In sum, by beginning their account of the role of the Bank in neoliberal governance 
with the Washington Consensus, critical accounts make significant assumptions about the 
capacity of the Bank to straightforwardly enact US strategies. This naturalises the conflation of 
the practice of structural adjustment and neoliberal governance, denying their distinctiveness 
and erasing the historicity of the processes through which they became intertwined. 
My central claim in response to this is that the Bank has never been a passive recipient 
of American hegemonic agendas. I articulate this argument at two levels of analysis. Firstly, I 
draw upon Constructivist accounts in arguing that the agency of management was crucial in 
creating an organisational structure which allowed the Bank to meet the imperatives 
associated with the development of its operations. The process of developing a viable 
organisational structure allowed management to carve out a proprietary terrain in which their 
agency is decisive in constructing the tools and strategies of governance. However, I move 
beyond the Constructivist tendency to de-contextualise managerial agency, by arguing that the 
strategic choices management make are socially anchored in the imperatives of American 
financial capital. 
Secondly, I argue that the social basis of the Bank in private American finance means 
its imperatives as an institution are to secure and promote its access to the uniquely deeply 
capitalised American financial system. The relationship between the Bank and the US is 
defined by its continuing reliance on American capital markets. In pursuing this institutional 
imperative, the Bank’s agenda has become increasingly closely intertwined with that of the US. 
However, the basis of its operations in private financial capital sets the parameters of its 
capacity to act. Financial imperatives mediate the Bank’s relationship to American agendas. 
By focusing on the specifically American financial imperatives which set the 
parameters of management’s capacity to act in pursuit of American agendas, we are able to 
locate the Bank in its specific social context. This is important in that it helps us to decentre the 
US state from the historical narrative by emphasising how the agency of the Bank emerges 
through the pragmatic negotiation of institutional imperatives arising from its social anchoring 
in American private finance. This helps to break the causal linkage between US power and 
Bank practices.  It is perhaps counter-intuitive that the imperatives shaping the development 
of structural adjustment should be, in broad terms, the same as those which demanded that 
                                                          
10 Address of James A. Baker, III, US Governor of the Bank and Fund, in IBRD, IFC, IDA, 1985 Annual 
Meetings of the Boards of Governors Summary Proceedings, Washington, January 1986. Pg.208 
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the Bank adopt an approach of lending for specific productive projects in the course of the 
1950s. However, this is an extremely important observation for our understanding of the 
origins of structural adjustment as it helps us to take an important step in disaggregating it 
from the Washington Consensus as an artefact of US power.  
I will open my exploration of these themes with a review of contemporary literature 
on the role of the World Bank in global governance in Chapter 1. The most important currents 
in writing on the Bank appear to offer dramatically different readings of the nature of the 
Bank. For authors in what I term the ‘Wall Street – Treasury Nexus’ approach, a material 
assessment of the political and economic field of social forces in which the Bank operates 
offers the conclusion that the Bank should be considered no less than a part of the 
infrastructure of the American state. Counterposed to this, writers in the ‘Relative Autonomy’ 
tradition consider that while the location of the Bank in this field of social forces must be 
acknowledged, the agenda of the institution is defined by the intellectual and professional 
norms into which its management is socialised to a greater extent than external factors. 
However, paradigm change within the Bank relies upon political-economic paradigm change in 
the US, and American dominance of recruitment into key managerial positions. Both these 
approaches tend to rely upon the coercive power of the US in explaining the change in the 
Bank across the post-war era, and retain the tendency of the Washington Consensus narrative 
to locate the origins of structural adjustment in the neoliberal politics of the US. 
To begin to uncover the agency of the Bank I will take a longer historical view. By 
exploring four critical moments from the 1920s to the 1980s, I will trace the impact of 
American financial imperatives on the Bank’s structure, practices of management, and 
processes of lending. I begin, in Chapter 2, with an exploration of the way in which the Bank 
has been located in a Polanyian narrative of ‘disembedding’ and ‘embedding’ the power of 
finance in the real economy, after J.G. Ruggie and Eric Helleiner. This is founded on a reading 
of the era of the Bretton Woods conference as one in which the Bank was a force for the 
‘embedding’ of financial power in social purpose: the internationalisation of America’s New 
Deal. Yet, as I will show, finance played a much greater role in the pre-history of the Bank: 
important aspects of the Bank as conceived at Bretton Woods were inherited from the private 
financial planners of the international conferences of the 1920s. More importantly, the anti-
financier rhetoric of the New Deal was highly specific. Finance was uniquely socially important 
in the US, and financiers were an extremely important part of the coalition upon which New 
Deal social policies and multilateral internationalism were founded. As a result, financiers were 
supportive of the Bank and were able to extract important changes to the Bretton Woods Act. 
On the basis of these necessary changes, the Bank as it was eventually founded was the central 
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agent of international liquidity provision prior to the Marshall Plan – and was intended to 
function to restore the international capital market as a profitable arena for investment. This 
suggests that the transition to neoliberal governance in the 1980s was not a new departure for 
the Bank, in terms of its organic relation to private American finance. 
The importance of the social anchoring of the Bank in the infrastructure of American 
private finance would, as I show in Chapter 3, rapidly become apparent as the institution 
attempted to begin lending operations. During its first eighteen months, it faced a series of 
challenges which confirmed the central importance of financial considerations. By 1948 it was 
managed differently, capitalised differently, and lent differently than had been imagined. 
Accounts of the period speak of a financiers’ ‘coup’, or argue that the most important feature 
of the changes to the institution are derived from an internal ‘battle of ideas’, on the basis of 
the autonomy from member states afforded by its basis in private capital. However, I will show 
that the imperatives of the financial community in which the Bank’s agency was situated 
framed the parameters of management action in crucial ways. The inconvertibility of European 
currencies meant that the Bank had very limited funds to operate with: it would have to 
borrow. If it were to borrow, it would have to issue bonds. For Bank bonds to be attractive to 
investors, they would have to be backing loans made by the Bank itself – not the guarantees of 
private financial operations which had originally been planned. Finally, it would have to 
convince investors that it would lend for economic, rather than ‘political’ reasons. This entailed 
transforming the way the Bank was run – ousting the Executive Directors from the quotidian 
operation of the institution and asserting management control. In order to facilitate this and 
expand operations in support of Truman’s ‘Point Four’ agenda, the US accepted the 
appointment of a management team of Wall Street lawyers and bankers. To illustrate the 
struggles over these issues between management and Executive Directors, I will provide a case 
study of the Chilean loan application over which these battles were fought. The 
transformations wrought by management in the period 1946-8 reflect the limitations placed 
on the Bank’s capacity to act in support of the US agenda. They were the consequence of 
rooting the Bank in the infrastructure of American finance. 
In Chapter 4, I will explore what this means for our understanding of the longer 
Bretton Woods period from 1948-68 – a period conventionally understood as the ‘turn to 
development’. The Bank was further transformed through the reorganisation of 1952, the 
diversification of the Bank’s investor base, and the foundation of the IFC and IDA. Writing on 
this period tends to argue that in spite of the Wall Street ‘coup’ under McCloy, management 
adopted project-oriented lending model in order to pursue US ‘Point Four’ objectives. In 
response, Jeffrey Chwieroth has argued this change was not directed by the US or external 
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financial interests, but emerged internally. It was, he argues, driven by the recruitment of elite 
individuals socialised into commercial managerial practices which they lobbied to reproduce in 
the Bank. Yet I will show that the specific transformations made by management were not, as 
Chwieroth argues, only one possible choice. They reflect the Bank’s perennial imperative of 
securing and increasing access to investment in private international capital markets. 
Stretched by the Point Four programme, and pressure for more concessional lending through 
the UN from the South, the Bank had to find ways to meet these demands without damaging 
its creditworthiness. I will show that the ‘turn to development’ was not a voluntarist move – as 
a phenomenon, it was contingent upon the achievement of the Bank’s institutional objectives. 
The technology of governance of this era – the project model – was shaped by management’s 
pragmatic engagement with the imperatives of financiers in solving the Bank’s on-going crisis 
of capitalisation. This is important for our understanding of the Washington Consensus, as it 
shows that there was no easy consonance between ‘embedded liberalism’ and ‘development’.  
In Chapter 5, I will explore the origins of structural adjustment in Bank management’s 
response to a new contradiction emerging from the rapid expansion of the Eurocurrency 
market. By 1968, the Bank was faced with a new crisis: its clients were able to access the 
Eurodollar markets, and bypass the conditions attached to project loans. It was more liquid 
than ever, but struggling to lend.This period is often considered the Bank’s most progressive 
moment, as it engaged with international organisations such as the ILO and reconceptualised 
its interventions to target the rural poor through a massive new lending programme. The new 
agenda is associated with McNamara’s dynamic – if flawed - personality, and deep moral 
engagement with development. The shift from these practices to structural adjustment is 
portrayed as the outcome of larger external forces acting on the Bank in ways beyond its 
control, and the imposition of a neoliberal agenda on the Bank by the US. In response to these 
currents, Sharma has argued that the shift was driven by internal bureaucratic processes. As 
the debt profile of low-income borrowers worsened across the 1970s, it became more difficult 
to find projects which could be considered viable investments – and the Bank’s ability to lend 
was again restricted. Structural adjustment was a solution to this disbursement problem, 
driven by the imperative to maintain the organisation’s position in the governance of the 
international political economy. However, I argue that the specific nature of the changes was 
shaped more profoundly by the necessity to re-enlist financiers in expanding the lending 
programme than internal bureaucratic imperatives. As I will show, convincing financiers of the 
soundness of pro-poor lending saw Bank management take two major steps in the direction of 
structural adjustment lending in the 1970s. Firstly, the Bank was reorganised on the basis of 
cutting-edge American managerial techniques of systems analysis which McNamara had 
10 
 
 
encountered at the Pentagon and facilitated the generation of quantitative data. This was 
allied to the basis of the new approach to development in positive mathematical modelling, in 
order to illustrate that it was based upon sound economic principles. The second was the 
rehabilitation of programme lending, in order to provide the Bank with greater leverage over 
the broad macroeconomic policy environment in which its interventions would take place.  
By taking this longer view, I show that the Bank was an important agent in the 
construction of the international regime of governance in the post-war period, in its own right. 
Because the Bank was socially anchored in the infrastructure of American finance, the agency 
of both management in the pursuit of the Bank’s institutional imperatives and the objectives 
of the US, was mediated by the imperatives of US finance. Accordingly, American managerial 
techniques were of particular importance to the Bank, in translating the US agenda to 
financiers and making the Bank’s activities legible in commercial terms. It is from the agency of 
Bank management that the specific form of the tools and practices of governance emerge, not 
the ideology or power of its most important donor.  
  
11 
 
 
Chapter 1: It’s the Washington Consensus, Stupid. 
 
As I have suggested in the introduction, more than three decades on from the 1982 
debt crisis, writing on the role of the World Bank in global governance still frames the 
institution in terms of its relationship to the Washington Consensus. From the Baker Plan 
onwards, the nature of the Bank is seen to have been transformed from a relatively benign 
‘development’-oriented institution lending for ‘basic needs’ under McNamara; to a dogmatic 
adjunct of the US Treasury policing the extension of free-market capitalism for the benefit of 
American finance and business. As in the Bank, so in the South: since they were formulated in 
1990, Williamson’s ten policy guidelines have been reified to the extent that political 
transitions in the global south are frequently depicted as the ‘adoption’ of the Washington 
Consensus, as an externally imposed off-the-shelf package in which neither the agency of 
international financial institutions nor subaltern groups have any meaning. 
 In this review I will explore how the continuing deployment of this analytical frame for 
understanding the Bank’s role in global governance casts the contemporary nature of the 
institution – and the nature of the contemporary neoliberal order more broadly - in the mould 
of the political struggles of the 1980s. The notion of the Washington Consensus as the origin of 
the neoliberal era of governance has functioned as an analytically obstructive cipher for the 
nature of the role played by the Bank (and Fund) in the process of the construction of this 
international order. As I shall show, even the most sober reviews largely concur: the policy of 
the Bank largely reflects the strategy of the US. The Bank is persistently constructed as the 
passive object of US state strategy, of the historic Bretton Woods-era objective of ‘embedding’ 
finance in national economies and the contemporary objective of ‘disembedding’ it again. The 
power of the US state and private finance is coercively extended through the Bank. 
Accordingly, the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ is depicted as a rhetorical shell for American 
power, in pursuit of the same objectives, acting on the Bank in the same direct way. It’s still 
the Washington Consensus, stupid. 
One of the most important features of this account is the conception that the US 
oversaw the institutional capture of the Bank by neoliberal economists, drawn from an elite 
pool of Ivy League scholars or Wall Street financiers. The Reagan administration is credited 
with having initiated and successfully overseen a transition which has been global in scope, 
and a runaway strategic success. The outcomes of the crisis are equated with the success of an 
ideological project, and the adoption of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the Bank under Clausen 
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and Ann Krueger entailed a radical US-enforced change from the McNamara and Chenery 
regime. 
Defining the nature of the neoliberal international order by juxtaposing it with the 
Bretton Woods regime directs the critical gaze away from important continuities, particularly 
in the policy and practices of the Bank. The basis of structural adjustment in crisis and the 
convenient bundling of the actors involved in its development in a notional ‘Washington’ has 
obviated the need to scrutinise the specific processes which have led it to become a central 
feature of neoliberal governance beyond the observation of more-or-less contingent material 
events. Following from this, the endurance of the hegemony of neoliberal interests is 
frequently explained simply by reference to the power of ‘Washington’, with varying emphasis 
on its ideational or real components. 
I hope, by reassessing this narrative, to contribute to an understanding of the historical 
development of the agency of the Bank in neoliberal governance which is capable of moving 
beyond the obstructive reification of the Washington Consensus as a diktat from the imperial 
heartland imposed upon passive recipients, and its origins in the crisis of the Bretton Woods 
regime. Rather, the roots of neoliberal governance are to be found in the mediation of the US’ 
hegemonic agenda by financial imperatives throughout the Bretton Woods era and its 
successor. 
I will begin this review by illustrating the way in which the persistence of the 
Washington Consensus as a frame for the analysis of the neoliberal regime of governance cuts 
across contemporary Liberal, Neo-Gramscian, and Constructivist political economy. The 
continued deployment of this signifier for the nature of the contemporary regime is the 
consequence of the enduring tendency of these traditions to depict the institutions of global 
economic governance as the passive objects of US state strategy, and to neglect the way in 
which the Bank is anchored in specifically American financial relations. More generally, 
neoliberalism is often conceived of as a disempowering technology of governance which swept 
away the practices of the Bretton Woods era. 
The broad thrust of this narrative can be captured by considering its two most salient 
features. Firstly, the advent of neoliberalism in the Bank is consistently represented as the 
result of the power of the American state following from a sudden epochal political change 
occasioned by international crisis. By exaggerating the break between the two eras, critical 
accounts tend to turn to the external power of the US to explain the turn to neoliberal 
governance in the Bank. As an extension of their accession to state power in the US and UK, 
neoliberal economists effected institutional capture of the Bank. Secondly, the Bank’s policies 
of conditionality in offering balance of payments financing in exchange for ‘structural 
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adjustment’ are the specific signifier of governance in the neoliberal age; as the primary tool 
through which the objectives of the US state and financial capital are pursued. These policies, 
which temporally correspond to the Kuhnian paradigmatic shift in political economy and the 
attainment of political power by the Right in the US and UK as described in this literature; are 
considered to be the direct outcome of the neoliberal capture of the state and the 
international financial institutions.  
Underpinning this common functionalist narrative, as I shall show in the second and 
third sections of this review, are two apparently divergent conceptions of the Bank.  I turn first 
to what I term the ‘Wall Street – Treasury nexus’, in which the Bank is an essentially passive 
recipient of American objectives. The most prominent exponents of this tradition of writing 
about the Bank are Robert Wade and Richard Peet. The analytical centre of their interventions 
is the intellectual hegemony of the US. Here, the Bank’s strategy is a reflection of the dominant 
political paradigm at a particular juncture – or, where necessary, the hard power of the US 
Treasury. This is the objective of these accounts, to illustrate that the hegemony of the US 
remains the determinant of the nature and practices of global neoliberal governance. 
In the third section, I explore the ‘relative autonomy’ tradition, which proffers a 
narrative of change which is rooted in the agency of the management and staff of the 
institution mediated by epistemic change in the elite academic community. The most 
important interventions in this tradition have been made by Constructivist authors Jeffrey 
Chwieroth and Patrick Sharma. Their writings focus upon the internal culture and bureaucratic 
imperatives of the Bank as an institution possessed of autonomy from the direct domination of 
its largest donors by virtue of its basis in private finance. These works make important 
contributions in decentring the US state from the analysis, and illustrating the historicity of the 
agency of Bank management. Ultimately, I will show that they rely upon the same narrow 
social anchoring of the Bank in elite scholarly and commercial networks as the ‘Wall Street 
Treasury nexus’ accounts, and provide an account of change on a largely voluntarist basis. 
Yet in both traditions, the transition to neoliberalism is the result of the power of the 
American state, expressed in the ideational consonance of Bank management and state 
managers, or in the domination of the Bank by neoliberals opportunistically manipulating the 
crisis of the Bretton Woods system. In this respect, they adopt the central failing of the 
Washington Consensus narrative – beginning with the hegemonic ideology of the US. The 
outcome of this is that for all that they emphasise the processes of socialisation and change 
internal to the institution, they erase the agency of the Bank from their account of the 
historical development of practices of global governance. 
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In the fourth section, I will argue that in order to provide a satisfactory account of the 
origins of structural adjustment, it is essential to recognise the agency of Bank management. I 
show that in order to make space for this in our account, we must locate the material basis of 
the imperatives which shape the parameters within which their actions take place. To do this, I 
take a longer historical account, drawing on the work of Martijn Konings, Hannes Lacher, and 
Leo Panitch.  
By showing that the institutional imperatives of the Bank and the complex of social 
power relations in which it is situated are mutually constitutive of the changing regimes of 
global governance, I hope to contribute to an understanding of the political economy of the 
Bretton Woods order and its successor which is capable of demonstrating how the agency of 
the Bank is anchored in the everyday life of the societies it aims to support, create, and police.  
 
1: A Paradigm with Nine Lives? 
The most striking feature of writing about the Bank’s role in neoliberal governance is 
the tendency to view it through the prism of the Washington Consensus. As far as the 
international financial institutions are concerned, the use of the term denotes the practice of 
structural adjustment which officially commenced in 1980. As I shall show, understanding the 
relationship between structural adjustment lending and the Washington Consensus in this way 
is actually quite problematic. Two distinct phenomena - an ex-post attempt during the 1990s 
to encapsulate the zeitgeist of 1980s neoliberal political economy, and Republican foreign 
economic policy responses to the crisis of the Bretton Woods system – have been 
uncomfortably conflated. The tendency to bundle structural adjustment along with the 
‘Washington Consensus’ and deploy these terms as interchangeable synonyms for 
‘neoliberalism’ is problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, it privileges the imperatives which mobilised the Washington Consensus – 
those of the US state – and obscures those which gave rise to the development of the practice 
of conditional programme lending in the 1970s, by assuming they are the same.  The tendency 
to deploy the terms interchangeably as a cipher for neoliberalism more broadly means that 
Williamson’s mis-appropriation of the practice of structural adjustment in the name of 
neoliberal Republican foreign economic policy is reproduced in critical accounts.  
Secondly, this implies a neat elision of neoliberal political economy and the agenda of 
the US state in spite of the tenuous basis of the policies the ‘Washington Consensus’ describes 
in neoliberal economic theory. This has been acknowledged as a political rather than academic 
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paradigm shift (as I shall discuss below), yet this insight is not followed through: structural 
adjustment lending is depicted as the sine qua non of neoliberalism.  
In sum, this account’s mis-appropriation of structural adjustment as the heart of the 
‘Washington Consensus’ lends currency to an understanding of the Bank agenda which 
suggests that it is dictated by the hard power of the US state, and reflects the epochal 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods era. Structural adjustment is seen to reflect a new paradigm 
expressing the exercise of US power over the international financial institutions following the 
last convulsion of the old order in the debt crisis of 1982. As the neoliberal paradigm has not 
been dislodged by the financial crisis of 2008, critical accounts of the Bank’s role in the 
governance of the contemporary order persistently return to the Washington Consensus as 
the frame in which the Bank is situated.  
In this section I will illustrate how these accounts depict structural adjustment as a 
feature of the US response to the crisis of Bretton Woods, and persistently frame the Bank’s 
role in the governance of the contemporary order in terms of the Washington Consensus. I 
argue that in so doing, they fail to account for the agency of the Bank in the construction and 
governance of the contemporary international order. 
In her 2013 article in the Review of International Political Economy, Sarah Babb 
observes both of these problems. Firstly, she points out that “None of the theories in vogue at 
the time – the rational expectations theory, public choice theory and so on – had anything to 
say about mobilizing international organizations to promote policy reforms”11, and that 
Republicans were fond of citing laissez faire principles to argue that the Bank and the Fund 
ought to be scrapped. Secondly, she observes the central tension in the deployment of the 
term ‘Washington Consensus’ as a cipher for structural adjustment as a neoliberal reform: 
“...the term ‘Washington Consensus’ was originally coined to help make sense of the IFIs 
practice of conditionality...”12  
Perhaps the most important contribution Babb offers is to shift the focus of our 
understanding of the development of the Washington Consensus to the Bank as the most 
salient agency in the operationalisation of the paradigm. Although the Bank’s practice of 
structural adjustment is familiar, the deployment of this practice as a core disciplinary element 
of the Washington Consensus is more usually associated with the IMF. This, however, is 
problematic, she argues. While the IMF lent for policy reform, it did so only in the fields of 
fiscal and monetary policy. The Bank, as she points out, had experience of the application of 
                                                          
11 Babb, S., ‘The Washington Consensus as Transnational Policy Paradigm: its Origins, Trajectory and 
Likely Successor’, Review of International Political Economy, 20:2, 2013. Pg.276-277 
12Ibid. Pg. 274 
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much wider conditionality – which made it the perfect vehicle for Baker’s objective in 
enforcing financial discipline to safeguard the international banking system.13 
Babb makes an important contribution in observing both the problem of the conflation 
of structural adjustment lending with the Washington Consensus, and the proper locus of the 
practice of structural adjustment in the Bank, rather than the Fund. Yet by focusing solely on 
the Baker plan’s intention to manage the crisis by using conditional loans she does not move 
beyond the tropes of the contemporary critical literature on the Bank. 
Firstly, having acknowledged that the Washington Consensus was an appropriation of 
existing practices of structural adjustment, Babb nonetheless reproduces it. Secondly, 
structural adjustment appears as a novel invention of the US strategic ‘neoliberal’ response to 
the epochal crisis of the post-war order of embedded liberalism. This aspect of Babb’s account 
echoes the contributions of political economists from across the spectrum of epistemology and 
political commitment – notably in the work of neo-Listian political economists Chang and 
Grabel14; neo-Keynesian ex-Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz,15 and orthodox Marxist Paul 
Cammack.16 
For Babb, the Bank is still the vehicle for the US government’s hegemonic project – the 
transformation of neoliberal political economy into a functional transnational policy paradigm 
through structural adjustment. The policy response of conservative political forces in the US 
and UK to the inflationary crisis of the 1970s and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s 
was to facilitate the institutional capture of the Bank by market-oriented neoliberal political 
economy.17 “...as a vehicle to promote ‘growth enhancing’ policy reforms, including ‘the 
privatisation of burdensome and inefficient public enterprises, the liberalisation of domestic 
capital markets, tax reform, the creation of more favourable environments for foreign 
investment, and trade liberalisation’”.18  
This is a position Babb holds in common with a number of critical authors – for 
example, Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam; for whom the outcome of the crisis was the 
constitution of the Bank, through structural adjustment, as the “...principal conduit for the 
                                                          
13Ibid. Pg. 275 
14 Chang, H., and Grabel, I., ‘Reclaiming Development from the Washington Consensus’, in Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, vol.27, no. 2 (Winter 2004-2005). Pg.287 
15Stiglitz, J., E., ‘Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?’ in Serra, N., and Stiglitz, J.E., The 
Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008.  Pg.43 
16 Cammack, P., 2002. Pg. 126 
17 Babb, S., 2013. Pg. 276 
18 Baker’s testimony in US House, 1986, pg.595-6, cited in Babb, S., 2013. Pg.275 
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transmission of neo-liberal ideas to developing countries”.19 Likewise for Fine, Bayliss and van 
Waeyenberge; the debt crisis was the terminal convulsion of the Bretton Woods order, and 
the point at which neoliberal perspectives: 
“...replaced a short-lived focus on poverty reduction that had emerged during the 
1970s and had been combined with a generally favourable appraisal of the need 
for the state to intervene to promote development.”20 
In these accounts, exemplified by van Waeyenberge in the same volume, US power is 
the determining factor in the shift from poverty reduction to structural adjustment. The 
transition followed from the political hostility to aid spending among neoliberal 
administrations elected in OECD countries in the context of the crisis of the Bretton Woods 
regime. The dominance of this ideology is epitomised by the appointment of Anne Krueger as 
chief economist, and the publication of the Berg Report as a pointed critique of the ‘over-
extension’ of the state, reflecting US distaste for the ‘welfare spending’ of the McNamara 
years. The oil price and interest rate rises increased the need for aid, while the latter increased 
donor hostility to aid. During this period the Bank adopted a ‘monoeconomics’ which 
reasserted the economic rationality of all agents and advocated structural adjustment in order 
to allow the primacy of the price system and the incentives of private ownership to overcome 
the distortions created by governmental interventions. The neoliberal discourse of the Bank in 
the 1980s “...easily lent itself to ideological affiliation with the right wing leadership of core 
shareholders in the Bank...”21  
The radical transformation of the Bank from the McNamara regime to the Clausen era 
is a theme which is also expressed by Ben Fine and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, who, like van 
Waeyenberge, cast the neoliberal era as a major intellectual and ideological break with its 
roots in the crisis precipitated by the oil price and interest rate increase: “The McNamara-
Chenery era of the World Bank – of ‘growth with redistribution’, meeting ‘basic needs’ and 
development finance – was set aside by Anne Krueger’s efforts to roll back the state...such 
policy perspectives had their intellectual counterpart in seeking to ‘rubbish’ a caricatured 
                                                          
19 Beeson, M., and Islam, I., ‘Neo-liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus’, in 
Journal of Development Studies, 41:2, 2005. Pg.198-201 
20 Van Waeyenberge, E., Fine, B., and Bayliss, K., ‘The World Bank, Neoliberalism, and Development 
Research’, in Bayliss, K., Fine, B., and van Waeyenberge, E., The Political Economy of Development: the 
World Bank, Neoliberalism, and Development Research, Pluto Press, London, 2011. 
21 Van Waeyenberge, E., ‘From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: Illusions of Development’, in 
Fine, B., and Jomo, K.S., The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus, Zed Books, 
London, 2006. Pg.24 
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development economics, not least by appointing ideologue Deepak Lal as head of research at 
the World Bank.”22 
Fine and Jomo argue that appointments such as these were not, however, only the 
reflection of a Kuhnian paradigm-change in economics. They were active political efforts by the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations to undermine the UN system by focusing on the Bank, 
and implant academically respected ideologues to offer intellectual currency to the structural 
adjustment concept. They conclude that dominating the Bank in this way is a recurring feature 
of the hard-power dynamics of the institution’s relationship with the US, a position they 
support by pointing to the way Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers ‘forced’ Stiglitz to resign 
following his ‘modest retreat’ from the Washington Consensus. 
By continually emphasising the persistence of the hard power of the US in dictating the 
agenda of the Bank, these accounts foster the persistence of the Washington Consensus as a 
frame for understanding the Bank’s role in contemporary governance.  
Colin Crouch has been the latest to note that the return to growth and stability appears 
not to have disturbed the socio-economic compact by reformulating the regime of 
accumulation in a meaningful way.23 Governmental responses to the most recent crisis of 
global capitalism have not displaced the neoliberal paradigm. Crouch’s conclusion chimes with 
Babb’s observation that the objectives and the instruments of both national governments and 
the international financial institutions have not changed to an extent that would suggest the 
development of a new paradigm, and that therefore “...the Washington Consensus lives on.”24 
Ben Fine has argued that the McNamara-era emphasis on modernisation and 
industrialisation has not been restored, in spite of the intense criticism the extreme nature of 
the neoliberal project expressed by the Washington Consensus. In fact,  
“...the newer development economics, in the form of the post-Washington 
Consensus, looks much more like the Washington Consensus than the old 
development economics that [it] sought to displace. This is especially so within 
the World Bank...”25   
Likewise Ha-Joon Chang and Irene Grabel : 
“...this updated Washington Consensus...seeks to save the core tenets of the 
original program from embarrassment and refutation by modifying a few of its 
                                                          
22 Fine, B., and Jomo, K.S., ‘Preface’ in Jomo, K.S., and Fine, B., (eds) The New Development Economics: 
After the Washington Consensus, Zed Books, London 2006.  Pg.viii 
23 Crouch, C., The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, Polity, Malden MA, 2011. 
24 Babb, S., 2013. Pg.285 
25 Fine, B., ‘The New Development Economics’, in Jomo, K.S., and Fine, B., (eds) The New Development 
Economics: After the Washington Consensus, Zed Books, London 2006. Pg.2 
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less central policy prescriptions...Indeed, the new thinking reaffirms and even 
extends the neoliberal character of the original...”26  
The contemporary consensus embodies the core of the old. Therefore, the political 
economy of the Bank is thus seen to be rooted in the politics of the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. This period is widely seen to have been one in which a radical break took place 
from Keynesianism to neoliberalism – the crisis of the Keynesian economic paradigm being 
reflected in a political realignment across the OECD and by extension, in the Bank. 
 This view relies on an historical perspective which considers the transition to 
structural adjustment not only to be a radical break from the Bank’s previous agenda, but 
which depends on the presentation of the McNamara era as the most progressive in the 
history of the Bank.  
Yet there is little reference in Fine, Jomo, and van Waeyenberge’s work to the nature 
of the Bank’s role in governance and its relation to the US during this or any earlier period. 
Instead, there is an assumed consonance between the intellectual paradigm of development 
economics and the political paradigm of corporatism – though the mechanism for the 
transmission and maintenance of this consonance is only expressed in terms of the fact that 
McNamara was an American, appointed by President Johnson after his chastening experience 
at the Pentagon. The basis for this is John Toye’s observation that the ‘old development 
economics’ consisted in modernisation theory’s roots in Keynesianism, which provided the 
intellectual underpinning for the Bank’s support for state intervention in the transition from 
peasant agricultural to industrial capitalist society, in the footsteps – according to Rostow – of 
the West. As Toye has it  the prevailing academic paradigm was one in which ‘development’ 
was constituted by “...moving from traditional society...the polar opposite of the modern type, 
through a series of stages of development – derived essentially from the history of Europe, 
North America and Japan – to modernity, that is, approximately the United States of the 
1950s.”27  McNamara’s pursuit of public intervention to this end followed this idea. It is implied 
that he was given the freedom to pursue this end because it happened to express US interests. 
Understanding the transition to neoliberalism as the expression of American political 
domination of the Bank with the goal of intellectually underpinning strategic interests served 
by the policy of structural adjustment; is a consequence of understanding the preceding era as 
an era of ‘embedded liberalism’, and theorising the transition as the outcome of a coherent 
project of global scope. As Harrison has suggested, such accounts evidence a tendency to take 
                                                          
26 Chang, H., and Grabel, I., 2004. Pg.275 
27 Toye, J., Dilemmas of Development,( 2nd edition), Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Pg.30-31, cited in Fine, B., 
‘The New Development Economics’ in Fine, B., and Jomo, K.S., (eds) The New Development Economics: 
After the Washington Consensus, Zed Books, London 2006.  Pg. 5 
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a deterministic view of the transition to neoliberal governance – and in so doing, obscure the 
crucial agency of the management of the Bank.  Further, in using the Washington Consensus as 
an explanator of change in its own right, these accounts display a tendency to “...make an 
agent out of a concept.”28 
I will argue that the Bank’s capacity to support the US hegemonic agenda was 
mediated from the very outset by financial imperatives. Negotiating a way in which these 
could be met shaped the strategies of successive Bank management teams, and defined the 
way in which they related to the objectives of US hegemony. By de-centreing the power of the 
US state from analysis of the Bank’s role in governance and taking a longer historical view of 
the roots of the specific practices of neoliberal governance, I will illustrate the importance of 
the pragmatic engagement of Bank management with often complementary, sometimes 
contradictory imperatives of American finance and the US state in shaping the tools and 
practices through which the international order is governed. The agency of the Bank, and the 
character of the international order is deeply rooted in specifically American financial 
infrastructure and managerial practices and not defined solely by the imperatives of the state 
or the ideological character of incumbent administrations. 
In the following two sections I will illustrate the problems which follow from the way in 
which US power is approached in contemporary writing about the Bank in neoliberal 
governance. These approaches can be situated along a continuum between two poles: the 
‘Wall Street-Treasury Nexus’, and ‘relative autonomy’. In emphasising the importance of the 
crisis, institutional capture, and US power; and perhaps most importantly in conceptualising 
the neoliberal alliance of state and financial power as a novel political constellation which the 
Bank couldn’t resist – the transition is not theorised in a way that reveals the agency of the 
Bank, nor the way in which it is rooted in specifically American social relations of financial 
power and managerial practices.  
 
2: The Wall Street – Treasury Nexus 
 As the insider critique of the Washington Consensus built to a crescendo in the later 
1990s against the backdrop of the Asian and Russian financial crises, one of the most insightful 
responses to the calls made by Stiglitz and Rodrik et al for the articulation of a ‘post-
Washington Consensus’ came from another Bank insider. Former staff member Robert Wade 
published a series of articles which argued that whatever the nature of the development 
                                                          
28 Harrison, G., Neoliberal Africa: the Impact of Global Social Engineering, Zed Books, London, 2010. 
Pg.27-8 
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economics which animated the analyses informing Bank project and programme interventions, 
the future of the Bank and its role in global governance would likely display a remarkable 
continuity. The institution would continue to function as an instrument of American 
hegemony, promoting free trade and capital movement in the face of evidence of the positive 
role of states in development, on the basis of US interests.29 
Wade’s earliest intervention was animated by the limitations of both neorealist and 
institutionalist theorising of the endurance of a liberal international trading and financial order 
centred on the Bretton Woods institutions beyond the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
The state had declined in relation to ‘the market’, and the international order was no longer 
seen to be predicated on the stability of US hegemony. These debates, largely in the pages of 
International Organization, tended to emphasise the autonomy conferred upon international 
organisations due to the power of rules in bureaucratic structures, and the way in which this 
gave the regime a life of its own beyond the causal factors of its foundation.  
Wade’s objective in relation to these contributions from Keohane and Nye, Krasner, 
and Ruggie; was to offer an assessment of the “...political and economic substance of the field 
of forces in which the Bank operates”30 as the basis of a reconsideration of their claims for the 
autonomy of international organisations. Not only did the US directly intervene, but its 
capability to dominate the Bank’s authorising environment enabled the American state to 
treat the Bank as part of its external infrastructural power in the post-cold war context. This 
was manifest in the Bank’s ability to absorb a Japanese challenge to core ideas about the role 
of the state in development and shift the institution out of directly productive activities - away 
from developmental strategies likely to promote potential competitors to US capital or 
goods31. Claims to autonomy, Wade finds, are questionable at best. 
From 1998, Wade took the insight from his Japanese case study a step further, and 
drew on free-trade advocate Jagdish Bhagwati’s conceptualisation of the international 
financial institutions as components of a ‘power elite’: “...a definite networking of like-minded 
luminaries among the powerful institutions – Wall Street, the Treasury Department, the State 
Department, the IMF and the World Bank most prominent among them.”32 For Bhagwati, this 
                                                          
29 A perspective expressed with particular clarity in ‘Wade, R., ‘Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of 
Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective’, in New Left Review, 1/217, May-
June 1996; and Wade, R. H., ‘US Hegemony and the World Bank: the Fight over People and Ideas’, in 
Review of International Political Economy, 9:2, Summer 2002. 
30 Wade, R., 1996. Pg.3-4 
31 Wade, R ‘The US Role in the Malaise at the World Bank: Get Up Gulliver’, paper presented at the 
meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001. Pg. 16 
32 Bhagwati, J., ‘The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars’, in Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.77, No.3. 1998.  Pg.11 
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powerful network was composed of ideologues who equated global interests with their own, 
and deployed their power of office to force the international institutions and their members to 
endorse the goal of free global capital mobility.   
Although Bhagwati’s formula is slightly extended to a ‘Wall Street – Treasury – IMF’ 
complex, the Bank is included in this network. Its elite-educated Wall Street-oriented agents 
are depicted as seeking to promote free mobility of capital and goods in the global economy to 
the detriment of alternative forms of capitalism and alternative approaches to development 
beyond that currently hegemonic in the US33. For Wade, the US faces a dilemma: on one hand, 
it needs the international institutions to push its Washington Consensus agenda – while on the 
other it needs the appearance of multilateralism.34  Drawing on the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony, Wade argues that the US exercises intellectual and moral leadership through the 
Bank by promoting the belief that free market capitalism is beneficial to all, and that the 
procedures and processes of governance are applied to it too. Perhaps more significantly, US 
ideology in respect of the role of governments and markets constitutes the “conceptual centre 
of gravity of Bank thinking”35. Since a majority of Bank economists hold post-graduate 
qualifications from US universities, the Bank is located in Washington in close proximity to the 
organs of the US government and US think-tanks, and staff consume American print or TV 
media: “American premises structure the very mindset with which most Bank staff approach 
development”.36 
 The great strength of this approach is its ability to incorporate multiple factors in and 
features of US power: the hard power to withhold funding, covert power to dismiss prominent 
dissenters, and the soft power in the discourse of free-market capitalism. Wade’s experiences 
as a Bank staffer have given him special insight into its processes of management and the 
nature of international relationships, and he is at pains to explore the extent of independence 
of the Bank in the context of the Stiglitz/Summers/Wolfensohn drama.  For example, he argues 
that “the US Treasury does not always get the Bank to do what it wants [...] the Bank may do 
and say what the Treasury wants for reasons beyond the fact that the Treasury wants it.” 
However, at the same time he concedes that “you do not get to be a Bank economist without 
having demonstrated your commitment to the presumptions of neoliberalism and to the 
analytical techniques of Anglo-American economics”, and that staff can expect a negative 
                                                          
33 Veneroso, F, and Wade, R, ‘The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street – Treasury – 
IMF Complex’ in New Left Review 1/228, March-April 1998. Pg.20 
34 Wade, R.H., ‘Showdown at the World Bank’, in New Left Review, Vol. 7, Jan-Feb 2001. Pg.127 
35 Wade, R.H., 2002. Pg.218 
36 Ibid. 
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response to any anti-free market research findings37. Wade aims to demonstrate the socially 
constructed nature of Bank and IMF policy in this way, and his most significant contribution is 
arguably in his exploration of the ideational consensus-building role of the institutions through 
the strategic practice of ‘paradigm maintenance’. However, there are some important 
problems in Wade’s location of the Bank in this elite political economic relationship nexus.  
Firstly, the observations that Wade marshals to support the argument that the Bank is 
a more-or-less passive tool of American foreign economic policy relies upon a highly familiar 
roll-call of institutional features and constitutional relationships. Having included the US 
citizenship of the president, Congressional oversight of IDA replenishments, the strategic 
limitation of American intervention to ‘negative’ power to prevent the Bank acting or speaking 
against US objectives, the foremost among these remains the stocking of the institution’s 
policy formulating organs with neoliberal intellectuals as a part of the broader US response to 
the contingencies of the crisis of Bretton Woods. Secondly, the broader implications of the 
Gramscian conception of hegemony which he draws upon to illustrate the limitations of the 
Realist variant are only hinted at. While Wade’s reading of the concept allows him to 
emphasise the soft power of the US, exercised through ideational colonisation of the 
institution and the production of a commonsense, it means there is only very limited 
sociological substance to the elite nexus of policymakers of which the Bank is a pillar. This is a 
feature which Richard Peet seeks to improve upon in his 2009 survey of the institutions of 
global economic governance, Unholy Trinity.  
Wade’s works, and the extension of Bhagwati’s ‘Wall Street-Treasury’ network to the 
‘Wall Street-Treasury-IMF’ network by Wade and Veneroso, are important points of origin for 
Peet. As for Wade, the Bank is a recipient and a transmitter of American economic 
commonsense through its staff. Presenting policy to borrowers as a response to practicalities is 
the persuasive element of its role in the support of neoliberal hegemony, while the US’ 
coercive capacity to discipline by withholding support for loans lurks in the background.  
The globalisation of neoliberalism is, after Harvey, a ‘spatial fix’ to a crisis of 
accumulation manifest in the stagflation of the late corporatist era. Neoliberals, as agents of 
the global super-rich and the transnational bourgeoisie, have exploited the hard power of the 
advanced capitalist countries through the international financial institutions through the 
leverage provided by the structural indebtedness of the poor, to implement the Washington 
Consensus and restore profitability to the enterprises owned by the rich, and the dividends on 
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investments to the super-rich.38 It is above all a class project. However: “the trick lies in 
converting a politics, which represents a distinct class interest…into a practicality that appears 
to come from theory”.39 
Similarly to Wade, Peet observes that US soft power is visible beyond the IFIs in the 
central banks and treasuries of the developing world. From this basis, Peet notes that while 
the there is a strong connection between finance and the World Bank, there is a “far broader 
circle of consent than that formed in Washington, DC.”40 Capturing the nature of this circle, 
centred on Wall Street, entails the further expansion of the nexus to a ‘Washington – Wall 
Street Alliance’ of the US Treasury, the IFIs, and elite institutions such as Harvard, MIT, and 
investment banks. Including the the educational institutions in Peet’s framework is the key 
step in augmenting the structuralism of  Marxist accounts of class power, and the Gramscian 
concept of the social construction of hegemonic rationality.  
Peet’s major contribution to the literature on the Bank lies in his effort to root changes 
in Bank policy in American social relations. The transition to neoliberalism is best understood 
as a response to the fractional conflicts within the hegemonic bloc – between the common-
senses of Keynesian and neo-Classical liberalism. Drawing on Foucault, Peet argues that the 
discursive formations of elite economists are expressive of social conventions with a distinct 
class base.41 These originate with the organic intellectuals of financial capitalism, in their seats 
at elite universities, and filter via academic literature into technocratic practices. These 
practices are further influenced by phenomena arising from the contradictions in hegemonic 
ideology in material practice. This leads to transitions in executives and civil service cadres and 
ultimately results in new marching orders for the international financial institutions from the 
imperial master. 
However, very similar problems follow from this analysis. The weight of causation 
placed on relatively opportunistic implantation of neoliberal intellectuals in key positions, on 
the basis of the hard power of the American state echoes Wade very closely. Like Wade, Peet 
emphasises the Wall Street background of the Bank’s presidents – and stresses the 
commonality of their outlook with financiers. 
 Limiting the social linkages of the presidency and key management intellectuals to 
small elite networks leads to a difficulty over precisely how much agency the management has. 
In a perhaps unwelcome echo of the liberal Brookings Institution histories of the Bank, Peet 
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takes successive presidencies as turning points in the narrative of ‘development’ theory, 
leading up to the debt crisis when the Bank caved to US pressure. Woods initiated a ‘frustrated 
move away from economic growth’ into pro-poor lending; while McNamara brought a 
‘crusading energy’ to a return to a New Deal liberalism on the basis of genuine motivation to 
deal with poverty. As this initiative was also frustrated, McNamara drew on neoliberal 
intellectual currents to launch structural adjustment – and the change was sealed by US 
treasury pressure to appoint Clausen and Krueger.42 The answer, then, would appear to be 
‘very little’.  
These examples demonstrate that by limiting the social anchoring of the Bank to elite 
networks, the Bank’s strategy is framed in terms of its congruence with these narrow 
epistemic communities. Behind this, at moments of crisis, the hard power of the stands ready 
US to implement its strategic objectives through the Bank by promoting institutional capture, 
as in the cases of Clausen and Krueger. Augmenting this slender sociology by emphasising the 
political nature of ‘science’ and the class power which confers legitimacy on discursive 
formations mobilised as hegemonic common-sense does not move substantially beyond this. 
Institutional capture can only be achieved by coercive means. 
In the historical chapters I reconceptualise the social anchoring of the Bank to show 
that the turn to neoliberalism was not effected in this way, with the Bank forced by bitter 
circumstance to bargain with the financial fraction of the American bourgeoisie and accept the 
leadership of its organic intellectuals in return. Instead, I show that this relationship is deeply 
rooted in the financial infrastructure and managerial practices of American society than Wade 
and Peet’s conception of the Wall Street – Treasury nexus will allow. Most importantly, the 
role of the Bank as an agent can be seen in that it has not only drawn upon, but through its 
pursuit of specifically institutional imperatives, has enhanced this infrastructural power and 
played a key role in its global extension. By focusing more sharply upon the exact institutional 
mechanisms through which the Bank was able to make ‘pro-poor’ lending legible to bankers I 
will show that, rather than deriving from institutional capture and US-led re-orientation during 
the 1980s, the roots of structural adjustment lie in precisely the Bank’s most progressive 
moment. 
Exploring these specific mechanisms invites an engagement with the body of recent 
Constructivist literature which has sought to emphasise the importance of social processes 
within the institution, and thereby to overcome the recourse to US power as an explanator of 
change in the Bank. 
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3: ‘Relative Autonomy’ 
In recent years, some of the most insightful and challenging literature on the Bank has 
come from within the Constructivist paradigm. Jeffrey Chwieroth has shown that the Bank was 
the foremost of the two Bretton Woods institutions in the management of the new 
international monetary and financial settlement prior to the return to widespread multilateral 
convertibility. More recently still, Patrick Sharma has offered a re-appraisal of the roots of the 
structural adjustment phenomenon on the basis of its endogenous origins.  In so doing, they 
have forced a re-assessment of the coercive state-power centric analysis of the relationships 
which succour and limit the Bank. 
These contributions have been developed in relation to the broad rationalist tradition 
exemplified by the Brookings Institution histories of the Bank. Commissioned by the Bank itself 
at the twenty-fifth and fiftieth anniversaries of its foundation respectively, the tomes 
laboriously complied by Edward Mason and Richard Asher; Kapur, Lewis, and Webb; and 
Jochen Kraske and his team develop a narrative of change which is shaped predominantly by 
two factors. Firstly, the power of dominant states and financial markets; and secondly, the 
personality and national background of the Bank’s president and senior management. The 
imperative to secure financial sector backing for the Bank’s operations has meant that, since 
the McCloy presidency, these key personnel have been drawn from elite financial circles. To a 
limited extent, this ‘constituency’ has mediated the influence of the US government and during 
the golden years of the Bretton Woods order, this gave the institution relative autonomy from 
its principals. Kraske et al argue that this has meant that presidents drawn from the financial 
elite have had very significant personal, impact on policy, strategy, and organisational 
character43 – a distinctly Whiggish historiography. 
In this vein, Mason and Asher depict the institution as ‘management dominated’ due 
to donor disinterest at the turn of its first quarter-century, and contend that this situation 
would continue as long as it remained a project-lending institution.44 Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 
offer a similar analysis in the Bank’s 50th year – arguing that the new conservatism of the later 
1970s meant that it had to follow ‘global fashions’.45 The limits to the Bretton Woods 
autonomy were revealed in the dominance of the US and historically ‘over-weighted’ 
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European members in formal decisionmaking in this era.46 Ultimately, while change is 
presented as ‘internal’ to the institution,47 the fundamentals of the origin of the Bank as an 
‘intergovernmental co-operative’ whose governance was rooted in political realism would 
continue to determine its role in global governance.48 The transformation of the Bank is 
framed in the context of the erosion of the bilateral aid constituency in the US congress as the 
Republican Party embraced neoliberalism. 
The objective of constructivist authors such as Chwieroth, Sharma, Babb, Park, and 
Vetterlein; is to move the Bank out from the long shadows of state-centrism, in which the 
Brookings histories stand alongside the Wall Street-Treasury nexus accounts. These authors 
follow in the path broken by Barnett and Finnemore’s observation that although the power of 
international organisations must be derived from the authority which constituted them; these 
institutions exercise a bureaucratic form of power in their own right, based upon the ability to 
manipulate knowledge in such a way as to shape the behaviour of other actors by articulating 
and diffusing new norms and rules.49 Emphasis on formal and informal material mechanisms of 
control cannot provide a full account of change, and an exploration of organisational culture 
offers an alternative understanding of the processes through which institutions such as the 
Bank are able to successfully gain authority and act autonomously. 
Approaching international institutions with an emphasis on the processes of change 
and strategic staff agency marks the distinction between Chwieroth and Sharma and their 
antecedents., While authors such as Barnett and Finnemore argue that the nature of IOs as 
bureaucracies drives them to maintain their power to constitute and regulate defined policy 
fields – embodying and disseminating norms by maximising their budgets, for Chwieroth, this 
gives rise to a perception of staff as hide-bound and underplays their role in change. Formal 
rules and informal staff behaviour do not always align, and norms, once adopted, can be 
subject to struggle over interpretation and application. This is Chwieroth’s major contribution 
to the constructivist canon on the Bank – which is a label he modifies, depicting his focus on 
change and staff agency as ‘strategic constructivism’.50  
In the Bank’s case, Jeffrey Chwieroth observes two crucial moments in which the Bank 
was able to gain sufficient autonomy to become an agent in its own right. The first is the 
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delegation by principals which was essential in the construction of ‘interpretative authority’, 
and the second is the reconfiguration of internal processes and procedures. 
Firstly, then, the authority bestowed by states in the constitution of institutions of 
global governance such as the Bank is depicted as an ‘interpretative authority’. Chwieroth 
points out that this was latent from the outset, in the ambiguity which arose from the wording 
of the Articles of Agreement concerning the Bank’s mandate to offer general-purpose 
financing under ‘special’ circumstances. Chwieroth illustrates how this authority to interpret 
the constitutional document of the institution and set policy accordingly allowed the Bank to 
make loans to European members to support their balance of payments. Prior to the Marshall 
Plan, this was a significant stop-gap allowing them to meet commitments already made to 
largely American suppliers without which the tentative steps toward reconstruction could not 
have been made. Yet the most significant aspect, as Chwieroth describes, is that it moved the 
IBRD to the heart of the international system of liquidity provision at the expense of the IMF.51 
Secondly, an internal shift in the formal balance of power in favour of the management was 
effected in the course of the appointment of President McCloy which allowed sufficient 
autonomy from its principals for the agency of management to become decisive.52 
This is extremely important, Chwieroth shows, for two reasons. This suggests, firstly, 
that as the Bank was simultaneously able to draw heavily upon the American capital market 
for its funding, state support was not the defining material prop for Bank action. Secondly, 
financial opposition to the second New Deal and its international components is often 
overstated; and the Bank was the central pillar of the new international monetary order.  
This strategy had helped it stake a claim to the centre of the new order. Yet the Bank 
did not retain this position. Nor, importantly, did it continue to pursue the strategy of balance 
of payments lending which had been so popular with members. However, the long history of 
conditionality shows that the Bank has lent, in the main, for specific productive projects – not 
for balance of payments support. Where did this new norm come from? How did this change 
from balance of payments lending to US allies to wider project lending come about? 
There are clear material considerations which Chwieroth acknowledges, but these 
relate to the position of the bank in the international order: Marshall Aid dwarfed Bank 
capabilities. Although it made the Bank’s processes and structures more akin to those of its 
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most important financial backers, unlike DiMaggio and Powell,53 Chwieroth does not depict 
this as a case of ‘institutional isomorphism’. Rather, in terms of its role and strategy in this 
order, the most significant factors in the transition to the project model were internal 
processes and collectively shared beliefs.54  
These features of the strategic and intellectual life of the organisation are mediated by 
rounds of recruitment. Staff who are aligned to specific practices and beliefs derived from their 
professional and educational background may be replaced or ‘supplanted’ by new staff with 
different ideas. These appointments and dismissals may lead to the development of 
‘subcultures’, within which ‘norm entrepreneurs’ may emerge.55 The ability to institutionalise 
the values and strategies espoused by these individuals and groups is dependent on their 
ability to win what Chwieroth describes as a ‘battle of ideas’ (which he derives explicitly from 
Mason & Asher’s 1975 history56). Success in this regard is dependent on location within the 
organisation, and the possession of the discursive influence to outperform advocates of 
competing ideas. 
The most important contribution which this approach offers in exploring the transition 
from the early program loans to the project lending model in the 1950s, and from ‘basic needs’ 
to structural adjustment, lies in demonstrating the way in which strategy and policy is socially 
constructed within the Bank. While such processes are constant, these transitions occurred at 
instances when it was undergoing crises – first of capitalisation, then potentially of solvency. 
These moments, in which the Bank acted to reconfigure procedures and processes in order to 
re-frame its relationship with the ‘authorising environment’, represent the turning points in 
what was an on-going strategic imperative, in which for the Bank as for the IMF: “Power 
politics and Wall Street financial interests were not irrelevant, but they also were not the sole 
or even the decisive factor in shaping organizational behaviour.”57 
The importance of member states and financiers lies, for Chwieroth as for Sharma, in 
providing an authorising environment which is flexible enough for the agency of the Bank as an 
institution to be shaped and directed by its staff and management.58 While Chwieroth 
concedes that the material factors emphasised by the various functionalist approaches to the 
Bank do matter – in the sense that they shape the Bank’s ‘authorizing environment’, it appears 
in this framework as though the relationship with financiers, in mediating the hard power of 
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the state, has solved a problem for the Bank. It is clear that the transition to the project 
approach and the transition to structural adjustment were critical junctures in the 
development of the Bank’s agency in global governance. Further, the success of both 
Chwieroth and Sharma in illustrating the agency of management in dynamic internal social 
processes leading to normative and material change is a significant step in improving upon the  
understanding of the Bank as an institution characterised by ‘mission creep’ or an imperative 
to maximise its budget. But success in this regard is simultaneously the most problematic 
aspect of their analysis of the development of the Bank’s agency in global governance.  
There are difficult questions which may be asked regarding the specific processes at 
work in the transition away from a dominant established norm. Firstly, what compels line 
managers – as arbiters of strategy – to adopt the premises advocated by newly-hired ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’? Chwieroth’s account of these processes is ultimately dependent upon the 
relative power of rhetoric in conjunction with personal ‘belief’.  Yet because the mutability of 
common belief is not sufficient, recruitment rounds are deployed to bolster this factor as the 
determinant of such transitions. What is the difference between this thesis and the 
‘institutional capture’ thesis of the Wall Street – Treasury Complex approach? It appears 
therefore that these transitions are a ‘numbers game’. The more like-minded new-hires, 
socialised into specific beliefs through professionalisation or education, the more likely it is 
that their new norm could displace the old. This feature of the analysis therefore suffers from 
the same problems as the ‘institutional capture’ thesis of the Wall Street – Treasury complex 
approach: by over-determining the internal processes of change, it can only conceptualise the 
institution as socially anchored in the same narrow elite as Wade and Peet. 
Secondly, relying on these narrow social linkages suggests that normative change in 
the Bank is the reflection of Kuhnian paradigmatic changes in the elite epistemic communities 
into whose practices new recruits have been socialised. Therefore, a further problem familiar 
to the Wall Street – Treasury approach is retained: the conceptualisation of crisis as an 
external trigger of the processes leading to paradigmatic change within the Bank. Further, the 
nature of the shift in paradigm is broadly the same: the transitions from the inter-war liberal 
international order to the Bretton Woods order and again to the neoliberal era are read as 
major historical ruptures. Similarly to the ‘Wall Street-Treasury nexus’ accounts, the outcome 
of characterisation of the Bretton Woods order as ‘embedded liberalism’ mistakes the 
convergence of the interests of the US state and financiers in the 1982 debt crisis and the 
broader neoliberal context for a novel political constellation, the power of which the Bank was 
simply unable to resist. 
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 The inability of this approach to grasp the broad social anchoring of the Bank in 
specifically American financial relationships which have come in which every stratum of society 
is involved, is at the root of this failure to offer a satisfying account of the logic of these 
transformations. Only by addressing this issue directly will it be possible to offer an 
understanding of the development of the ‘Washington Consensus’ as a system of governance 
which does not underplay the Bank’s decisive agency in this process. 
 
4: Anchoring the Bank 
As we have seen, the origins of structural adjustment have been subsumed within the 
rubric of the Washington Consensus. The tendency to associate it, as the most significant tool 
of governance in the neoliberal era, with deregulation, liberalisation, and a turn to ‘market’ 
solutions in general, arises from the faulty identification of structural adjustment as rooted in a 
neoliberal politics enforced by American power. Common use of the term interchangeably 
with the ‘Washington Consensus’ as a synecdoche for neoliberalism has rendered the former a 
truly rascal term. Its continuing currency in contemporary accounts of the Bank’s strategy and 
role in global governance reinforces these problems, obscuring the basis on which the 
endurance of neoliberal governance is rooted in the infrastructural power of finance and the 
mediation of the US hegemonic agenda by financial imperatives. The ‘Wall Street – Treasury 
Nexus’ and ‘relative autonomy’ approaches which underpin this narrative share three broad 
tendencies that perpetuate these problems.  
Firstly, they continue to frame their analyses in the Polanyian narrative of a historical 
trajectory of ‘dis-embedding’ and ‘re-embedding’ finance in the economy. By placing the 
contemporary Bank in this trajectory, they support the equation of the neoliberal intellectual 
and political paradigms with the narrower precepts of the Washington Consensus. By taking 
the nature of both the Bretton Woods era and the era of neoliberal governance as axiomatic in 
this way, as Broome and Seabrooke suggest, they create an analytical blind spot which 
prevents them from examining features of these eras which do not slot into the rubric of 
‘embedded liberalism’ or the ‘Washington Consensus’59. Through eliding these distinct 
phenomena in an artefact of US foreign economic policy these accounts continue to cast the 
Bank as an object of the US’ hegemonic agenda.  
A second point of contact is the conception that the transition from Bretton Woods to 
the neoliberal international order was a major historical rupture. The novel political 
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constellation which seized upon this crisis, through which the state actively fostered a zero-
sum transfer to the market, was simply too powerful for the Bank to resist. 
Thirdly, they represent each transition - Bretton Woods to the Washington Consensus or 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism - as a set of outcomes which was clearly conceptualised and 
coherently executed. As far as the Bank is concerned, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
ideas are transmitted via institutional capture – either through the hard power of the US to 
hire and fire, or recruitment rounds through which the latest economic doctrine could be 
transplanted. Thus, the change in norms within the institution reflects Kuhnian paradigmatic 
shifts in the elite epistemic or professional communities into which management have been 
socialised, or whose interests they nakedly represent. The agency of the Bank is therefore 
socially rooted in narrow elites, and reflective of ideational change in elite epistemic 
communities. This gives rise to a tendency to over-emphasise the moral character of key 
figures such as presidents in pursuit of ‘development’. By exaggerating the ability of these 
individuals – of whom Robert McNamara is exemplary – to transform the institution, these 
accounts privilege the power of free-floating ideas above material imperatives arising from the 
social relationships of the institution other than that of the hard power of the US.  
As a consequence these approaches erase the agency of the Bank in the construction of 
the Washington Consensus framework of governance, even as they insist on its centrality to it. 
By drawing on Williamson’s narrative of the tools of the Washington Consensus as expressed 
in the Baker Plan, they likewise struggle to grasp the importance of financial imperatives in 
mediating US hegemonic strategy – even though the Plan was itself a response to a financial 
crisis by which American banks were the most affected. This surprising lacuna is a 
consequence of the de-historicisation of the tools of neoliberal governance, and the tendency 
to root the paradigm of the Bank in the hard power of the US or narrow intellectual or 
business elites. It’s still the Washington Consensus, stupid. 
Therefore, disentangling the history of structural adjustment from the Washington 
Consensus entails addressing the historiography of the foundation, consolidation, and decline 
of the Bretton Woods order which has placed it there as an expression of a neoliberal US 
agenda. To this end, I will undertake a revisionist history of the Bretton Woods era in order to 
offer an alternative account of the development of the Bank’s role in the ‘Washington 
Consensus’. 
To begin to re-frame the familiar historiography of ‘embedding’ and ‘disembedding’ it is 
necessary to address the core conception: that the Bank’s strategy is a reflection of the 
hegemonic ideology of the US in each successive epoch. In as far as they both rest upon this 
assumption, the ‘Wall Street – Treasury nexus’ and ‘relative autonomy’ approaches are 
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reminiscent of another of Polanyi’s aphorisms, that: “Interests...like intents, remain platonic 
unless they are translated into politics by the means of some social instrumentality.”60 By 
conceptualising the Bretton Woods and Washington Consensus eras as diametrically opposed 
to one-another, these accounts appear to suggest that particular social interests can be 
rendered suddenly inert or platonic; repressed by political design or invoked by crisis. While I 
concede that it is intuitive that specific social interests may require institutionalisation via 
‘some social instrumentality’ (such as the Bank), in order to take on the character of a 
coherent and legible politics, it is clear that financial interests were not shut out of the political 
picture in the New Deal, and suddenly reactivated with the crisis of Keynsianism and the 
advent of neoliberalism. 
In fact, as Martijn Konings has shown, this was an impossibility: American financial 
markets penetrated American society in a uniquely deep way. In considering the significance of 
the New Deal, Konings argues that “Policy makers recognised that the growing connectivity of 
socioeconomic life was not just responsible for intense contradictions but also opened up new 
possibilities for public policy.”61 Public authority was to be put to new uses: finance was not to 
be repressed, but to be harnessed. This meant that while the New Deal should manage finance 
actively, Roosevelt’s administrations aimed to prescribe limitations to short-term speculation 
and curb volatility in financial markets. Yet as Panitch and Konings argue, this was aimed at 
“precisely the fortification of key financial institutions and so an enhanced capacity to regulate 
the dynamics of expansion.”62 The observation of changes to the modality of the power 
relations between particular social groups or sets of institutional actors need not be followed 
with the assertion that their interests have been suddenly neutered. 
Such observations problematise the narrative of the ‘embedding’ and ‘dis-embedding’ of 
financial power. Hannes Lacher has argued that the New Deal should be seen as the 
foundation of a post-war order that promoted a universalising capitalism. In the longer run, he 
argues,  it did not express the re-embedding of the market in social purpose but “the 
dominance of a protectionist form of regulation of the market economy...”63 Further, in spite of 
the protection of national economies, the truly novel element of the post-war order was the 
extent to which society was “...geared more directly to the exigencies of the economy; never 
was humanity defined more clearly by an attempt to render individuals into masses of 
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‘economic’ men and women.”64 For Panitch and Konings, the specific feature of the New Deal 
was the correspondence of this endeavour with the integration of the working classes into the 
financial system. The Polanyian narrative which underpins the Washington Consensus story 
does not capture the social importance of finance in the US during the 1930s and the war 
years, and worse, “...has served as the foundation of an overly-stylised periodisation of the half 
century after World War Two into two highly distinct orders...”65 
It is clear that financial interests were in no way rendered platonic; and they were not 
ideologically opposed to the Bretton Woods institutions. As Chwieroth points out, prior to the 
Marshall Plan, the Bank was the most important of the Bretton Woods institutions for the 
provision of liquidity internationally.66 The Fund would not take on its proper role until 
multilateral convertibility was achieved in 1958, having been marginalised by the opposition of 
American financiers in the course of the ratification of the Bretton Woods Act. The Bank, on 
the other hand, Chwieroth points out, was welcomed. As it was then envisaged, by offering 
guarantees to private lenders, it would have functioned to re-introduce private American 
finance to the international capital markets.  
Of the writing on this crucial agency in the creation and governance of the post-war 
order, Chwieroth provides one of two important contributions from the Constructivist 
paradigm. The Bank was, he shows, the central agency in the international liquidity 
architecture before multilateral convertibility. Further, its internal processes were key in 
shaping the tools which were deployed to create, support, and police the order. By focussing 
on the internal culture and institutional structure, and centring his analysis on the agency of 
management, he is able to highlight the way in which major changes in the Bank’s lending 
approach took place at junctures and under conditions which do not correspond to the neat 
schema of paradigmatic shifts between ‘embedded liberalism’ in the Bretton Woods era, and 
neoliberalism in the Washington Consensus period.  
The second comes from Patrick Sharma. Writing on the transition to structural 
adjustment, Sharma builds on Chwieroth’s intervention by emphasising the bureaucratic 
imperatives which shaped management agency. The major contribution which Sharma is able 
to offer is his observation that the flaws in the Bank’s operational procedures were a major 
catalyst in the change. To remain relevant, he argues, the Bank had to alter its procedures in 
order that it could disburse funds more rapidly. This suggests, as Chwieroth has shown 
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regarding the project approach, that the shift to structural adjustment should likewise not be 
framed in the narrative and trajectory of the Washington Consensus. 
However, the greatest problem facing Constructivist accounts is the issue of the specific 
form taken by the structural adjustment loan, or, for that matter, the project loan. Were these 
simply one choice, from a range of possibilities? Sharma offers the stipulation that the new 
lending model had to be quick-disbursing, and, by emphasising the bureaucratic imperative of 
the institution to survive, moves to head off the charge of voluntarism. Yet while he observes 
the importance of these internal processes, he does not explore their precise nature or origin 
and cannot fully explain why structural adjustment lending took the precise form it did. The 
charge of voluntarism must then stick.  
In building on these accounts, I will focus my analysis on two features of the Bank. 
Firstly, I show that the nature and origins of the specific processes of institutional governance 
are of central importance for our understanding of the agency of the Bank. The techniques 
which McNamara used to control the institution were highly specific. They were not developed 
organically, within the institution, by norm entrepreneurs in a process of contestation. They 
were uniquely suited to the Bank’s imperative as an institution: to continue to expand its 
drawings on private capital, in order to pursue the US’ hegemonic agenda. These processes 
were at the cutting edge of American management techniques, and their extensive use of 
quantitative data modelling was familiar to US financiers. Their deployment made the Bank’s 
programme workable. The specificity of the processes through which the Bank was managed 
is, I argue, crucial for our understanding of why structural adjustment loans were the vehicle 
for the lending expansion demanded by the combination of the dollar glut and the advent of 
monetarist inflation targeting in the US Federal Reserve system.  
Secondly, I will show that the tools which the Bank deploys are shaped by its imperatives 
as an institution anchored in the social infrastructure of American finance. Crucially, although I 
argue that the Bank was a key institution in the evolution of what Konings and Panitch 
describe as the American ‘informal empire’, its methods have not been derived in a 
straightforward fashion from the hard power of the US, or through the transmitting of 
hegemonic American ideologies. They have been developed pragmatically, as the Bank’s 
management sought to marry political pressures to act as an agent of US imperial governance 
and a development institution, with the particular requirements of American investors.  
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Conclusion 
By emphasising the way in which the institution is socially anchored within a specific 
framework of imperatives which form the parameters of management agency in pursuit of the 
US’ hegemonic agenda, I will show that during the Bretton Woods era the Bank’s strategies 
were shaped most profoundly by specifically American financial imperatives and technologies 
of management. Most importantly for our understanding of structural adjustment, I will show 
that it has its origins in the pragmatic engagement of management with the Bank’s ongoing 
problem of capitalisation during the course of the 1970s – not in the selective ‘neoliberalism’ 
of the Washington Consensus. 
Throughout the Bank’s history, the agency of management in determining lending 
strategy and institutional structure has been located in these parameters. By placing the Bank 
in this framework, I will show that we can make space in our understanding of the material 
basis of imperial governance for the agency of Bank management, in a way which allows us to 
make sense of its contradictions and its continuities. 
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Chapter 2: Neither laissez faire nor ‘Embedded Liberalism’: Re-
enlisting Private Finance in Support of Bretton Woods. 
 
In Chapter 1 we have seen that both currents in the specialised literature on the Bank 
are underpinned by an essentially functionalist understanding of its relationship with the US. In 
this literature, the Washington Consensus is a reflection of the US agenda of liberating the 
financial economy from regulations aimed at subordinating it to the directly productive 
economy of international trade. 
In this chapter, I will show that this understanding of the contemporary order is 
dependent upon an understanding of the Bretton Woods order as the antithesis of the 
Washington Consensus. The Bretton Woods order is depicted as an expression of the US’ 
previous epochal objective of ‘embedding’ financial agents in a liberal international trade 
regime – subordinating the financial economy to the real economy of production.  
 The conceptualisation of the Bretton Woods era as an expression of the wholesale 
repudiation of the liberal laissez-faire tradition follows from the work of John Ruggie. In his 
International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order, Ruggie follows Polanyi in arguing that the Bretton Woods order represented 
an iteration of liberalism which expressed a radical break with the inter-war order. The pre-
1914 order had been based upon British power, and a liberal international trade regime on the 
basis of the gold standard as an external mechanism of economic adjustment. The Bretton 
Woods order on the other hand reflected two major shifts. Firstly, the transition to American 
dominance following the decline of British power in the inter-war period and the economic 
crises of the 1930s. Secondly, it expressed a change in the relationship between states and 
societies in European and Anglo-Saxon countries that demanded the insulation of domestic 
economies from the consequences of monetary adjustment. The marriage of US power to this 
common social purpose at the Bretton Woods conference constituted the hegemony of an 
‘embedded liberal’ international regime.67 
 The most powerful articulation of this understanding of the Bretton Woods order has 
been offered by Eric Helleiner. In his classic account of the role of states in shaping institutional 
arrangements of the Bretton Woods system and its successor, Helleiner draws upon Ruggie’s 
concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ as a descriptor of the changed relationship between state 
and society after the New Deal. For Helleiner, the subordination of the financial economy to 
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the real economy of production and trade is most clearly visible in the adoption of controls on 
international financial transfers, designed to eliminate disequilibrating speculative flows. 68  
Helleiner’s argument that the New Deal constituted a break with the ‘liberal tradition’ 
in international finance has had major consequences in terms of the way in which the role of 
the Bank in the post-war order is understood. The relationship which is conventionally taken to 
define the character and strategy of the Bank in the governance of the Bretton Woods order is 
that between its management, directors, and the formal states of its largest subscribers – with 
particular emphasis on the US Congress. The hegemonic agenda of the US is the agenda of the 
Bank 
By rooting their understanding of the creation of these respective orders in the agency 
of the US as hegemon, these accounts promote a tendency to conceptualise the engineering of 
successive international orders as radical breaks with the practices of the old. The new political 
paradigms which constitute each respective hegemonic order are derived from the precepts of 
new intellectual paradigms in economics which reject and sweep away all traces of previous 
practice. The inter-war period was the era of laissez-faire liberalism, Bretton Woods was the 
era of Keynesian macroeconomic management, and the Washington Consensus is the era of 
neoliberal New Political Economy.  
I will argue that while the Bretton Woods conference was a major moment of change 
in the international political economy, it did not represent the radical break depicted by Ruggie 
and Helleiner. I will show that the most immediate intellectual heritage of Bretton Woods lay 
in the efforts of financiers to overcome the liquidity problem of the Versailles settlement in the 
international monetary and financial conferences of the 1920s.  
In making this argument, I will draw upon the re-conceptualisation of the power of the 
US offered by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, which suggests that the efforts to create a liberal 
trading order strongly reflected the interests and influence of American financial capital and 
contributed to the enhancement in the longer term of its global power;69 and Martijn Konings’ 
account of the roots of the financial relations of the Bretton Woods era in specifically 
American institutional forms emerging in the late 19th century.70 These accounts suggest that 
the New Deal era reforms enhanced financial power in two significant ways. Firstly, they 
facilitated a profound expansion and deepening of social engagement in financial relationships 
– enhancing financial power at the infrastructural level. Secondly, they enhanced the power of 
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American financiers to exercise direct leverage in domestic politics and the governance of the 
international order. 
The significance of these accounts for our understanding of the Bank lies in the way in 
which they invite a re-framing of the famously anti-financier rhetoric of the New Deal era, and 
the capital controls of the post-war period. These were primarily a European feature of the 
post-war international political economy: as these flows were mostly in the direction of New 
York and the safety of the dollar, they did not pose as much of a problem to the US. Therefore, 
in the US context, anti-financier rhetoric may be seen to reflect the social importance of 
finance.   
As I will show, enlisting the support of American financiers was essential to the 
passage of the Bretton Woods accords through Congress. Coping with the problem of illiquidity 
which paralysed the international system in the 1940s required buttressing the foundations of 
the new institutions against the uniquely socially deep-rooted infrastructure of American 
finance. 
Firstly, I will explore Helleiner’s argument that the New Deal constituted a break with 
the ‘liberal tradition’ in international finance. Helleiner roots his narrative of this transition in 
observation of the political currents of the 1930s, such as the increasing regulation of 
international capital flows, assertion of Treasury control over monetary policy, and decisive 
moves away from the gold standard. I argue that while these are highly salient political 
features of the era, they are only proximate factors in the character of the Bretton Woods era 
and do not necessarily offer a full account of the importance of financial relations in American 
society which may be captured by a longer view. Therefore they do not imply, as Helleiner 
suggests, that the balance was tipped decisively away from the financiers of New York and 
toward the state in international economic affairs. 
To begin to support this claim, in the second part of the section I will explore the 
longer and less familiar history of the antecedents of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 
international financial and monetary conferences of the 1920s. These efforts to solve the 
problem of international illiquidity in the context of the pre-Depression drive to return to a 
gold standard form the direct intellectual ancestry of the Bretton Woods institutions. The ideas 
which were debated at the Bretton Woods conference had their origins in the proposals for 
international banking institutions put forward at conferences in Brussels and Genoa, and in the 
Dawes plan, by private financiers acting as quasi-state agents to prop up the gold standard and 
maintain war debt payments.  
In the second section of the chapter, I will explore how the ability of American 
financiers to find a solution – albeit temporary – to the problem of liquidity in the 1920s 
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reflected the infrastructural power of finance in American society indicated by Martijn 
Konings. While the era was replete with anti-financier rhetoric, as Konings and Leo Panitch 
argue, this reflected the increasing importance of finance in American society. The New 
Dealers’ desire to break the Morgan monopoly and gain control of powerful tools of national 
monetary policy need not be understood as a vendetta against finance per se. I will show that 
those measures and institutions which are taken to have done the most to begin the process 
of ‘re-embedding’ financial power functioned to increase the structural power of finance. As 
the first New Deal programme of financial regulation aimed to break up veteran financiers’ 
cosy relations with the Federal Reserve, financiers increasingly lined up behind the Roosevelt 
administration. 
In the final section, I will illustrate how crucial this support would be in gaining the 
passage of the Bretton Woods Act through Congress, and launching the new international 
monetary and financial order. It is striking that of the two institutions which were founded at 
Bretton Woods, the one which emerged from the ratification process the strongest was the 
IBRD. Financiers’ opposition centred instead on the IMF – which had, it was feared, the 
capacity to supplant private international finance and help irresponsible governments to avoid 
adjustment. As it was conceived at this stage, the IBRD on the other hand took the re-
establishment of international capital markets as its primary objective. Financiers’ acceptance 
of the Bank and rejection of the Fund may have been predicated upon the assumption that the 
Bank would anyway be a temporary measure, but their direct influence constituted the IBRD 
as the central pillar of the international liquidity architecture. As in the 1920s, private finance 
was to be the means to overcome the dearth of liquidity in the international system. 
In sum, finance should be positioned centrally in the story of Bretton Woods – and the 
anti-financier rhetoric which is given such prominence in the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis 
should be located in the politics of American financial reform in the 1920s and 1930s. Making 
the new institutional framework viable was dependent on the enlistment of American 
financiers. Crucially, for our understanding of the development of the practices of the 
Washington Consensus, Bretton Woods was not a radical break with the practices of the 
laissez-faire era. As I will show, the deep infrastructure of American finance and the 
endorsement of American financiers was as essential to the new order as it had been to the 
Dawes plan two decades previously. 
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1: A Break with Liberal Tradition in International Finance? 
According to Helleiner, the negotiations between the allied and associated powers at 
Bretton Woods represented the “culmination of a long Polanyian ‘countermovement’ against 
the liberal financial practices of the nineteenth century.”71 This analysis builds upon John 
Ruggie’s account of Polanyi – which argues that while The Great Transformation may not stand 
the test of time given the internationalisation of production and finance from the 1950s 
onwards, it made the significant observation that in the 1930s a “new threshold had been 
crossed in the balance between ‘markets’ and ‘authority’72”. The reorganisation of the 
international economic order was an imperative, in order to ensure that it reflected the 
change in the relationship between the state and society that had undermined the political 
authority of the inter-war regime. 
In this reading of the period, there are two key identifiers of the social ‘embeddedness’ 
of the post-war order. Firstly: the restriction on movements of capital, the better to protect 
the societies of national capitalist states from the previously superordinate imperatives of the 
global marketplace. Secondly: although the powerful banking houses of New York opposed 
moves to control capital movements and the foundation of the new institutions, they failed to 
halt the passage of the Bretton Woods Act through Congress and the Senate. This is the basis 
on which Ruggie and Helleiner argue that the inability of Wall Street to modify the plans of the 
Department of the Treasury tilted the balance of power decisively in favour of the state in 
international finance. 
Helleiner argues that the transition away from the liberal international system began 
after the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and the J.P. Morgan-dominated US financial 
community of New York ceased their efforts to resuscitate and prop up the gold-exchange 
standard after failing to halt a speculative run on sterling in 1931. Their efforts to support 
sterling represented the highest point on liberalism’s pendular arc, although a reaction against 
the social outcomes of external monetary constraints on national fiscal policy had been in 
gestation since the 19th century.73 It is not difficult to see why this argument is so compelling. 
 From 1931, Helleiner points out, capital controls were more comprehensive and 
permanent. Most importantly, they were also situated in more broadly interventionist 
strategies of economic nationalism in those economies which had previously been constructed 
as bastions of the liberal international regime. The broad trend, particularly in the US and 
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Britain, was that national Treasuries assumed greater control over monetary affairs, at the 
expense of national reserve banks and financial communities.74 
For example, in Britain after the break with gold, the Bank of England ceded control 
over monetary policy to the Treasury, which committed to balanced budgets until the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Japan and Germany introduced controls to maintain their 
balance of payments in the course of the 1931 crisis, and retained them in order to prevent 
capital flight and the pressures of speculation during subsequent experiments with active 
monetary policy and deficit financing. In the rest of the Gold Bloc, the Swiss, French, Belgians, 
and Dutch attempted to remain relatively liberal - but by 1939 full financial planning and 
capital controls became the norm75. 
In the US, the Morgenthau’s Department of the Treasury gained control over monetary 
policy once the gold standard was abandoned. Devaluation was undertaken in 1933, and the 
Treasury began operations to sterilise the inflationary impact of capital flight from Europe 
from 1936. Although the US did not itself deploy capital controls, it accepted and supported 
them elsewhere. Perhaps most importantly, Helleiner notes that the financiers of New York 
were popularly held responsible for the crisis, and that the Roosevelt administration sought to 
break the Morgan empire and reverse financial consolidation through government 
regulation76. 
It is clear that bankers fervently hoped that the levels of international investment 
characterising the pre-Crash era could be returned to as soon as possible. It is also clear, as 
Carosso points out, that the events of the 1930s identified by Helleiner - the abandonment of 
the gold standard combined with the transfer of power from central banks to national 
treasuries which subsequently undertook experiments with capital controls and planning – 
constituted a series of major blows to bankers’ direct political influence.77 
Yet these seismic changes to the shape of the international system did not 
fundamentally alter the central contradiction of American foreign economic policy: as in the 
1920s, maintaining the stability of the currencies at the core of the global economy still 
required the US to either increase the volume of goods imported from Europe and South 
America and sacrifice its own export surplus, or continue liquidity injections to Britain and 
Europe. As this balance of payments adjustment would have borne too high a political price, 
the latter strategy persisted. However, whereas these flows had been provided by American 
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bankers across the period 1910-1931, in the medium to long term these flows could not be 
sustained without the state intervention which followed the cessation of hostilities in 1945. 
During the 1930s, as the Roosevelt administration took the US off the gold standard, 
abandoned the London conference, and initiated the New Deal, restrictive tariff practices and 
exchange controls became the new international norm, while the Treasuries of the US and 
Britain remained largely committed to balanced budgets and orthodox economic principles. It 
was only following the onset of the war that Keynesian economics attained mainstream status. 
Helleiner points out that in their early drafts of the proposals which would eventually become 
the basis for the Bretton Woods negotiations, they both argued for capital controls to prevent 
speculative movements of currency from undermining national macroeconomic planning and 
the fledgling welfare state.78  
The development of Keynesian economics, the ceding of monetary control to national 
treasuries, and the development of social democratic political currents in national politics are 
the proximate sources of the currents which would constitute the post-war international 
order. But the there is a longer history to the practical and intellectual ancestry of the Bretton 
Woods organisations. For the origins of many of the ideas upon which Keynes and White 
would eventually draw in their plans for international agencies of monetary and financial 
governance in the 1940s may be seen in the 1920s.  Thanks to the difficulties states found in 
negotiating the minefield of sovereignty and debt in the aftermath of the Versailles treaty, 
private financial actors took on quasi-official roles in achieving the only lasting multilateral 
settlement of the period. It was an era which Helleiner depicts as the antithesis of Bretton 
Woods due to the extent to which it was “...dominated by an initiative by private and central 
bankers throughout the advanced industrial world to restore the pre-1914 liberal international 
monetary and financial order in which they had been so prominent.”79 This was the decade of 
the Genoa Conference, and the Dawes Plan: precisely the zenith of private financial planning. 
 
Financiers & Solutions to the Problem of Liquidity: Historical Precedents for 
International Financial Organisation. 
The history of the drafting of the Bretton Woods Accord itself has been extensively 
covered elsewhere – not least by Eric Helleiner.80 The history of the precedents which Bretton 
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Woods planners drew upon in search of solutions to the problems of liquidity which could be 
operationalised in the post-war period is less familiar.  
Proposals for a supra-national IBRD-like organisation which would variously lend for 
specific productive projects, limited balance-of-payments support, or simply guarantee private 
investment – were made throughout the 1920s. In the drafting of these proposals, financiers 
acted as quasi-state agents and would ultimately come to create the only lasting multilateral 
agreement on monetary and financial matters of the inter-war period, in the form of the 
Dawes plan. For Helleiner, financiers’ success in reconstructing the international capital market 
after 1918 through lending to governments willing to return to balanced budgets, free capital 
movement, the independence of central banks, and a form of gold standard – as well as their 
activities at the major international conferences of the era – constituted nothing less than a 
‘bankers’ victory’.81 In the third part of this chapter, I will argue that the deployment of 
financiers as quasi-state agents in creating the conditions under which new lending to 
Germany could facilitate the repayment of Allied war-debts to US bankers and re-create the 
international capital market was an expression of the particular financial relations of US 
society in the Progressive era. Firstly, I will turn to the Bretton Woods institutions’ antecedents 
as proposed at the Brussels and Genoa conferences of the 1920s. 
From 1918 to 1929, American state objectives and those of private finance were 
closely interrelated. The shared objective was to stabilise European currencies in relation to 
gold in order to return to the automaticity in international monetary relations of the classical 
gold standard; and maintain repayment on war debts owed to private financiers. This was to 
be achieved through inter-governmental agreements regarding currency reform and austerity, 
intended to reverse the inflationary trends in prices and wages seen during the war years. 
Maintaining private capital flows to overcome the shortage of international liquidity was an 
essential corollary of this objective.82  
US foreign economic policy expressed a contradiction which was widely discussed in 
the popular press throughout the 1920s and which remained a constant for the Progressive-
era Republican administrations and Roosevelt’s first New Deal administration.83 The central 
problem remained that while“...for the United States to receive payment it was necessary that 
America should import additional goods from the outside world or else reduce her exports by a 
corresponding amount” there was “virtually no presumption at all that the United States 
                                                          
81 Helleiner, E., 1994. Pg.27 
82 Oliver, R., International Economic Co-Operation and the World Bank, MacMillan Press, London, 1977. 
Pg.12-13. 
83 Frieden, J., ‘Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914, 1940’, International Organization, 
Vol.42, Issue 1, December 1988. Pg.82. 
45 
 
 
herself would be willing to increase her imports in proportion to the growth of her interest 
claims.”84  
At this juncture the understanding of the means by which any defaulting debtor would 
gain the means to repay tended to emphasise the provision of liquidity. Therefore, from 1919, 
American embassies and private economic ‘missions’ sponsored by the State Department 
supported bankers’ foreign activities. Most importantly, the majority of attendees of the major 
international economic conferences of the 1920s were bankers and economists. They were not 
official representatives of their governments: very few were diplomats or politicians, and only 
a small number were civil servants. Their orthodoxy in economic matters was informed by an 
anti-governmental and anti-nationalist discourse which reflected the tenor of post-Versailles 
sentiment85.  
Although ultimately unsuccessful, these plans are the immediate intellectual heritage 
of the IBRD and prefigure some of the controversies it would face in its early years. Due to the 
intended function of proposals made at the international conferences of the era as temporary 
measures supporting a return to a gold standard regime, and their deployment in the 
‘embedded liberalism’ narrative as contributing to the perpetuation of the ‘dis-embedding’ of 
finance during this era the Genoa-Dawes era and the Bretton Woods institutions are 
conventionally discussed in opposition to one another. Nevertheless, the Bretton Woods 
planners would draw upon the proposals put forward by financiers to overcome the problem 
of liquidity in Europe at international conferences during this period. 
In the general approach to the problematic of reconstruction, it was recognised that 
private financial assistance from ‘abroad’ - i.e. the United States – was a pre-requisite86. 
Further, the desire among politicians, financiers, and central bankers to return to a stable and 
automatic liberal international regime during the interwar period was clear. Recommendations 
made by delegates at a conference organised by the League of Nations in Brussels in October 
1920 exemplified this, stressing sound public finance, balanced budgets, halting inflation, 
returning to the pre-war gold standard, and creating the conditions for free trade. 
Representing the orthodoxy of the era, these proposals were enthusiastically endorsed by 
delegates – although they were not binding on the states participating in the conference. 
Two proposals for international banking and monetary cooperation discussed at 
Brussels bore striking resemblance in certain of their features to the eventual operations of 
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the Bank, particularly in terms of the importance of the mechanisms for the supervision of the 
deployment of funds and materials. 
The first came from Leon Delacroix, simultaneously finance, foreign, and first prime 
minister of Belgium, also advocated the foundation of an international institution. Members of 
an ‘International Bank of Issue’ would subscribe to shares by paying in gold  - however, in a 
major point of difference to the IBRD, the amount of shares purchased would not determine 
the amount of capital members were authorised to access. However, the similarities to the 
eventual institutional structure of the IBRD are marked.  
First, each member government would be represented at an annual meeting, and the 
voting power of each delegate would be determined by the number of shares held by the 
government. Second, the ‘IBI’ would be governed by a board of between five and nine 
members, who would be elected at an annual meeting for terms of five years. Third, authority 
to carry on the everyday operations of the IBI would be delegated to a managerial staff under 
a General Manager hired for that specific purpose. Fourth, the IBI would have the capacity to 
issue bonds, to grant advances, loans and credits to members, to negotiate, take legal action, 
and regulate the use of its own capital. Fifth, members would apply to the management for 
loans (although these would take the form of interest-bearing gold bonds), and the operating 
costs of the bank would be covered by that interest. Sixth, general assessments of 
creditworthiness would govern the volumes lent and the securities sought in terms of specific 
revenues. At bottom, it was expected that private banks in exporting countries would have to 
provide the credit for reconstruction: the bonds could be discounted with private banks by 
exporters who were in receipt of payment in bonds, as the bonds were intended to be equal in 
value to gold87. 
This proposition was not a success: while the political discourse of European elites 
might have been anti-nationalist, the creation of another body which could infringe upon the 
sovereignty of the national state in this manner was beyond countenance. The capitalisation 
proposed was minute proposed to the needs of European reconstruction, and the expansion of 
the money supply through the issuing of bonds in this way threatened to undermine progress 
in the reduction of inflation. While the revenues of the borrower would have functioned as the 
real guarantee, the bankers upon whose involvement the scheme ultimately depended were 
unlikely to consider the paper of such an institution to be ‘as good as gold’.88 
The second proposal came from Dutch banker C.E. Ter Meulen, and was met with 
considerably greater enthusiasm. It was adopted by the Brussels delegates, and once taken up 
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by the League of Nations, staff were appointed to the proposed bodies and for a very short 
period it became the basis upon which private capital was harnessed for Austrian 
reconstruction strategy from March 1921 onwards – until superseded by the negotiations at 
Genoa in 1922. 
According to the Ter Meulen plan, the League of Nations would appoint a central 
international commission of financial experts. The borrowing government would notify this 
Commission of assets preferred as securities against which it would issue five or ten year 
interest-bearing bonds, which would in turn be lent to importers who would offer them to  
private financiers of exporting countries as security for commercial credits granted with which 
to purchase their goods. At the close of each transaction, the supplier of the goods would 
return the bonds to the importer, who would return them to the government.89 As in the early 
operations of the IBRD the Ter Meulen financing arrangements concluded with Austria 
required austere fiscal policy90. Essentially, the basis was (as in the Delacroix plan) the use of 
the revenues of governments as security against credit, to be organised through the existing 
mechanisms of international organisation, and predicated upon the participation of private 
finance. The security of the private creditor was paramount. 
Brussels had laid the foundation for the 1922 Genoa conference, called by Britain’s 
Lloyd George. Seeking to promote international cooperation to restore the international 
economy, it was attended by thirty-four nations although the US was notable by its absence, 
exemplifying the hard-line attitude to war debts later expressed by President Coolidge: “They 
hired the money, didn’t they?”91 American truculence notwithstanding, Genoa represented the 
sole occasion on which intergovernmental negotiations addressed the problems of the 
European condition in the post-Versailles era in a comprehensive manner. 
The proposals of the conference further pre-figured the practices and concerns of the 
Bank. A Central International Corporation would authorise and finance specific reconstruction 
projects, under the auspices of nationally-based private financing corporations, to be 
guaranteed by national governments. The Corporation was intended to operate under its own 
name in the countries where specific projects had been agreed, or, lend funds to national 
governments for specific projects subject to assurances on the rights of private property and 
‘justice’ against the security of specified assets.92  
These plans foundered against Soviet refusal to assume the obligations of the Tsarists, 
the French refusal to subscribe in Sterling, Britain’s refusal to subscribe in Dollars, and 
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American refusal to subscribe at all, instead raising tariffs on total imports to almost 16%93 to 
protect labour intensive industries. The most significant outcome of the conference was the 
commitment to the restoration of the gold standard, towards which ‘order’ in public finances 
and currencies was to be pursued. Expressed as an official resolution of the Genoa Conference, 
the reconstruction of Europe depended on “...the restoration of conditions under which private 
credits, and in particular investible capital, will flow freely from countries where there is a 
surplus lending capacity to countries which are in need of external assistance.”94 
Efforts to legitimise the building of the new regime of monetary orthodoxy centred 
upon a new supra-national institution appear in this context as idealistic pipe-dreams, given 
the United States refusal to participate in the Genoa conference or to recognise publicly any 
linkage between the issues of reparations and war debts. 
The only alternative available to American and European statesmen was to turn again 
to private financiers, whose objective remained to re-create an international gold-exchange 
standard regime. In a post-war environment in which the old ways of formal diplomacy were 
seen to have failed to keep the peace amongst the empires and contenders of the European 
continent,95 financiers were well placed to insist that satisfying the private creditors of the 
USA, Britain, and France was an essential pre-requisite of the achievement of pragmatic 
solutions to the debt problem which could be presented to the Allied debtors. 96  
Faced with this imperative, in 1922 US Secretary of State Hughes publicly invited men 
of ‘prestige, honor, and experience’ to replace statesmen in consideration of the German 
economic situation with a view to working out how to finance reparation payments in the 
wake of their default in that year.97 The outcome of these decisions was the Dawes Plan. 
Signed in 1924, the plan drew upon new lending arranged by J. P. Morgan to prop up 
Germany’s ability to meet reparation payments by reducing interest rates and agreeing new 
financing. The Dawes Commission’s committee of financial ‘experts’ was convened by Leon 
Fraser, agent of the Reparation Commission, and subsequent President (from 1937) of the First 
National Bank of New York. The financiers’ proposals were adopted by Allied and German 
governments at the London Conference of August 1924. The plan outlined a total amount that 
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Germany would repay annually – and excluded the threat of any new demands or sanctions.  
In sum, in 1924 Germany would receive an external loan, issued to the public as bonds at 92 
basis points, paying 7% interest in New York, London, Paris, the Swiss exchanges, Brussels, 
Amsterdam, Stockholm, Milan, and Berlin, to the value of $230m. The US bloc alone amounted 
to £110m underwritten by J.P. Morgan and company - in Europe by Morgan Harjes of Paris.98 
On the Committee, as representatives of the European nations, were Sir Robert M. 
Kindersley and Sir Josiah Stamp (Britain - respectively a banker with Lazard Brothers and an 
academic economist); M. Parmentier and M. Allix (France - both bankers); Baron Houtart and 
M. Emile Francqui (Belgium – a civil servant and financier); and Dr. Alberto Pirelli and Professor 
Federico Flora (Italy – respectively a financier and businessman, and an academic economist). 
The American contingent was considerably larger, comprising: Charles G. Dawes, businessman, 
lawyer, and banker with the Central Trust Company of Illinois; Owen D. Young, a lawyer and 
subsequent chairman of the Board of General Electric and the Radio Corporation of America; 
Henry M. Robinson, philanthropist and banker with the First National Bank of Los Angeles; 
John E. Barber, a colleague of Robinson at First National Bank of Los Angeles; and Colonel 
Leonard P. Ayers of the Cleveland Trust Company, along with several academic economists 
from Stanford and Princeton including the globe-trotting apostle of the gold standard 
Professor Edwin Kemmerer99. 
These financiers, businessmen, industrialists, and academic economists were valuable 
in this context precisely because, while they represented the major debtors and creditors of 
the 1914-18 period, they were not formally state agents. Their proposals would not be binding, 
and were a politically accessible combination of vagueness and concrete recommendations. 
Participants characterised the experts’ report as an expression of a simple business 
transaction. According to George P. Auld, then Accountant General of the Inter-Allied 
Reparations Commission and assistant to Owen D. Young, the Dawes Loan was “a basic 
contract between a willing group of purchasers of a promise to pay and a willing seller of his 
own credit” which released ‘dammed-up’ forces of production and trade100. A prominent 
American Quaker businessman in France, J. Henry Scattergood wrote in 1924 that “It needed 
the businessmen of the Dawes Commission to bring the world to the realities the politicians had 
so long hesitated to reveal.”101 
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In the 1920s the Delacroix and Ter Meulen plans failed to achieve the creation of a set 
of formal institutions which would manage international liquidity. Doing so was a political 
impossibility, on the grounds either that it infringed upon national sovereignty to too great a 
degree, or that it was likely to have problems of creditworthiness and create inflation. 
Conversely, by the 1940s, it was a political necessity to found the IBRD as part of a process of 
accomplishing the same goal. In each case, there was no other source of liquidity than that 
which could be made available through private capital markets. The first sets of institutions 
were abandoned in favour of direct popular participation in private financing, while the second 
set of institutions was adopted precisely on the basis of the imbrication of private finance in 
their very fabric. At this juncture, the structural imbalance of the international order was 
exacerbated by the illiquidity which was the legacy of the collapse of the NYSE bubble and the 
foreign bond market in the 1930s – to which direct private participation had been a major 
contributor. However, the solution was the same at each juncture – although the institutional 
technology which was deployed to achieve it was different. 
Private finance was no less central to the new regime than its predecessor, and the 
methods and principles which the Bank and Fund would come to operate were developed with 
explicit reference to the plans put forward at Brussels and Genoa by private financiers.  
The Dawes Plan itself prefigured certain of the practices for which the Bretton Woods 
institutions would become notorious: conditions upon lending were specified, supervisory 
capacities were institutionalised, funds were drawn from globally significant private capital 
markets, and governments guaranteed repayments. In the early years of the Bank’s operation 
it was a commonplace among management that similarly to the Dawes Plan, the Bank would 
function as a temporary fix to a liquidity problem. The era of the Bretton Woods institutions 
was to be an interregnum, during which, while the problems of illiquidity and inconvertibility 
were resolved, private financiers could not retain their delegated roles in international 
negotiations. It was hoped that subsequently, normal service could be resumed rapidly.  
 
2:  From Progressive Reform to the New Deal: the Infrastructural 
Power of Finance and Shifting Political Alliances. 
So far we have seen how the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis tends to counterpose the 
1920s with the New Deal era, both internationally and domestically. For example, in 
considering the origins of the Bretton Woods institutions, the negotiations of the 1920s and 
the proposals of private financiers are not usually discussed. As they did not result in a lasting 
institution such as the Bank, or a glorious failure like the League of Nations – they are 
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considered to have been damp squibs, which were anyway aimed at restoring a set of 
practices antithetical to the ideas of Keynes and White. Yet as I will show in this section, their 
relevance for the political economy of the New Deal and the post-war era can hardly be over-
stated – and not only for the purposes of contrast. 
It is for the purpose of contrast that the pronouncements of Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau concerning the role of private financiers in American society – and particularly in 
international finance – are conventionally deployed. His closing address to the final plenary 
session of the Bretton Woods conference has passed into the lore of the New Dealers’ 
supposedly idealistic approach to the post-war order. The purpose of the Bank was to “...to 
provide capital for those who need it at lower interest rates than in the past and to drive the 
usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance.” 102 Extensive use of this 
pronouncement is a recurring feature of the mythology of Bretton Woods as the foundation of 
the regime of ‘embedded liberalism’. 
Morgenthau’s famous hostility to the usurious money lenders is often cited as the 
exemplar of the Roosevelt administration’s hostility to finance. This enmity is largely 
considered to have been general, and reactive to the crisis of the 1930s. However, once 
located in the historical context of the Progressive reforms of the 1920s as a precursor to the 
New Deal, and the successive Pujo and Pecora hearings into corruption and monopoly in 
private banking by the agents of the House of Morgan, the real target of Democratic ire can be 
clarified. As Martijn Konings has shown, extending the participation of wider strata of 
American society in financial relations was one of the key objectives of the Progressive 
Republican administrations of the era. The preservation of this feature of US political economy 
became an objective of the reforms of Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
Not only did the quasi-official activity of financiers at international monetary 
conferences result in a directly useful legacy concerning the eventual institutional structure, 
scope, and practice of the IBRD, but the Dawes Plan in particular had a seismic impact in 
American society. Its short-lived success was due in large part to the unique infrastructural 
power of American finance. 
The most salient feature of 1924 was the boom in foreign bond issues which followed 
the ratification of the Dawes Plan. On the basis of the supposition that European economies 
were now less unstable, private American investors purchased almost $12bn of new foreign 
capital issues between 1920 and 1931. Whereas in 1923 the volume of US private investment 
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in foreign markets was below $400m, it had reached $1.2bn by the end of 1924103. The Dawes 
loans themselves, taken together with the Young Plan and League loans to Austria, Bulgaria, 
Danzig, Estonia, Greece, and Hungary, reached a total in the region of $1bn – less than 10% of 
total foreign capital issues between 1920 and 1931.104  
The boom in investment in foreign issues which this triggered reflects a wider 
implication of Helleiner’s ‘bankers’ victory’. Ordinary citizens became financially linked in large 
numbers with foreign governments and firms for the first time. From this we can infer that the 
centring of the international order of the 1920s upon the problematique of German 
reparations and the delegation of governmental functions in international economic diplomacy 
to private financial agents expressed the increasing infrastructural power of finance in 
American society – even while financiers and governments sought to re-create the external 
monetary restraint of the gold standard. 
These efforts, on the part of Republican administrations of the Progressive era to 
perpetuate the centrality of private finance to the international system and return the 
monetary order to a ‘sound’ basis in gold, were a counterpart to their attempts to address the 
political problems which had followed from the industrialisation and modernisation of the US 
economy in the aftermath of the Civil War. A major aspect of their objectives – to correct 
modernity’s social pathologies through rational bureaucratic interventions - rested on the 
conception of the necessity to manage the processes of industrial and financial concentration 
which had begun to emerge through the later 19th century. In practical terms, this had two 
major features. 
One of the first items on the Progressive political agenda was to break the hold of the 
so-called ‘money trust’ on the boardrooms of the country’s most valuable companies. 
Allegations of anti-competitive collusion by hundreds of major businesses and financial 
institutions centred upon J.P Morgan were corroborated by the Congressional hearings of the 
Pujo Committee, and saw the era become imbued with lasting anti-banker sentiment. This was 
exacerbated by the perception that bankers were able to manipulate the government to 
ensure that World War I debts would be repaid by any means. 105   
The Pujo hearings formed the backdrop to some of the most important Progressive 
legislation, including the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. In the context of public fears concerning 
elite cooperation and anti-competitive practices, the Federal Reserve System was founded as a 
decentralised network of Reserve Banks – rather than a centralised authority in the manner of 
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the Bank of England. It was mandated to formalise the rules of credit extension – constituting 
the dollar as an asset-based currency in the context of the formal gold standard. In order to 
avoid the concentration of financial power so abhorrent to the public, a network of Federal 
Reserve Banks would therefore take responsibility for credit policy, which was understood as 
creating a market for banks’ assets – bills of exchange, and commercial and agricultural paper 
– to ensure that the banking system remained liquid. 106  
As Konings observes, for all that Progressive rhetoric excoriated financial elites, this 
was not a significant challenge to the concentration of business ownership and financial power 
in the hands of the Money Trust. It was intended to restore ‘sound financial conditions’ i.e. to 
meet demand for credit, and although its institutional structure was decentralised, this had no 
bearing on the highly concentrated existing structures of financial intermediation which 
‘pyramided’ the entire US financial structure on the Wall Street ‘money centre’ banks. As the 
Fed’s mandate for credit-creation in response to demand for bank reserves saw it expand 
credit during upturns, and tighten it during downturns, this institutional feature would have 
major significance in the context of the Dawes plan and the boom in foreign lending – as I will 
explore below. 
This relates closely to the second – and most essential – feature of the Progressive 
agenda: a process of detailed public and civic regulation with the objectives of promoting self-
improvement, entrepreneurialism and competition in the domestic economy.  
One of the key features of reform to working and middle-class people was the 
extension of formal credit. Following the First World War, instalment credit products other 
than mortgage lending were popularised, seeing borrowing and lending enter the social 
mainstream as a means to accommodate enhanced productivity by promoting consumption. 
As Martijn Konings has shown, during the 1920s, stock market speculation and new forms of 
lending and borrowing entered the middle and working-class milieu.  The entrance of large 
numbers of small investors into the domestic and international capital markets through 
Progressive reforms effectively served the interests of the financial and corporate elites.107 
The new features of the Progressive landscape of the US did not cause the bubble of 
the 1920s on their own:  this was intimately related to the particular institutional nature of the 
American banking system, which was centred on the New York Stock Exchange, and the role it 
played in the international economy. 
 In this era the general character of international investment was already determined 
to a greater degree by the practices of New York than by the City of London. Following the First 
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World War, American financial methods and practices were highly influential. The entry of new 
groups into the capital markets combined with the newly-founded Federal Reserve’s mandate 
to generate credit pro-cyclically led to increased volumes of funds being channelled into the 
stock market. Commercial banks promoted the holding of securities, and began to take on 
functions of investment banks such as underwriting, in their efforts to challenge the House of 
Morgan-oriented institutions of the so-called ‘Money Trust’ targeted by the Republicans. 
Securities – commercial stock or government bills – were used by commercial banks to 
replace their cash reserves. A proportion of these reserves would be held on deposit at larger 
banks, which would in turn keep accounts with New York’s largest financial institutions. The 
‘money centre banks’ then used these assets as the basis for short term overnight deposits in 
the accounts of stockbrokers. These short-term loans were known as ‘call loans’, the 
profitability of which was predicated upon capital appreciation via the ‘call rate’, a feature of 
the volume of business done on the exchange. Short-term money was available at rates which 
were determined only by activity on the exchange - unlike in London, where short-term 
obligations were highly sensitive to international conditions, as they were only settled every 
two weeks. Call rates rose to fantastic levels during periods of expansion, and would suck 
funds in from rival exchanges.108 The reforms of the Progressive era, combined with the 
centrality of the Wall Street to international capital markets led to the ‘pyramiding’ of almost 
the entire system’s stock of rapidly realisable assets on the NYSE. 
The potential returns on international investment through this pyramid were a major 
driver of the growth of the domestic US financial market. The attraction of foreign bonds to 
private American investors was rivalled only by the attraction of foreign bonds to New York’s 
major issue houses. From 1918 until 1927, a larger proportion of US capital invested in new 
issues was employed abroad than at home. New issues on foreign account increased both in 
absolute terms, and relative to domestic investment, and the profits available attracted large 
numbers of foreign countries, municipalities, and corporations. 
It was not just the prospect of the returns which could be gained from international 
investment undertaken by private individuals which made it such a central aspect of the 
extension of the infrastructural power of finance in American society. Again, this was related 
to the specific practices of US intermediaries: the profits to the issuing house consisted of the 
spread between what the ultimate borrower received, and the ultimate purchaser paid, with 
floatation expenses deducted. Foreign issues were passed through long chains of syndicates of 
banks and houses, selling onwards at ever increasing margins – investors enjoyed a positive 
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interest rate differential of between 1.7 and 1.9 points over domestic issues, and an average 
return of 6.4%. Bond salesmen were dispatched to new metropolitan bank branches across the 
US, which were not bound by the laws preventing branch banking – entailing higher costs and 
pushing the spreads up – in the pursuit of new investors. Eventually, the popularity of this 
market drew in sufficient new participants to force issue houses to drop their margins, making 
it cheaper for borrowers while continuing to yield above domestic investments109.  
The way in which international investments were undertaken was therefore of huge 
importance to the international system. Large numbers of investment houses would compete 
over the same loan, incurring huge expenses while entertaining clients and bribing officials. 
The loans and their contracts provided a considerable market for US materials and services 
and employed engineers in large numbers abroad, and projects enhanced demand for the 
products of US industry. All manner of loans – for stabilisation, for productive purposes, 
residential developments, to church organisations and schools – were made as American 
promoters travelled widely in search of borrowers.  
In a contemporary account, Cleona Lewis observed that: 
 “Some of the more conservative bankers attempted to protect the public from 
the losses likely to follow unrestrained foreign lending, but there were many 
others who were urging loans upon foreign borrowers in excess of their 
requirements, and sometimes in opposition to the advice of responsible officials 
in the borrowing countries.”110 
The weaker the issue, the larger the spread – seeking out poor risks and selling them 
to gullible private buyers was strongly incentivised, to the extent that the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency would later comment that: 
 “The record of the activities of investment bankers in the floatation of foreign 
securities is one of the most scandalous chapters in the history of American 
investment banking. The sale of these foreign issues was characterised by 
practices and abuses which were violative of the most elementary principles of 
business ethics.”111  
In 1927 the Peruvian president made a personal visit to New York to request that the 
size of the loan they were negotiating be halved: his request was refused, and several further 
loans followed. Lewis comments that a great many applicants demonstrated extravagance, 
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wastefulness, and borrowed far more than they needed. However, warnings from both sides 
including from representatives of J.P. Morgan, and the Agent General for Reparation Payments 
in respect of new lending to Germany, went unheeded by the banking community and largely 
escaped the notice of the investing public. 
After the crash of 1929, falling commodity prices and the decline in world trade and 
productive activity were structural conditions of the global political economy of the inter-war 
era. These obstacles to repayment were in fact consequences of American policy: imports 
were restricted, which was highly problematic for those debtors who were dependent on 
single product exports which were already impacted by falling prices.  
Around 75% of total foreign bonds held in the US in 1929 were the obligations of 
municipal or local governments. By 1937 35-40% of foreign bonds issued were in default – 
nearly half were European borrowers with Germany alone counting for almost 32% of the 
total. 39% were South American countries, of which Brazil and Chile accounted for 22%. As 
local currencies sank against the dollar, the terms of repayment became even less favourable 
than they already were. Loans had been agreed at onerous terms of between 6 and 8%, in 
some cases reaching levels of 10.2% by maturity. If amortization charges were included, this 
often rose to 12-15% of the amount originally borrowed112. In terms of foreign private lending, 
the ultimate impact of the 1929 crash and ensuing Depression was that the US itself became a 
distressed creditor, with an aggregated sum outstanding of $6.3bn at the end of 1935.  
The salient feature of the era then, was the way in which mass participation in 
financial relations and the specific practices of intermediaries interacted with Progressive 
reforms in the context of the NYSE’s centrality to international liquidity provision. This 
represented the deepening of the infrastructural power of finance, and it was this power 
which was reflected in the delegation of financiers to negotiate at the conferences which 
would shape the international monetary order prior to the Depression. Although Roosevelt 
appeared to follow in the ostensibly anti-financial traces of Progressive reformers, legislating 
more directly against the institutional concentration of the US banking system upon the 
‘money centre’ banks of New York, these conditions would not be threatened by the New 
Deal. As I will show in greater detail in the following section, the ‘anti-finance’ rhetoric which 
emerged as a key feature of political discourse in this era was in fact designed to locate the 
Democratic project in the legacy of Progressivism and safeguard the involvement of anti-
Morgan financiers in the historic New Deal coalition. 
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Shifting Political Alliances and the Political Economy of the New Deal.  
The narrative of ‘financial repression’ which is developed at the centre of the 
‘embedded liberalism’ thesis on the Bretton Woods era draws considerable credibility from 
the popular discourse of the  Progressive era. It is clear enough that the zeitgeist remained 
significantly anti-financier or perhaps more accurately, anti- J.P. Morgan during the New Deal 
era.  The public were again scandalised by the monopolistic practices and corruption revealed 
in the course of the Republican-initiated Pecora investigation into the Wall Street Crash. The 
level of public interest in the hearings as Jack Morgan testified during reached ‘hysterical’ 
levels113. Hysteria was also a driver in a run on commercial banks beginning in February 1933, 
which prompted US citizens to hoard cash – increasing private holdings by $1.78bn between 
the 8th of February and the 8th of March. This led Roosevelt to call a bank holiday universalising 
the ad-hoc moratoria called independently across the country, during which Congress passed 
the Emergency Banking Act as a predecessor to the Banking Act of 1933 – which would 
become famous as the ‘Glass – Steagall Act’114. However, the resolution of the crisis of the 
1930s which is emphasised in the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis was contingent upon the 
enlistment of financiers in the cause of the New Deal. 
The Roosevelt administration was determined to be seen to break up the close 
relationships between the Federal Reserve System and Wall Street by enacting legislation 
reigning in the FRBNY and bringing its powerful Open Market Committee under the control of 
the Reserve Board in Washington. Roosevelt also sought to protect investors through the 
foundation of the Securities and Exchange Commission with the remit to enhance oversight, 
improve competition, and undermine the House of Morgan’s hold on the financial system at 
large by enforcing the separation of deposit-taking commercial banking operations from 
investment banking under the terms of the Glass-Steagall act.  
It is interesting to note the extent to which this objective has been mythologised in 
order to make it fit the narrative of the New Deal as a radical break with the practices of the 
1920s which underpins the concept of ‘embedded liberalism. As I noted above, the quotation 
from Morgenthau’s closing address to the final plenary session of the Bretton Woods 
conference is frequently deployed as prima facia evidence of the New Dealers’ commitment to 
this end. Yet it is extremely surprising to note that it is conventionally distorted through 
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paraphrase, or slightly but crucially misquoted, divorced from its context in the remainder of 
his speech.115   
As Brett Christophers has pointed out, the word ‘only’ is omitted from its position in 
the famous quotation.116 It is worth quoting this passage at length, as it appears in the minutes 
of the final plenary session of the UN monetary and financial conference at Bretton Woods on 
the 22nd of July 1944: 
 “Objections to this Bank have been raised by some bankers and a few economists. 
The institutions proposed by the Bretton Woods Conference would indeed limit the 
control which certain private bankers have in the past exercises [sic] over 
international finance. It would by no means restrict the investment sphere in which 
bankers could engage. On the contrary, it would greatly expand this sphere by 
enlarging the volume of international investment and would act as an enormously 
effective stabilizer and guarantor of loans which they might make. The chief 
purpose of the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development is to 
guarantee private loans made through the usual investment channels. It would 
make loans only when these could not be floated through the normal channels at 
reasonable rates. The effect would be to provide capital for those who need it at 
lower interest rates than in the past and to drive only the usurious money lenders 
from the temple of international finance. For my own part I cannot look upon this 
outcome with any sense of dismay.” 117 (My emphasis). 
 
Wall Street may not have been invited to Bretton Woods, as Kapur et al have it, but 
Morgenthau was speaking in praise of the Bank’s role in support of finance – the IBRD would, 
by offering guarantees, complement private capital and facilitate the expansion of investment 
beyond its contemporary limits on a sounder basis than during the inter-war boom.  This 
should be seen in the context of the effort to break the Morgan monopoly in the form of the 
‘money trust’, as he alluded to only very slightly later in the same speech: “Capital, like any 
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other commodity, should be free from monopoly control, and available upon reasonable terms 
to those who will put it to use for the general welfare.”118 
The ‘usurious money lenders’ had developed an extremely close relationship with the 
Federal Reserve system during its efforts to resuscitate and prop up the gold exchange 
standard from 1925-1931. The J. P. Morgan-dominated New York financial community and 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York governor Benjamin Strong continued to espouse the core 
ideal of the classical gold standard era: that monetary policy should be insulated from 
politicians’ interference, while seeking to extend their own influence over it. Strong 
successfully lobbied for the central administration of open market operations in support of 
European currencies, which had been controversial among the member banks of the federal 
system119. Policy would be formulated by the Governors’ Conference (the Federal Open 
Market Committee from 1930) and executed by the FRBNY, transforming it into a de-facto 
American central bank for international transactions – to which Washington remained 
‘indifferent’120. This coup meant that the established financial elites of Wall Street had been 
able to gain significant institutional influence over the main tool of US monetary policy. 
It had been clear since the later 1920s that the adjustment mechanism of the 
international regime was not working to eliminate surpluses and deficits as it should, and that 
the capital flows which had previously financed current account deficits were too volatile to be 
relied upon.121 Arguments for the gold standard had been forcefully made, and the House of 
Morgan and the Federal Reserve had undertaken major efforts to support established parities 
– of Sterling in particular. Yet austerity, strictly balanced budgets, and greater adherence to 
the rules of the system - which had been habitually broken in the US and Britain122 - had failed 
to achieve stability. The rigor of such a position had already become politically unsustainable, 
and the scale of the problem posed an existential crisis for the financial systems of Europe and 
the US. Following the Wall Street Crash, as conditions deteriorated everywhere, so did 
prospects for successful management of the international monetary system through informal 
cooperation among central bankers and private financiers. 
That the international monetary system of the 1920s was supported by financial 
practices which while stabilising in the short term in the longer term would confound hopes of 
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a return to stability and growth, became an article of common sense in the 1930s123. These 
features were stressed in the RIIA report of 1937 which cited Keynes’ 1922 A Revision of the 
Treaty to the effect that the European dependence on American financial flows as seen in the 
1920s was not analogous to America’s heavy borrowing in European capital markets during the 
19th century. By the time of the Hoover Moratorium and the abandonment of the gold 
standard in 1931, the connection between war debts and reparations was finally made explicit 
- after the US had received over $2.6bn in war debt payments, the majority of which had been 
interest124. There was little likelihood that American investment would re-develop Europe 
because there was “...no natural increase, no real sinking fund, out of which they will be 
repaid.”125  
Although the political discourse of the age was replete with anti-financier rhetoric, it 
does not necessarily follow that finance was actually ‘repressed’.  The desire to break the 
Morgan monopoly and gain control of powerful tools of national monetary policy need not be 
equated with abandonment of the close relationship between the financial community and 
previous Republican administrations.  
Fred Block expressed the currents in American political economy of the 1930s and 
1940s concerning the role of the US in the international economy as a conflict between 
‘business internationalists’ and ‘idealistic internationalists’. Business internationalists, on the 
one hand, feared links between ‘planners’ and labour – high taxes and the attenuation of 
capital’s power would cause US goods and finance to be priced out of global markets. This 
group sought a multilateral and open global system, in contrast to the ‘idealists’ who hoped to 
extend the New Deal internationally and create international institutions which would funnel 
capital into under-developed areas without the participation of private capital. According to 
Block, this division was reflected in governmental bureaucratic conflicts, between the idealistic 
anti-Wall Street planners of the Treasury and the Wilsonian free-traders among the business 
internationalists of the State Department126. The central issue for both was how to prevent a 
return to socially unacceptable levels of unemployment and simultaneously overcome the 
illiquidity of the international system of the inter-war era, exacerbated by the capital flight into 
the US in the late 1930s. 
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The evolving foreign economic policy debate or the era did hinge on the export 
surplus, but perspectives on solutions and the constituencies taking positions in relation to this 
matter were not as monolithic or inflexible, or easily comparable to partisan politics between 
departments as Block suggests. The positioning of finance was relatively fluid in terms of its 
political support and while international transactions cleared ‘automatically’ in gold might well 
have been considered an ideal in some quarters, financiers engaged pragmatically with the 
new managed political economy in seeking to achieve new conditions for profitable 
investment. 
The Treasury’s moves to stabilise the dollar against the Sterling and Gold blocs, 
engineered by Harry White and Roosevelt’s economic adviser-at-large in European relations 
Jacob Viner, were popular among the banking fraternity. The pronouncements of Leon Fraser 
of the First National Bank of New York are exemplary of this political flexibility, revealed in the 
transition between the first and second New Deal administrations. Fraser deplored the policies 
of the Roosevelt administration of 1933, while eulogising the policies of the Roosevelt 
administration of 1937 as a move toward an international policy which would incorporate the 
best of the old gold standard, corrected on the basis of contemporary experiences of currency 
management127 
Finance houses such as J.P. Morgan and Company; Kuhn, Loeb and Company; or Dillon, 
Read and Company had historically been the most internationally oriented fraction of the 
business community, along with those industries which had grown profitable during the First 
World War. Their political interests were potentially as bipartisan as their business interests 
were diverse: it was revealed during the Pecora investigation that J.P. Morgan representatives 
had made attempts to influence prominent figures in business, finance, and both Republican 
and Democratic parties including Roosevelt’s first Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin by 
privately offering discounted shares.128 It was understood that the future of the international 
monetary system would not look the same as the past. 
Industrialists related to the question of planning and protectionism, labour rights and 
taxation depending upon their relation with European competitors. Ferguson’s study of the 
socio-political transitions of the New Deal era explores this fluid set of relations between 
political representatives, industrialists, and financiers. Older industrial concerns in steel, 
textiles, and coal, faced competitive pressures from European and Latin American firms and 
sought the protection of tariffs or specific bilateral trade treaties. These labour-intensive 
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industries were characterised by bitter antagonism with unions, in contrast to a smaller group 
of newer capital-intensive industrial firms which had profited enormously from the First World 
War and within which labour relations were broadly more conciliatory. Organised according to 
modern Taylorist production models; these latter firms had less stake in Republican ‘laissez 
faire’ social policies. World leaders such as General Electric found that rather than threatening 
competitors, European markets represented potentially lucrative zones of expansion. As the 
war had transformed the US into a net creditor, investment and commercial bankers, who had 
previously supported the Republican party’s combination of aggressive nationalism and laissez 
faire international monetary and financial practices, found that their greatest interest lay in a 
multilateral trading system and advocated lower tariffs with a view to rendering their 
investments in capital intensive industry more productive129. 
The withdrawal of governmental support to international investors during the 
Coolidge and Hoover administrations drove greater numbers of financiers and industrialists 
into this nascent internationalist bloc130. Within the financial community a further split 
developed in the previously Republican-oriented compact of banking and industry, as outrage 
among smaller and newer investment houses grew at the cosy relationship between the house 
of Morgan, fellow veteran institutions such as Kuhn, Loeb, and newer public organisations, 
particularly the FRBNY. The ability of these established firms to manipulate interest rates in 
order to support the viability of their own international commercial and financial interests 
drove newer and smaller firms such as Brown Brothers Harriman, Goldman Sachs, Lehman 
Brothers, the First National Bank of Chicago and Dillon Read into the arms of the Democratic 
party in the election of 1928. This was compounded by Hoover’s international debt 
moratorium, and industrial and agricultural interests were further alienated by Republican 
attitudes against deficit financing, tariff rises beyond Smoot-Hawley, cartelisation, and ‘easy’ 
monetary policy. The shared interest of industry and finance in traditional liberal international 
political economy was disappearing. 
Behind the first New Deal programme of financial regulation, expansionary domestic 
monetary policy, devaluation, and the protectionism of the National Recovery Administration, 
stood a coalition of industrialists, farmers, major anti-Morgan financial interests and oil 
companies. Recovery destabilised this coalition, as internationally-oriented industrialists and 
financiers sought to resume business overseas. However, the success of Roosevelt’s banking 
reforms, moves toward freer multilateral trade, and stabilisation of the dollar combined with 
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social welfare programs such as the 1935 National Labour Relations Act saw a reconfiguration 
of the Democratic support base. Crucially, by 1938, reserves had become sufficient to allow 
deficit financing without devaluation or significant protectionism – partly at the expense of the 
absorption of European flight capital. For financiers such as Leon Fraser, the bilateral 
agreements, managed floating, and negotiations with Latin American governments over 
defaults constituted highly welcome moves in the direction of the foundation of a functioning 
international capital market131. 
A crucial element of the solution to the crisis of the 1930s was laid as financial 
interests lined up for Roosevelt. These included the established houses of the Warburgs, 
Rockefellers, and J.P.Morgan - as the second New Deal administration formed an historic 
coalition of high-tech industry, finance, and labour around issues of social welfare, free trade, 
Keynesian counter-cyclical spending, and oil price regulation132. During the Congressional 
hearings on the Bretton Woods Act, their support for the new institutions over Williams’ Key 
Currency Plan, and the spoiling tactics of Republican Senators such as Robert Taft, would be 
crucial in the launching of the new international monetary and financial order. 
3: Passing the Act, Founding the Bank. 
The re-constituted gold standard did not outlast the first year of the 1930s: the 
continual avoidance of adjustment by the leading players in the gold exchange standard 
regime which the Dawes plan had aimed to support ultimately prevented the system from 
functioning, and had led to increasing protectionism and volatility in capital flows. The New 
Deal had followed the collapse of the inter-war system, and as described above, financiers had 
been instrumental in attempts to reconfigure the social instrumentalities through which the 
international regime of the future would be structured and operated. 
These efforts did not mean that financiers accepted the necessity of capital controls. 
Indeed, the trenchant opposition of certain of the foremost members of the New York 
financial community to the political consensus on the necessity of capital controls expressed 
by the US and British proposals is a prominent theme of Helleiner’s account of the Bretton 
Woods regime. According to Mason and Asher, US commercial banks feared the creation of 
any institution which would compete with them; while Eckes describes private bankers as the 
‘natural’ enemies of the new institutions. In seeking to undermine the proposals for the post-
war liquidity regime, these bankers were part of a wider conservative group including the Wall 
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Street Journal, New York Times, and Chicago Tribune; and a vocal contingent of the Republican 
Party133.   
These observations constitute the foundation of Helleiner’s argument that the Fund 
and the Bank were founded in opposition to the wishes and interests of New York bankers. 
That the Act was passed by Congress in the face of this opposition is taken to mean that the 
interests of financial capital were not served by the Bretton Woods regime to the same extent 
as the ‘liberal’ regime which had preceded it, and by Ruggie to mean that they were 
‘embedded’ in the relatively more socially legitimate interests of ‘states’ in building a regime 
based upon Fordist production and free trade. 
Opposition to the institutions of the post-war regime centred upon the IMF as the 
principal lightening-rod of the critique of the financial community. Article VI, Section 3 of the 
IMF Articles of Agreement concedes the right to utilise capital controls to member 
governments, although this is hedged elsewhere in the Articles to discourage policy tools 
which functioned to delay transfer of funds in settlement of ‘commitments’ (Article VI, Section 
3), or which could obstruct payments and transfers in relation to current international 
transactions (Article VIII Section 2a)134. In drafting its articles, British and American officials 
sought to create a system where capital controls would be the norm. 
 In White’s original conception the Bank had featured as the stronger of the two 
proposed institutions, with powers to act in support of global full employment135. With a gold 
and local currency capital stock of $10bn, 50% of which would be paid-in capital, it would 
depart significantly from multilateral orthodoxy by acting against financial fluctuations to 
support member currencies, stabilise commodity prices, and lend over long terms at low 
rates136. Bankers found themselves almost superfluous in the international system envisaged in 
this plan, and criticised it accordingly.  
Nonetheless, in comparison to the IMF,  Eckes’ ‘natural opponents’ such as prominent 
banker Winthrop Aldrich, treated the Bank as relatively uncontroversial in the process of 
Congressional ratification of the Bretton Woods Act. Mason and Asher suggest that this may 
have been a strategic effort on the part of the financial community to present their position in 
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such a way as to demonstrate that they were not entirely negative about the post-war 
settlement, and thus retain the capacity to influence it137. 
While fear of being squeezed out by state financial capital was clearly a significant 
characteristic of private financiers’ attitudes to the proposed institutions, their opposition was 
ameliorated by the idea that the new institutions would constitute a set of temporary 
measures aimed at creating a sound regime for international trade. This was also a feature of 
the early attitudes of members of Bank management. Sections of the financial community also 
expressed appreciation of the Bank’s potential utility in establishing the conditions under 
which international investment would become profitable again, following the breakdown of 
relations between Wall Street and Latin American investors which had remained unresolved 
since the onset of the Depression.  Further, the efforts of the anti-Bretton Woods grouping to 
reduce the scope of the IMF’s operations would come to enhance the significance of the Bank 
in the short-term, and the same contingent’s intransigence on the matter of capitalisation 
would necessitate close engagement with the bond market in a way which would 
institutionalise the interests of financial capital in the Bank’s practices, policies, and personnel 
through to the present day. 
These efforts began with a series of intensive discussions of potential revisions to the 
proposals which took place among officials from the State, Treasury, and Commerce 
Departments; the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Export-Import Bank, and the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System between April 1942 and January 1944. It was 
concluded that the new institutions were to co-operate with private financial agencies with a 
view to facilitating flows of private portfolio investment where this would not occur under 
‘normal’ market conditions.  
This was reflected in the substantially revised position evident in a January 1944 
question-and answer document shared with foreign representatives: investment capital should 
be provided by private investment channels supported by Bank guarantees, and private capital 
was to be supplemented through Bank participation in loans, or ‘encouraged’ through direct 
lending. From this point onwards, the Treasury’s concept of the Bank reflected financial 
concerns and aimed to encourage private capital to invest overseas by offering guarantees – 
its’ primary function should be to share private risk, with direct lending as a secondary 
strategy138.  
These concessions began to thaw the attitudes of the financial community, eliciting a 
statement from the American Institute of Banking (AIB) that it would likely have a ‘wholesome’ 
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effect on the volume and quality of international investment. The ability to consider loans in 
the light of the general conditions of member economies would enable it to help investors to 
overcome the excessive extensions of credit which had been at the root of the defaults which 
remained outstanding in 1944. Further, it would be able to coordinate lending policies to 
offset large fluctuations in international investment and hence to facilitate counter-cyclical 
policies.139 
None of this was considered inimical to the activities of financiers: Bank guarantees 
would be essential in supporting private lending – the emphasis upon which the AIB 
particularly welcomed “in view of the general disrepute into which foreign loans have fallen 
and the fact that the public in many cases may not be familiar with the position of the 
borrower and thus the quality of the security”140. The importance of creating the conditions for 
long-term international investment called, in the view of the AIB, for the supervision of such 
flows by an international organisation141. This perspective was shared by the Executive 
Committee of the American Bankers’ Association (ABA) and the US Chamber of Commerce’s 
Finance Department. Their conclusion was that the Fund should be deferred, but the Bank 
should play a major role in facilitating the return of private capital to the international arena. 
Their attitude towards the IMF was an entirely different matter. 
During the 1945 Congressional hearings, a loose coalition of isolationists, Republican 
business-people and laissez-faire conservatives began to coalesce around figures such as 
Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and Winthrop Aldrich, the chairman of the Chase 
National Bank. Alongside other prominent Rockefeller-oriented Democrats, Aldrich had 
supported Roosevelt’s campaign during the formation of the first New Deal coalition when 
tensions between rival financial groups played an important role in redefining the national 
political agenda. Conflict with the House of Morgan over his chairmanship of the Chase had 
seen him personally lobby for the Glass-Steagall bill in order to further undermine Morgan 
interests142. In spite of this bitter conflict, Aldrich now found common ground with Morgan’s 
Thomas W. Lamont during the Congressional hearings.   
Their opposition took a familiar form – around the same arguments which had 
confounded the Delacroix and Ter Meulen plans: the contravention of national sovereignty, 
and potential to cause inflation. Speaking on behalf of the Republican National committee, 
Aldrich attacked the Bretton Woods accords in his September 1944 address to the Executives 
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Club of Chicago. Arguing that the Fund was little more than a trick by which governments 
would be allowed to avoid responsibility for enacting unpopular internal adjustments, Aldrich 
contended that the proposed institutions should be abandoned in favour of a return to a gold 
anchored system which would operate automatically to enforce adjustment in response to 
deficits and surpluses143. Prominent figures in the American financial community who had also 
previously supported the Roosevelt administration, such as Leon Fraser, Eugene Stetson 
(chairman of the Guaranty Trust), Gordon Reutscher (City Bank), George Whitney (J.P. Morgan 
and Company144), and most damagingly of all, veterans of the Federal Reserve system including 
American Bankers’ Association (ABA) chairman W. Randolph Burgess, Edward ‘Eagle’ Brown of 
the Federal Reserve Advisory council, and both the FRBNY president Allan Sproul and vice-
president John H. Williams, all  lined up in favour of a supplanting the Fund with a stabilisation 
programme akin to the 19th century form of the gold standard. 
Their alternative was formulated by Williams. The ‘key currency plan’ he proposed 
entailed stabilising sterling and the US dollar as a first order priority. These were the only truly 
international currencies, and their determined the relations between all others. Therefore, if 
this were to be achieved, international trade and finance could be organised without any kind 
of international governing body. To this end, Britain should be offered significant dollar funds 
in either credits or aid grants.145 If sterling resumed an international role, Britain could pursue 
multilateral trade policies – and the City of London could reduce the strain on the scarce US 
dollar by re-opening as an international capital market. This would facilitate European – US 
trade, and obviate the necessity to engage in bilateral financing arrangements through the 
IMF, and costly nationalist economic policies. Leon Fraser, in an address to the New York 
Herald-Tribune Forum on November 21st 1943 suggested a loan of $5,000m; while Aldrich, 
speaking before the International Business Conference at Rye, New York, a year later 
suggested a grant-in-aid of $3,000m; and Williams suggested the continuation of Lend-Lease in 
May of 1945146. The ABA argued instead for the Williams plan and for the merging of the IMF 
with the IBRD147, and was supported in this by the Association of Reserve City Bankers, and the 
Bankers Association for Foreign Trade.148 The system simply needed enough capital.149 
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The bankers had a solid basis for their arguments: the problems of sterling were 
problems for the stability of any post-war monetary order and the viability of the Bretton 
Woods proposals. Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, Britain was obliged to eliminate 
payments discriminations. To return to multilateral convertibility, Britain desperately needed 
funds to stabilise sterling at the head of the imperial trading bloc, and was attempting to 
obtain further budgetary relief by demanding write-downs of war-time debts to the US. 
Negotiations led to joint statements on trade and payments policy, and on the settlement of 
Lend-Lease.  Under the Anglo-American Financial and Commercial Agreements, Britain 
achieved a loan of $3.75 billion (although it had originally asked for much more, to Keynes’ 
chagrin), and for an additional payment of £615 million, obtained a write-off of over $20bn in 
assistance, and the transfer of $6.5bn of US property located within her borders in 1945150. If 
London had not obtained a loan to this end, Parliament would have been unlikely to ratify the 
Bretton Woods Act, as it would have been put in the humiliating position of having to compete 
for dollars with other Fund members. Providing the liquidity sterling needed was essential – it 
was the capital the system needed. 
Failing to provide this capital would have threatened the entire dollar-based blueprint 
for the post-war era. The Bretton Woods Act itself contained little in the way of specifics 
relating to how stable convertibility was to be achieved - the British loan and the Anglo-
American Commercial Agreements constituted the essential ‘nuts and bolts’ of the 
achievement of the new settlement. The loan may have resembled an attempt to appease 
bankers by implementing the core proposal of the Williams plan; at any rate, it was strongly 
supported by the American Banking Association and the New York banking fraternity.151 But it 
reflected a systemic imperative: its major purpose was to make Bretton Woods possible by 
deflecting the criticism which had been aimed at the Fund, and had threatened to scupper the 
entire settlement.  
With the core of the Williams Plan in place, guaranteeing economic benefits to US 
industries and their financial backers, financiers’ pressure groups were able to extract further 
crucial compromises concerning the role of the Fund to seal the passage of the Act. Firstly, 
moderate business leaders agreed to a proposal put forward by Beardsly Ruml (Treasurer of 
Macy and Co, and longstanding Roosevelt advisor) to the Committee for Economic 
Development think-tank to the effect that the Bank should take on the role of making short-
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term stabilisation loans in lieu of the Fund152. The Fund, they agreed, would benefit from the 
protection of a narrower mandate which would prevent its exhaustion in relief and 
reconstruction, and potential accumulation of unstable currencies in the context of the 
instability of the immediate post-war years153. 
Secondly, an interdepartmental committee was to be established to formulate US 
policy towards both institutions. The proposed committee eventually became the National 
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, chaired by the Secretaries 
of Treasury and Commerce, the chairmen of the Fed and the Export-Import Bank, although 
excluding the FRBNY. Secondly, policy coordination was to be further facilitated by uniting the 
posts of US governor in the Fund and the Bank, and likewise that of the American Executive 
Director. Ensuring that the proposals were accepted by the ABA was contingent upon Treasury 
agreement to seek an official interpretation confirming that the Bank could undertake short-
term lending for stabilisation and balance-of payments support.  
These twin compromises would come to define the subsequent character of the 
international monetary regime. The Bank would lend for stabilisation, at the expense of the 
Fund. Ultimately, the Bank emerged as the most important aspect of the international liquidity 
architecture and this would entail a particularly close relationship with the financiers who had 
sought to ensure that White and Keynes’ vision was stillborn. Staff selection, governance, and 
lending practices were to be shaped decisively by this relationship. The new institution’s first 
task would be to promote its bonds to American investors. 
Financiers’ opposition to the Fund ensured that the institution which emerged from 
the ratification process the strongest was not the institution which was capitalised by states. 
The Bank was – at least temporarily – to be the pillar of liquidity provision in the new 
international order, and it would draw its capitalisation from private financial markets. By 
enacting the core recommendation of the Williams plan, agreeing that the Bank would 
supplant the Fund in making short term stabilisation loans, and founding the NAC as a steering 
committee through which financial lobbyists would retain access to the US Executive Director 
of the Fund and the Bank, the Truman administration had secured the passage of the Bretton 
Woods Act through Congress and the British legislative apparatus – but had fundamentally 
altered the nature of its institutions. 
 That it was considered a political necessity to submit to the bankers’ mauling of the 
Fund in Congress is suggestive of the extent to which it was considered a necessity to enlist 
financiers in the operation of the institutions which would govern the new international order. 
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Without capitalisation from private investors, the infrastructure of the Bretton Woods regime 
would have been almost entirely impotent. The illiquidity of the international system was a 
problem for all fractions of the New Deal compact. Without the Bank’s action as a stop-gap 
financier to Europe – which I will discuss in the following chapter – there would have been no 
exchange movements to control. The interests of financiers were indivisible from the interests 
of business and the state in this period, as the problem they faced was one they had in 
common. 
 Focusing on capital controls as the key determinant of the nature of the era is as 
misleading as focusing on the anti-financier rhetoric of the popular press and the Roosevelt 
administration itself – or the anti-Bretton Woods, or more accurately, anti-IMF rhetoric of 
financiers themselves. In so doing, the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis and the many accounts 
which draw upon it, tend to underestimate the extent to which the very infrastructure of 
Bretton Woods required the enrolment of private finance. The place of finance in the story of 
Bretton Woods should more properly be understood as central and formative – not peripheral 
or oppositional. The success of the institutional framework demanded its enlistment. 
 
 Conclusion 
As we have seen, the depiction of the Bretton Woods order by Ruggie and Helleiner as 
a regime of ‘embedded liberalism’ in direct contrast to the ‘disembedded’ regime between the 
wars is somewhat misleading. Their understanding of New Deal anti-financier rhetoric as a 
signifier of a political programme which was antagonistic towards, and successful in repressing, 
the expression of financial interests in public policy follows from the emphasis they place on 
international capital controls. Yet from the US perspective, the financial movements of the era 
were not significantly destabilising and the US Treasury did not adopt capital controls in the 
manner of its counterparts across the Atlantic. Indeed, large flows into the US were actually 
favourable to the US agenda of building a new international order around the dollar: they were 
an essential aspect of the ability of the US to emerge as financier to European powers. For 
European economies on the other hand, the volatility of capital markets and the flight of 
European capital to the dollar was a significant concern. The centrality of capital controls as a 
signifier of the nature of the age may be argued to have been smuggled into accounts of the 
period via the protestations of Lord Keynes and his counterparts from the Treasuries of Europe 
in the feverish atmosphere of the Bretton Woods conference. 
Taking a longer historical view uncovers a still more serious challenge to this narrative. 
Drawing on the work of Martijn Konings and Leo Panitch, I have illustrated that the anti-
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financier rhetoric of the New Deal should be seen in the context of the problematique of the 
international financial order of the 1910s and 1920s. At the outbreak of conflict in 1914, 
European belligerents financed their munitions purchases through borrowing from the 
American public and American bankers. When the US entered the war in 1917, the 
government further tapped the American public through Liberty Loans and war bonds. During 
the inter-war period, J.P. Morgan and his associates were seen to have exerted direct political 
influence over the US government – and indeed over the entire international financial order in 
forcing the repayment of German reparations. This is the context in which Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau’s remarks on financiers must be situated. The New Deal programme was to be 
enacted in a society in which financiers had attained, through Progressive reforms aimed at 
increasing participation in financial relationships, an infrastructural power. During the 1920s, 
financiers were able to extend their reach into ever-broader strata of American society 
through innovation in credit products and the foundation of new investment institutions. 
Crucially, this infrastructural power was reflected in the international order of the 
1920s. Financiers were able to institutionalise a role as integral facilitators of the interactions 
of states at the international level – acting in concert with and on behalf of the formal 
institutions of states in international economic diplomacy. The problem of illiquidity in the 
aftermath of the Versailles settlement saw the conferences of Brussels and Genoa, as 
precursors to the successful transfusion of the international system with private American 
capital after the agreement of the Dawes Plan. Mass American participation in the purchase of 
foreign bonds followed this agreement – the default of which, after the Wall Street Crash of 
1929 and the onset of the Depression, would set the immediate parameters of Bank action, 
once the necessity of basing its operations in private capital had been realised. More 
immediately, the proposals of financiers at Brussels and Genoa for an institution providing 
guarantees to private investors in order to inject liquidity back into the international system, 
would provide the intellectual foundations upon which the Bank was built. The infrastructural 
power of financial capital was steadily enhanced, becoming increasingly embedded at each 
institutional level. 
This heritage could not be erased by administrative fiat. Even during the first New Deal 
as financiers’ reputations reached their nadir in public political discourse during the Pecora 
investigations of the 1930s, they were not dislodged from their privileged positions as quasi-
formal actors in the state apparatus. The Roosevelt administration courted the support of 
younger financial houses assiduously in its campaign against the Morgan empire. While the 
involvement of prominent private financiers in international negotiation was diminished 
during the Bretton Woods negotiations in comparison to the Dawes regime, they were not 
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displaced from the process. While financiers may have lost some of the direct leverage in the 
political process along with their roles as international negotiators, their infrastructural power 
endured. This infrastructural power had grown from structural necessity. This was largely 
because the central problem faced by the US and Europe endured throughout the efforts to 
return to orthodoxy in the 1920s and the turn towards nationalist macro-management in the 
later 1930s and the years of the second world war remained the same. The common obstacle 
was the basic illiquidity of the system and the problems of convertibility and attendant barriers 
to trade which that engendered. The refusal of the surplus economies to undertake the 
adjustment an automatic system dictated meant that continued capital transfers were 
required. 
The objective of the 1920s was to reconstitute an external autonomous mechanism for 
the management of international transactions and trade, and the objective of the 1940s was to 
replace it with a mechanism capable of stabilising national macro-management and 
multilateral trade simultaneously. At each juncture, this required the reconstitution of the 
private capital markets. The consequences of this were dramatically demonstrated during the 
Bretton Woods era.  
What is the importance of this evidence for our understanding of structural 
adjustment lending, and the narrative of the Washington Consensus? The impact of the 
features of the 1920s on the political climate of the 1930s is renowned. Yet the evidence of the 
strategic utility of finance, on the basis of its social importance, to the agenda of the New Deal 
has only recently been recovered through revisionist histories of the period. These illustrate 
the uniqueness of the American financial infrastructure, and its relationship to the US state. 
This was, these accounts have shown, unlike the haute finance of Europe: mass engagement in 
financial relationships was the basis of increasingly close linkages between the American state 
and financial markets. I argue that this transformation, in train through the Progressive era, 
was reflected in the foundation of the Bank.  
In the form in which it emerged from the Congressional ratification process, the Bank 
had been decisively shaped by financiers ideas and strategic political support. The social basis 
of the Bank in the infrastructure of American finance, which I have illustrated in this chapter, 
would set the parameters within which management could pursue the imperial agenda of the 
US throughout the Bretton Woods era, and beyond, into the era of the Washington Consensus. 
This social basis in the infrastructure of American finance would shape the Bank’s imperatives 
as an institution, in the development of the practice of structural adjustment just as much as in 
the Bank’s earliest operations. The financial imperatives which had already begun to shape the 
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emergent parameters of Bank action in 1945, would mediate the imperial agenda of the US 
from the outset.  
As I will show in the following chapter, this would have an immediate impact on its 
relationship with the US, its organisational structure, and its lending practices. 
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Chapter 3: Morgenthau’s Usurers and the Temple of International 
Finance. 
“Keynes always said you needed more money.”154 
Emilio Collado, US Executive Director. 
 
In Chapter 2, we saw that while the Bretton Woods conference was an affair of states 
and statesmen, the imperative of guaranteeing financiers’ backing began to mediate the 
agenda of the US in the constitution of the post-war order even as the Act passed through 
Congress. Financiers were not displaced from the political process by the New Deal: the 
founders of the Bretton Woods institutions drew upon the practices of private financial 
planners in the 1920s in the design of the new order. Anti-financier rhetoric must be 
understood as an aspect of an effort to reorganise finance in support of national economic 
management in a multilateral international order. Thirdly, the leverage afforded by the 
imperative of guaranteeing their participation meant that financiers were able to secure 
compromises which constituted the IBRD as the principle source of liquidity in the new 
international system at the expense of the Fund. The visible legacy of the 1920s in the basis of 
the Bank’s operation in private capital suggests that the balance of power in international 
finance was not tipped as decisively in favour of the state as Helleiner suggests. 
In this chapter I will show how the foundation of the IBRD on the basis of private 
financial capital mediated its pursuit of the US agenda from the outset. This is visible in the 
struggles between the Executive Directors and management over a series of major changes 
wrought to management structure and lending practice of the new institution within the first 
five years of its operation. These features of the Bank owed more to the practices and 
problems of American financiers than to the idealists of the New Deal or the pragmatists of the 
Truman administration. 
Finding a way in which to meet the immediate problem of capitalisation required 
further major changes to the Bank’s personnel, structure, and strategies. The Bank could not 
look to the major economies of the pre-war era. In some respects, this is intuitive: the 
rationale of its very existence was to foster a liberal international trade regime by helping to 
overcome the shortage of foreign exchange among the old imperial European powers, whose 
monetary policies had been thrown into disarray by the exigencies of war, and whose 
currencies were inconvertible. Therefore, in order to do so, it would be forced to mobilise the 
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support offered by financiers in exchange for the downgrading of the Fund during the 
ratification process.  
Understanding the nature of the Bretton Woods order as a regime in which the agency 
of the US was mediated significantly by the imperatives of financiers is of signal importance for 
our understanding of the Washington Consensus. Rather than subordinating the power of 
American financiers to the Keynesian liberal compromise, Bretton Woods institutionalised the 
extension of its infrastructural power to the international level. As I will show, the era against 
which the Washington Consensus is commonly defined begins to take on a different 
complexion: the extent to which the US agenda would be mediated by the imperatives which 
had begun to emerge in the process of Congressional ratification would rapidly become clear 
in the course of the Bank’s earliest operations. 
The centrality of financial interests as a decisive factor in the transitions made by the 
Bank in its first five years of operation has been widely discussed in the literature concerning 
the governance of the Bretton Woods system. Yet the conventional frame for these 
discussions of financial interests remains the agenda of the US state, which is seen to 
overdetermine the agency of financiers in setting the trajectory of the Bank. 
The account offered by the Brookings Institution historians of the Bank argues that the 
appointment of John J. McCloy as the second President after less than a year of operation 
represented nothing less than a coup executed by Wall Street.155 His appointment was 
predicated upon the re-assignment of operational control from the Executive Directors – as 
representatives of member states – to management. As Kapur, Lewis, and Webb argue, 
McCloy wanted to send a positive message to Wall Street to the effect that subsequent 
decisions would be made on an economic rather than a political basis. Accordingly, he 
recruited a management team which was strikingly representative of the American 
establishment – lawyers, bankers, and corporate officers with impeccable credentials among 
the financiers of New York. Mason and Asher argue that financiers saw this move return some 
of the prestige that the Bank had so rapidly lost after Bretton Woods.156 The 
institutionalisation of lending for productive projects was simply a strategic decision taken to 
appeal to this external constituency.157 
However, these accounts still regard these developments as taking place in a 
framework delineated most decisively by the power of the American state. For Kapur, Lewis, 
and Webb, it represented a short term victory – a strategic move which permitted the Bank to 
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gain the capitalisation it needed to begin operations in earnest.158 Ultimately, they locate this 
moment in the trajectory plotted by Helleiner’s historical analysis159, and after Gardner, argue 
that the Bretton Woods institutions aimed to make finance subservient to ‘human desires’ in 
the international as well as the domestic sphere of politics.160 The limited extent to which this 
‘coup’ is considered to have meaningfully altered the trajectory of US-Bank relations is 
confirmed by their characterisation of the Bank’s support the for US’ anti-communist 
‘development’ agenda on the basis of ideological compatibility.161 
It is surprising to note that although these histories of the Bank’s early operations offer 
accounts which challenge the Polanyian narrative presented by Helleiner, their reification of 
the US as a hegemon in the Realist mode drives them to persist with the narrative of 
embedded liberalism. As a result the ‘relative autonomy’ approach cannot avoid casting the 
Bank as a passive recipient of the political agendas of states and narrow social elites according 
to fluctuating dynamics of direct political influence.  
By depicting finance as antagonistic to the Bretton Woods regime, these accounts 
maintain an analytical blind spot which causes them to actively diminish the importance of the 
evidence which they present. I will show that the transition away from the governance of the 
Executive Directors to management specifically by Wall Street lawyers and bankers - which the 
Brookings accounts illustrate so vividly – reflected a necessary feature of the Bank’s 
governance, not a temporary moment of relative autonomy rapidly subsumed within American 
state power. The enlistment of financiers in the governance of the institution reflected their 
centrality to the Bretton Woods project. Drawing upon the capital available through the deeply 
embedded infrastructure of US finance meant that any agenda the US sought to pursue 
through the Bank would be mediated by the interests of private American investors. In the 
specific processes of lending and conditionality, the impact of this infrastructural power can be 
seen – throughout the history of the Bank. 
I will argue that the transformation of the Bank in the first five years reflects the 
underlying imperative of securing working capital. As Kapur et al show, a political struggle 
between Wall Street and Washington did occur over the governance of the institution. The 
enlistment of finance would have deeper consequences for the governance of the 
international order than the temporary addition of a role as liquidity provider. The key point is 
that this phenomenon is an aspect of the Bank’s capitalisation problems – which is intimately 
related to the wider problematique of liquidity in the immediate post-war period. Financiers’ 
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co-operation was integral to the Bretton Woods system: without it, the Bank would not have 
been able to function as an institution of governance. 
From the outset the Bank was under pressure to fulfil two major objectives. Firstly, it 
was to provide liquidity to Europe prior to the mobilisation of Marshall Aid. Secondly, it was 
under pressure to expand its operations beyond Europe by South American members and the 
Truman administration under the ‘Point Four’ programme. In achieving these aims, it faced a 
barrier which could not be overcome by recourse to the public finances of its members: it was 
drastically under-capitalised.  
Obtaining capital from private investors required the Bank to overcome a number of 
obstacles through a pragmatic political process across the first five years of operation, in order 
to demonstrate that it was a creditworthy institution. It required reconfiguring the original 
management structure to moderate state leverage, and adopting commercial lending practices 
in order to enforce financial discipline upon borrowers who had defaulted on dollar, franc, and 
sterling – denominated bonds in the 1930s. These changes to lending practice and managerial 
structure would become the established process of the day-to-day working of the institution 
until the later 1960s, and would enable the Bank to consistently tap capital markets in the US, 
Europe, and Asia. 
This meant that any agenda the Bank sought to pursue in its early operations would be 
mediated by the interests of the financial community. This observation suggests the limitations 
of the narrative of financial repression advanced by Helleiner. By focusing on the imperatives 
which gave rise to the transformation of the Bank, rather than on the transformations 
themselves, we are able to see how they are derived from the broader structural 
problematique of the illiquidity of the international order and the Bank’s resultant problem of 
capitalisation. From this perspective, the role of financiers cannot be seen as antagonistic to 
the objectives of the Bretton Woods era.  
This suggests that the character of the era, and the role of finance in it were rather 
different. Instead of subordinating financial interests to broader social goals, the era is one in 
which the attainment of broad social goals is predicated upon the satisfaction of financial 
interests. Indeed, it is not possible to isolate financial interests or sustain the presentation of 
‘finance’ as a ‘constituency’ external to the Bank. Financial interests were part of the very 
fabric of the institution, without which none of the objectives of the era could have been 
achieved. The defining feature of the international order – at least in the immediate post-war 
period – was not capital controls. Although it had not been possible to keep the global financial 
order open, financial interests were therefore not thwarted or repressed by such controls. 
Their imbrication into the foundations of the bank had extended their infrastructural power in 
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such a way as to ensure that the problems of financiers defined the agenda for the 
achievement of the objectives of the wider order. 
Recently, Constructivist authors have made important challenges to the narrative of 
the ‘coup’ as put forward by Kapur et al. I will begin the chapter with an exploration of 
Chwieroth’s intervention, in which he puts forward the argument that the ‘coup’ thesis offers a 
superficial account which does not allow us to grasp adequately how the Bank’s strategy was 
actually changed in the most prosaic and practical terms. Chwieroth seeks to move the Bank 
out of the long shadow of US power, and reveal the importance of ideas and the agency of 
management. To this end, Chwieroth argues that the Bank is vested with substantive forms of 
authority which combine to give management autonomy in defining strategy and procedure 
through internal debate and contestation among employees. 
This argument is rooted in his exploration of the transition from the Bank’s earliest 
‘programme’ loans to support the balance of payments of European members to the project 
model which became more usual from the early 1950s. As the legal authority to interpret its 
mandate had been vested in the Bank itself, and given that it drew its working capital from 
private investors not states, Chwieroth argues that the change is not attributable to pressure 
from either the US or private investors. It should be seen as a result of the expression of 
commercial norms by new recruits, into which they had previously been socialised in the 
course of their education or professional activities outside the Bank. 
Chwieroth’s intervention offers several important insights. Firstly, the Bank was the 
central organ of the international liquidity architecture before the Marshall Plan. Secondly, its 
basis in private capital is accorded central importance. Thirdly, it follows from this that by 
recognising the importance of finance as a key element of the Bank’s agency as an institution 
Chwieroth contributes to a narrative which is capable of challenging the ‘embedded liberalism’ 
thesis. Financial ideas and practices, Chwieroth shows us, remained central to the Bretton 
Woods regime of governance.  
However, by minimising ‘external’ factors such as investor pressure, and 
conceptualising the Bank as socially rooted only in narrow elite academic and professional 
groups, Chwieroth ultimately obscures the way in which these ideas are related to social forces 
at work in this wider field, and the material imperatives which animate them. As a result, the 
potential of the observation which Chwieroth makes is not fully realised. From this perspective 
material financial interests remain an external factor: Chwieroth cannot avoid ontologising an 
‘internal/external’ divide. The compatibility of ‘external’ features - the US agenda and the 
financial agenda – with ‘internal’ features of Bank strategy relies upon the same consonance of 
intellectual paradigm and political paradigm which underpins the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis. 
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This distinct domain of discrete external actors and ideas can only penetrate the internal world 
of institutional culture through recruitment. Ultimately, change in practice relies upon 
institutional capture - a similar conclusion to the ‘coup’ thesis of Kapur, Lewis, and Webb.  
In the second part of the chapter, I will illustrate how the transformation of the Bank 
reflects the imperative of securing working capital. Firstly, the high expectations of the Truman 
administration revealed the lack of working capital. New Deal negotiators and financiers in the 
immediate Bretton Woods period envisaged that the Bank would be a highly conservative 
institution, linking private investors with borrowers and offering a guarantee on the 
investment. Its lending operations would be secondary, and both guarantees and loans would 
be offered on the basis of paid-in capital. However, the Truman administration’s agenda 
immediately stretched the Bank, demanding capital transfers on a large scale – it rapidly 
became clear that the model worked out at Bretton Woods would be inadequate. 
Secondly, at the Savannah conference the necessity to make the turn to the bond 
markets was clarified. As the conservatism of the initial design was out, the question under 
consideration was how best to appeal to financiers in order to obtain the capital Truman’s 
objectives demanded. Further, it became clear that the Bank would have to lend on its own 
account if it were to be creditworthy enough to borrow to support the scaling-up of its 
operations.  
Thirdly, once the decision to base the Bank’s operations in private capital had been 
met it became clear that the initial management structure, in which Executive Directors 
exercised operational control on the behalf of member states, was a major obstacle to 
investment. The third step which would complete the turn to the bond market was the 
transfer of operational control to management, in order that lending decisions would not be 
made for ‘political’ purposes. 
This final step took place after the departure of President Meyer and his replacement 
John J. McCloy – whose acceptance of the job was conditional upon the ousting of the US 
Executive Director, Emilio Collado. In the final section, I will offer a more detailed exploration 
of this third and crucial step towards the bond market. Firstly, I will discuss the programme-
type lending of the early loans to Europe – and how, contrary to Chwieroth’s intervention they 
were supported by financiers as is illustrated by their impact on the Bank’s credit rating. 
Secondly, I will focus on the struggles between the Executive Directors and the Bank’s 
management team over the Chilean loan application. The Chilean loan was at the core of this 
issue. It offers considerable insight into both how the agenda of the US – to rapidly expand 
lending in support of security – was mediated by the imperatives of financiers following the 
turn to the bond market. Indeed, both the early programme loans and the project mode 
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reflected the intertwining of financial and US interests, in the context of the problem of 
liquidity in the post-war international order – and the centrality of the uniquely deeply rooted 
infrastructure of the American financial system to its recovery as an open trading order. 
In sum, the Bank of 1947 did not resemble the Bank of 1946, from which the Bank of 
1952 was still further removed. By the time of the 1952 reorganisation it drew the majority of 
its working capital from private financial markets – a different funding model to that which had 
been imagined at Bretton Woods. It was managed differently, having transferred responsibility 
for operations from state-appointed Executive Directors (EDs) to the President and managerial 
team. It also lent differently – ceding its role as primary liquidity provider to the IMF and 
switching to a project-based lending strategy rather than programme lending for balance of 
payments support. In respect of these important transitions, the conflicts over the Chilean loan 
illustrate the importance of situating the agency of management within the parameters of the 
imperatives of the Bank’s financial backers. Ultimately, it was the imperative of resolving the 
sovereign debt defaults of the 1930s – the key objective of international finance during this era 
– not the ideas of norm entrepreneurs which shaped management’s decisions regarding the 
Bank’s lending practice most definitively. 
 
1: ‘Relative Autonomy’, Institutional Capture and ‘Embedded 
Liberalism’. 
For Kapur, Lewis, and Webb; the appointment of President McCloy and his team 
constituted nothing less than a coup executed by Wall Street bankers and designed to 
demonstrate the marginalisation of the ‘New Deal crowd’.162 It is clear that a significant 
transition in personnel took place, and that new recruits at management level were 
quintessential Wall Street men. Further, if it can be seen as a coup, it was certainly Wall 
Street’s affair, and not the Truman administration’s. Yet this approach over-determines the 
direct influence of financiers as an external imposition: there is no room in this account for the 
agency of management. In this account financial leadership determines the action of the Bank 
– which had been occupied by Wall Street in a decisive victory against the New Deal, during 
the McCloy presidency at least. 
Jeffrey Chwieroth argues that while the ‘coup’ concept may grasp the surface events of 
the transition, it does not allow us to grasp either the processes through which it changed 
Bank strategy – or even the nature of international organisations as institutions. In his analysis 
of the early lending practices of the Bank, Chwieroth makes an important observation: 73% of 
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its lending across the period from 1946 to 1950 was programme lending for balance of 
payments support, whereas from 1951 to 1957 the quotient dropped to just 7%.163 For 
Chwieroth, the transition in the Bank’s lending practices between 1947 and 1952 is a case 
study of the role of ideas in shaping organisational culture. In this account the ability to draw 
upon private finance in capitalising the Bank confers autonomy from member-state authority, 
allowing the agency of management to become decisive in setting policy.  
The starting point of his account of this transition to the dominance of project lending 
is the authority which was conferred upon the Bank to interpret its Articles of Agreement. He 
begins by pointing out their ambiguity – and the use which was made of it.  
The core of the Bank’s mandate is described in the first and second clauses of Article 1: 
firstly, it was to assist in the reconstruction and development of war-damaged economies; and 
secondly to promote investment when private capital was not available directly to borrowers 
on reasonable terms. This latter aspect was considered of particular importance in the light of 
the high rates of inflation following from the scarcity of goods in the aftermath of conflict, and 
high government expenditures.  However, Chwieroth notes that it also opened up a further 
issue in relation to the ambiguous compromise language that had been built into Article 3 
during the negotiations in Congress.  
This concerned the Bank’s mandate to offer general-purpose financing under ‘special’ 
circumstances: 
 
Article III, Section 4: Conditions on which the Bank may guarantee or make loans: 
“The Bank may guarantee, participate in, or make loans to any member or 
any political sub-division thereof and any business, industrial, and agricultural 
enterprise in the territories of a members, subject to the following conditions: 
(vii) 
“Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special 
circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction and 
development.”164 
 
 By Congressional request, a defined legal interpretation was sought to clarify that the 
Bank was in fact able to make such loans. At Savannah, this was referred to the governors, 
who in turn referred the issue to the Board. Ultimately, the Board concluded that the Bank had 
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the authority to make or guarantee loans for economic and monetary reconstruction, inclusive 
of long-term stabilisation lending, even if they were not for specific projects.165 Loans could be 
made for stabilisation, and Bank management would judge what constituted ‘special 
circumstances’.  
 Although the right to interpret them was conferred by the US Congress, Chwieroth 
indicates that this gave the Bank important power to set its strategy from the very outset. The 
persistently ambiguous wording of the Bank’s foundational Articles conferred a degree of 
‘interpretative authority’. In combination with the decision to issue its own bonds, the 
delegation of the authority to interpret the Articles to management gave the Bank sufficient 
autonomy from its’ principals for the agency of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to become decisive. On 
this basis, he attributes primary causation in this transition to the development of a ‘project 
culture’ within the Bank. To support this argument, Chwieroth draws upon the early balance of 
payments programme loans as the context for the engagement of rival norm entrepreneurs in 
a ‘battle of ideas’ running across the first half-decade of the Bank’s activities. 
While France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg were all judged to fit the 
criteria of ‘special circumstances’, Chwieroth points out that this early lending strategy was 
altered significantly in the course of the later 1940s and early 1950s, to the extent that project 
lending dominated until the advent of structural adjustment in the 1980s. The Bank faced two 
sources of external pressure in relation to its strategy: the US government, and financiers. 
American officials pushed the Bank to lend to European applicants in order to bolster their 
governments against Communist parties; while Bank management, reliant on private finance 
for capitalisation, was concerned that programme lending would damage the institution’s 
creditworthiness. Yet Chwieroth argues that these pressures were not decisive in shaping 
decisions about the form the Bank’s lending should take. 
While it is clear that American officials did drive Bank lending for the same strategic 
reasons as the Marshall Plan finance was eventually deployed, Chwieroth argues that they 
were entirely indifferent about the precise form it took. Nor, he continues, should the change 
in Bank lending practices be attributed to pressure from private investors.166 If the change to 
project financing were attributable to the interests of financiers, he argues, it would be logical 
to expect the Bank to have made more project loans in the process of gaining AAA certification 
from the ratings agencies. Once it had been obtained, he contends, the constraint would 
diminish and more programme loans could be made. But the programme loans ceased after 
the AAA seal of confidence that management had been desperately seeking was obtained in 
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1958. For Chwieroth, this indicates that the agency of norm entrepreneurs was the decisive 
factor at work, not the imperatives of the Bank’s private backers. 
Chwieroth contends that in fact, the incidence of programme loans began to decline 
from 1951. The reason for this is that the most significant factor in the transition was neither 
sources of formal or informal external influence, but internal processes and collectively shared 
beliefs: “early lending practices can be understood largely as a product of intra-organizational 
dynamics and change.”167  
For Chwieroth, the emergence of the new commercially-oriented banker-friendly norm 
of project lending may be summarised as follows. Recruitment from a diverse pool of talent on 
either side of the Atlantic led to the burgeoning of subcultures within departments that 
reflected the ‘beliefs’ of new-hires according to their previous professional backgrounds168. 
Between these groupings, debates over strategy ensued in which leaders emerged relatively 
quickly. The victory of one conception of the optimum strategy and organisation depended 
upon the relative seniority of these leaders, the norm entrepreneurs, or their access to 
seniority. 
The great strength of Chwieroth’s account is in the way in which he is able to 
demonstrate the importance of the debates articulated within the institution in shaping an 
organisational culture, which shaped the Bank’s form in a way which locked in the practices 
which sustained that culture. It is clear from the 66% reduction in programme lending from 
1951-7 in comparison to 1946-50 that Chwieroth cites, that the adoption of the project 
approach was a critical turning-point in the development of the Bank – occurring as it did at a 
moment when the institution was undergoing a crisis of capitalisation and by extension of 
relevance to the order it was intended to express. 
Yet the central problem with Chwieroth’s account is that in depicting the social 
processes through which ideas attain a hegemonic status inside an institution, he divorces 
these ideas from the problem it was developed to overcome. He aims to address this by 
maintaining that recruitment is the key mechanism which builds constituencies behind new 
norms: the growth of a constituency behind the path-breaking ‘entrepreneur’ eventually 
causes a tipping point to be reached at which the new norm replaces the old. This leads to the 
conception that the Bank was only extremely narrowly socially anchored, in elite academic, 
managerial, and bureaucratic circles. In these respects Chwieroth’s account bears significant 
similarity to the Polanyian embedded liberalism narrative expressed in Kapur et al’s ‘coup’ 
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thesis, in that it relies upon institutional capture to transmit the hegemonic paradigm into the 
Bank. 
To an extent, he is forced to acknowledge this by offering an important caveat, to 
whit: “The point here is not to deny that private capital market constraints were a crucial factor 
shaping Bank lending. Rather, the point is to suggest that private capital market alone cannot 
fully explain the Bank’s early lending practices”.169 This means that he misses the imperative 
which gave rise to the ideas over which the battle was fought. This imperative did not come 
from ‘within’: the action of norm entrepreneurs, while a key aspect of the Bank’s early history 
is a surface phenomenon which expresses a social and strategic interest, which is derived from 
a material problem. This was the problem of illiquidity and inconvertibility in the post-war era 
to 1958. Only the ability to draw capital from the uniquely deep American financial market 
allowed the Bank to inject more liquidity into the international system. 
My point is precisely not to suggest that the private capital market alone provides a 
full explanation of the Bank’s early lending practices. The problems of the Bank and the private 
capital market were closely interrelated – and the solution to these problems was to be found 
only in adopting practices which were legible to financial agents and strategies which 
supported financial interests. Only then could the broader objectives of the coalition of 
interests which were mobilised in the creation of the Bank as an institution of governance be 
attained. 
Financial interests set the imperatives of the Bretton Woods institutions, and were a 
crucial factor in the development of the project lending model. Yet this need not imply that the 
early programme loans ran entirely counter to financial interests. The early European loans 
were intended as stop-gap financing prior to the Marshall Plan – and crucially, they were 
principally used to pay American firms for import orders which had already been placed. The 
complementarities of state, financial, and business interest are demonstrable here: as I 
stressed in Chapter 2, the second New Deal was supported by a coalition of anti-Morgan 
financiers and internationally-oriented businesses. Ensuring that these contracts were upheld 
supported all three. I will return to this point in discussing the Bank’s creditworthiness in Part 
Three. 
However, Chwieroth is certainly correct to point out that lending to France was 
encouraged by the US as an effort to forestall the electoral advance of the Communists, and it 
is clear that the program lending to Europe reflected the logical outcome of Congressional 
insistence that the Bank should make such loans. It may be argued that this is an example of 
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the Bank serving American state imperatives. On the other hand, McCloy was highly concerned 
that the Bank obtain the best possible credit rating and insure itself against the possibility that 
it could be excluded from American capital markets – and the switch to project-oriented 
lending which was more easily comprehensible to commercial lenders was a central plank of 
his strategy in this respect. 
Further, without additions to the Bank’s working capital drawn from private investors, 
the Bank would have been exhausted after the European loans. This would have been 
problematic because it would have obstructed the 1948 loan to Chile (as I will show in the final 
section of this chapter) and the accommodation between the Chilean government and 
American private bondholders upon which it was predicated. 
Just as the European program loans were not simply an objective of US state interests, 
so the Chilean loan was not simply a project of financial interests. It most certainly advanced 
financiers’ cause by setting a precedent for the resolution of international debt defaults. But it 
also served the interests of the US more broadly by helping to reconstruct the international 
capital market as an arena for profitable investment based, of course, upon the dollar. 
Therefore, the ‘battle of ideas’ wasn’t about the endorsement or negation of state or financial 
and commercial interests and practices – it was a pragmatic working out of the concrete 
politics of governance of the Bretton Woods order which should be seen as socially rooted in 
the financial relations of the US, rather than an ideational contest among elite technocrats 
governing an autonomous institution.170   
Though the agency of Bank management and staff was crucial in translating these 
interests into a concrete political program of governance, the level of choice which they were 
able to exercise should not be over-stated. The Bank had to increase its working capital, or 
cease to work. It was essential that it demonstrate its creditworthiness, and promoting a 
commercial lending model which was familiar to investors was a necessary precondition.  
The implication of this is that our exploration of the transitions which the Bank 
management forced the institution through in the earliest years of its operation should not 
begin with the transitions themselves. The phenomena which are associated with them, the 
‘battle of ideas’ and the recruitment of staff from Wall Street in large numbers, are all part of 
the story – but the story must begin with the problems which gave rise to the imperatives 
around which the battle was joined and the recruitment drive was initiated. This is the 
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problem of capitalisation, which derives from the wider problem of illiquidity and 
inconvertibility at the cessation of hostilities in 1945. 
 
 
2: Capitalising the Bank. 
Getting the Bank organised to begin operations required addressing a thorny set of 
questions which had not been resolved at either Bretton Woods or Savannah. What would the 
Bank actually do, and who would run it? During the closing days of the Bretton Woods 
conference the exhausted delegates had frequently become confused. In the meetings of 
Commission I under Harry White’s chairmanship, the process of minute-taking on the 
proposals for the International Monetary Fund was haphazard and almost careless. The 
meetings were a surprisingly disorganised affair, and no notes were taken at all during 
discussions in Keynes’ Commission II on the Bank. In the short discussions that were held 
specifically pertaining to the Bank, some clauses of the Act were either dropped accidentally or 
adopted in different forms to those which had been discussed and agreed upon.171  
 Within a calendar year from its launch, the essential problematique of the Bretton 
Woods order as it related to the Bank was clear. The inability of members to pay in sufficient 
capital to support the Bank’s operations entailed seeking funding in private capital markets, 
which required the transformation of the Bank’s operational strategy and managerial structure 
in order to guarantee the participation of private investors. 
In this section, I will offer a sketch of the three problems which had to be understood 
and resolved by management in order to address the Bank’s primary problem – a chronic lack 
of operating capital – before exploring these issues in the context of a more detailed case 
study in the third section of this chapter.  The first and second of these sections concern the 
process through which the capitalisation problem crystallised for the EDs, and recourse to the 
bond market was understood as a solution. The third details the process through which the 
EDs’ control of the institution became understood, by management and the Truman 
administration, as the obstacle which would have to be overcome in order to execute this 
manoeuvre and set the Bank running on a sustainable basis. 
Great Expectations in Hard Times 
Expectations of what the Bank would achieve were extremely high at Bretton Woods, 
and the first meeting in Savannah, Georgia in March 1946. This was particularly true of the 
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EDs, whose eagerness to commence lending contrasted with the highly conservative vision 
which was originally laid out for the Bank at Bretton Woods by US officials and supported by 
financiers. 
Initially, the vision of the Bank proposed by the New Dealers was that the Bank would 
function as a guarantor and cautious lender based on its paid-in capital. White had always 
intended that as far as the Bank was concerned “The primary aim of such an agency should be 
to encourage private capital to go abroad for productive investment by sharing the risks of 
private investors in large ventures.”172 For Aron Broches, one of the first members of the 
Bank’s legal team “there was no idea...that the Bank would supplement its paid capital by 
borrowing in the market so much as by guaranteeing loans made by others.”173 This had been a 
matter in which he felt there had been clarity from the outset: it had been strongly anticipated 
that the IRBD “... would make loans out of its paid-up capital, but the principal activity would 
be to guarantee loans made174”.  
This conservative approach was designed to reassure financiers that the Bank would 
be a reliable partner in the reconstitution of the international capital market. By contrast, the 
Truman administration was extremely eager to get the new institutions up and running quickly 
and stated explicitly that large volumes of capital would be available through the Bank for this 
purpose. 
It was anticipated that the Bank would begin operations by the end of the year, and 
that it would be capable of meeting global requirements in respect of international capital by 
the end of the calendar year of 1947. Treasury Secretary Snyder reiterated at the September 
1946 meeting of the Board of Governors that the Bank would assume the principal 
responsibility for reconstruction financing. This would mean that the Bank would replace the 
programmes of the UNRRA and the Export-Import Bank. In fact, the US government repeatedly 
stated that a total of $15 billion would be made available between the two Bretton Woods 
institutions – which would satisfy the needs of Europe and any further applicants175. 
As the senior institution, the Executive Directors anticipated that the Bank would have 
$10bn at its disposal.176 Yet this sum was only available to the IBRD on paper. Its operating 
funds at this early juncture came from capital subscriptions only. When the Bank opened for 
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business on the 25th of June 1946, 0.5% of the capital subscription had been made payable 
upon signature; and under the Articles of Agreement the first 2% of members’ was due to be 
paid within sixty days in either gold or US dollars. A subsequent 18% was due to be paid in 
local currency; while the remaining 80% was callable should the Bank require it in order to 
meet obligations arising from guarantees or its own borrowings177. It was anticipated that the 
20% call would be completed by late May 1947. By the middle of 1947, positive progress had 
been made, and $8 of the $10 billion which had been authorised had been officially 
subscribed.  
However, the amount of capital which had been successfully paid in to the Bank 
amounted to considerably less: the US was the only member whose 18% contribution ($571 
million) was paid in full and available for lending178. The total sum available was $1.6 billion of 
which $727 million had been contributed in US dollars or gold. This latter figure represented 
the ceiling of the Bank’s capacity to make guarantees or loans.179 Such a small sum was far 
beneath the expectations of the EDs. The realisation that the Bank would not be capable, in 
the short to medium term, of lending to its members on the basis of its paid in capital was the 
first step in the turn to private investors as a source of capitalisation. 
 Financiers’ Conservatism vs. Financial Reality. 
Although the EDs had emerged from the Savannah conference as the driving force in 
the management of the Bank’s operations, a guiding concern of that gathering, as in the case 
of its precedent in New Hampshire, had been to appeal not to the representatives of less 
developed members - but to the financiers upon whose participation the new institution 
would be based. 
However, there were problems with the financiers’ preferred model, as Mason and 
Asher point out: guaranteeing private borrowing would not have increased the volume of 
globally available financial resources. It also had the potential to crowd the Bank itself out of 
the bond market. Worse, costs to borrowers may in any case have been untenably high and 
varied among borrowers. Daniel Crena de Iongh (the Bank’s future treasurer), noted that if 
certain offerings were quoted at different prices, all the while backed by the IBRD’s 100% 
guarantee this may have damaged the creditworthiness of the Bank itself180.  
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 As a consequence it was not possible for the Bank to act as a guarantor linking private 
capital with willing borrowers. This realisation put an end to the concept of the Bank as a 
guarantor to private finance – the second necessary step in the turn to the bond market as a 
source of capitalisation.  
The only available solution to the capitalisation problem was that the Bank would have 
to become a borrower on behalf of its members. The change in strategy was accepted by 
September 1946: the Bank would issue its own bonds, and lend directly. 
Executing the turn to the bond market entailed surmounting one further obstacle: the 
perception among the financial community that the Bank, if dominated by the EDs, would lend 
for political, not commercial reasons. At Bretton Woods, ex-BIS President J.W. Beyen, the 
leader of the Dutch delegation had put forward a conservative proposal that if the Bank were 
to lend at all, its lending limit should be capped at 75% of callable capital. The American 
delegation argued for 150%.181 A compromise was struck at 100%, which Beyen warned was 
too much: financiers would not see the Bank as ‘sound’. 
He was correct. At a social engagement in autumn 1946, Harold Stanley of the firm 
Morgan, Stanley informed Beyen’s colleague, Crena de Iongh that 100% “was far too much, 
and that in practice the public wouldn’t buy more bonds than the amount that corresponded 
with the American and the Canadian guarantee.”182  Though the turn to the bond market 
would increase the lending power of the Bank, it still could not achieve the Truman 
administration’s objectives immediately. 
The power of the EDs 
With the Bank’s strategy transformed from a guarantor institution to a lending 
institution, it was becoming less and less tenable to private investors that lending and 
borrowing operations would be directed by the EDs. Following his encounter with Harold 
Stanley, de Iongh took pains to convince Eugene Meyer, the Bank’s first president, that the 
borrowing ability of the Bank would be even less than its capital subscription and that this 
should be the first matter for management to attend to. The scepticism about the soundness 
of the Bank’s business practice which de Iongh had encountered was widespread.  
Since the Bank had been ‘activated’ by the admission of Mexico as its thirtieth 
member on the 30th of December 1945, the EDs had begun a program of policy-formulation in 
the process of which they would meet formally as often as twice a week and confer informally 
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on a daily basis183. According to Kraske, they “...believed that the exchange and financial 
markets in general, and private international bankers in particular had failed miserably in the 
late 1920s and 1930s” – and considered that due to the high price industrial economies had 
paid for this failure, the multilaterally governed and interdependent world economy of the 
post war era should be “guided by international institutions that had to answer to the 
governments which created and sustained them”184.  
The Bank’s first task, in spite of the EDs’ ideas about the culpability of financiers for the 
Depression, and the importance of state power in governing the international order, was to 
court investors. For financiers, accepting the Bank and opposing the Fund was a tactical 
manoeuvre: they had held neither dear, but as it had become clear in the Congressional 
hearings on Bretton Woods that they would never ‘get’ the Fund, they had taken a particular 
interest in the Bank.185 The immediate problem of the relationship between members and 
management was exacerbated by the pressure placed on US Treasury Secretary Vinson to 
name a pillar of Wall Street for the role of President.  
With a New Dealer at the top, the Bank would be faced with difficulties selling its 
bonds. This was largely due to the opprobrium reserved for Emilio Collado, the US ED, who had 
been responsible for the Bank’s approach to financiers prior to the appointment of the first 
President. His role as the Bank’s principle agent in New York was made difficult by his 
reputation as a New Deal ‘planner’. The main problem with Collado, as far as financiers were 
concerned, was his sympathy for the objectives of his South American colleagues. They argued 
that the Treasurer should set up a system for the distribution of the Bank’s capital amongst its 
members in advance of the rush on the Bank’s assets they felt sure would follow its launch. 
Their primary fear was that the amounts which would be demanded for the reconstruction of 
Europe would deprive the developing economies of resources. 
Collado was sympathetic to this concern. His experience in South American economic 
affairs was extensive. In 1937 he had been seconded to the Bank of Mexico from the 
Department of the Treasury, and in 1938 to the Federal Reserve, where he became assistant 
chief of the Division of American Republics. From 1943 he worked for the State Department as 
associate advisor for International Economic Affairs 1943-44 before rising to head the Division 
of Financial and Monetary Affairs, and further still to become Director of the Office of Financial 
and Development Policy from 1945-6. In these roles, he had worked closely with Harry Dexter 
White, and Morgenthau, and South American governments in the construction of projects 
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such as the Pan American Highway and the putative Inter-American Bank (IAB). This latter 
project was formative in his approach to his role as US ED at the Bank – having also been 
present at the Atlantic City, Bretton Woods, and Savannah conferences, he was concerned to 
get the Bank acting quickly and anticipated that the IBRD’s structural similarities with the failed 
IAB put the EDs in the driving seat.186 
Collado’s vote carried the weight of the largest shareholder - 35% - which was cast 
under the guidance of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial 
Problems (NAC) at the insistence of Congress. This body formalised the network of connections 
Collado had developed over the years of his service in both the Department of State and 
Treasury, whose secretaries sat on the Committee alongside the Chairman of the Fed, and lent 
significant authority to his words. As I have detailed in Chapter 2, the creation of the NAC was 
crucial in pacifying the American Bankers’ Association whose president, Randall Burgess, had 
been Collado’s manager during his time at the Federal Reserve Bank. Including prominent 
financiers such as Winthrop Aldrich alongside the bureaucrats of the Truman administration 
offered the investment community a voice at the very highest level of decision-making in state 
foreign economic policy.  
The appointment of Eugene Meyer, made informally by President Truman after an 
embarrassing lack of applicants, appeared to offer a way out of the dilemma, and satisfy 
financiers and the EDs. He had forged a long career in finance with Lazard Frères and at the 
head of his own Wall Street brokerage house; and he had also served the US government 
under Wilson, Coolidge, and Hoover; before returning to government under Truman on the 
Famine Emergency Committee. He took up office in the Bank on the 4th of June 1946 aged 70 – 
at which point he was described as ‘senile’ by Luxford.187 Worse, he was already an outsider to 
a group of Executive Directors who had a clearer set of ideas about the future of the Bank as 
an institution than he did. 
 Prior to Meyer’s arrival, the Bank had been operated by the Executive Directors 
under the leadership of Collado. They had made the Bank’s initial calls on members’ capital, 
and invested the funds in received in US Treasury bills, notes, and certificates. They had 
secured the requisite amendments to enable wider private investment - first in New York 
State, and in New Jersey, with support from the NAC and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. They had also elaborated an organisational structure and, most importantly, 
working procedures and relationships had been developed. The practices which had been 
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developed under Collado and the EDs would bring the Bank into conflict with its new financial 
backers in a matter of months. 
Meyer redoubled the Bank’s efforts to engage the financial community. He had (like 
Collado) served the Federal Reserve and was able to exploit his extensive network of contacts 
in support of the Bank’s objective to educate potential investors. He presented the Bank to 
representatives of insurance companies and commercial, investment, and saving institutions at 
a meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1946188. He was supported in this by 
Collado and his assistant Richard Demuth. Ultimately, they were able to successfully press 
financiers to lobby their state legislatures to obtain alterations to banking laws which would 
enable private financial institutions operating in their jurisdictions to invest in Bank paper.189  
Shortly after Meyer’s arrival and success in legalising Bank paper, the first annual 
report to the board of governors of September 1946 emphasised that the office of the 
President was responsible for “operational, administrative, and organizational questions...” 
The President’s remit in these fields was qualified, “subject to the general direction and control 
of the Executive Directors”, although endowed with a deciding vote should an equal division 
occur190. The central aspect of the Bank’s function, the consideration of applications for 
lending, was also subject to the decision of the EDs and would proceed according to three 
stages. Firstly, the President would carry out ‘preliminary conversations’ with the applicant 
before receiving the judgement of the EDs as to whether the Bank could proceed with more 
formal negotiations. Secondly, where affirmation was given, the President would carry these 
negotiations out, and feed back to an ad hoc loan committee with a view to ensuring that the 
loan contract would be formulated in accordance with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. The 
committee would report to the President, and would maintain regular contact with the EDs to 
apprise them of the status of negotiations. Finally, the President would submit a proposal 
backed by a report developed by the Loan Committee to the EDs, who would make the final 
decision.191  
The institutional responsibility for policymaking lay with the EDs, and this dominance 
emboldened the Dutch ED, J.W. Beyen, to announce a bold borrowing strategy in order to 
supplement the small volume of funds available to it through its members’ subscriptions. In a 
speech to the New York Savings Bank Association Convention in Quebec on the 15th of October 
1946, he claimed that the Bank would seek to borrow amounts up to $2bn in 1947 alone. It 
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would do so by offering twenty-five year bonds for sale which he claimed would pay up to 50% 
more than US Treasury bills. Beyen’s announcement threatened to throw Meyer’s careful 
program of public relations into disarray: confusion reigned among bond investors. The 
Wisconsin State Banking Commission voted to prevent their financial institutions from 
purchasing the Bank’s paper – unanimously, the following day192.  
Beyen’s speech had cut right to the heart of the Bank’s claim to be a conservative 
institution which would operate on commercial lines. The pressure to lend, and lend rapidly, to 
less developed members which prompted Beyen’s statement, was considered by the Bank’s 
senior managers including Daniel Crena de Iongh (Treasurer) and Robert Garner (Vice 
President under McCloy) to be coming from Collado, as much as the Latin American governors 
themselves.193   
By the autumn of 1946, the tension between pressure to lend, and the pressure to 
conduct lending policy in the manner of a ‘sound’ commercial institution was coming to a 
head. In the course of the protracted negotiations over the Chilean loan, the struggle between 
management and EDs over the specific practices of borrowing and lending would reach its 
zenith. Its resolution, as I shall show in the following section, would transform both the Bank 
and the international capital market. 
 
3. The Chilean Loan: Reconstituting the Bond Market, Disciplining 
Debtors. 
Emilio Collado’s reputation as a New Deal ‘planner’ was, as we have observed, 
problematic for him in his efforts to market the Bank to the financiers of New York. His 
attempts to pursue the Truman administration’s objective of rapidly expanding Bank lending 
would soon sharpen bankers antipathy toward him – and by extension, toward the governance 
of the Bank by the Executive Directors in general. The case of the Chilean loan application is 
instructive because it spans a period of eighteen months in which the Bank underwent its first 
major institutional crisis, largely brought on by Collado’s desire to make the loan rapidly – in 
the face of financiers’ objections in relation to Chile’s default on foreign bonds in the 1930s. 
Ultimately, Collado would be a casualty of the procedural and structural reform through which 
the problem posed to financial interests by the power of the Executive Directors was 
surmounted. The Chilean case was the catalyst for the strategic reorientation of the institution 
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towards American financial capital. Financial imperatives were not repressed – they shaped 
the way in which the Bank was able to pursue the objectives of the Truman administration. 
This case therefore offers a unique opportunity to explore the issues of external 
relationships and organisational culture raised by Chwieroth’s interventions.  In this section, I 
will present the way in which lending was made conditional upon the resolution of existing 
bond defaults – to private American and European investors.  
On the 7th of October 1946, Luis Davila, assistant general manager of the Central 
Bank of Chile and alternate Chilean governor of the IBRD formally authorised the formal 
application of Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile (Fomento) and Chilean State 
Railways for a loan of US $40 million, initially submitted in a letter to President Meyer on the 
30th of September. A loan was granted in March 1948, by President McCloy. In the intervening 
period, the EDs would lose control of the Bank. 
By the time Meyer arrived at the Bank, the EDs had already begun to consider the 
first applications, or ‘approaches’, from Chile and Denmark.194 Working parties considering 
these applications were convened by senior EDs such as J.W. Beyen, who had stepped forward 
as acting loan director. Meyer’s assistant, Richard Demuth, offers remarkable candour on the 
working parties at this juncture: “...we were all terribly inexperienced [...] Nobody knew where 
to begin [...] We didn’t know what kinds of question to ask, what kind of investigation to 
make.”195 
In this environment, Collado was keen to get a loan authorised by the end of 1946, to 
demonstrate that the Bank was open for business.196 He pushed hard to get the Chilean loan 
approved, and engaged closely with US Treasury Secretary Snyder – exchanging memoranda 
on Bank policy and lending strategy on a daily basis.197 Encouraged by Collado’s suggestions 
that their application would meet with success,198 the Chileans were eager to borrow. Demuth 
recalls that Collado was arguing that not only should the Bank issue bonds quickly, but that “he 
knew Chile, he’d known them for a long time, and they were good for 40 million dollars and the 
Bank was darned well going to make the loan.”199 In this respect, he was backed by Ansel 
Luxford, who felt that financial opinion mattered little and that if presented with a fait 
accompli, they would rapidly take the sanguine approach that “business is business, and people 
buy government securities” owing to his experience in getting a hostile banking community to 
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finance US expenditure in the war years200. However, their application - which had arrived on 
the 7th of October – was held up by the outcomes of Beyen’s near-disastrous speech 
concerning the Bank’s likely borrowing strategy.  
Following Beyen’s mis-step, the necessity of engagement with the financial 
community only deepened. Meyer pushed back against Collado with this in mind, arguing that 
the Bank needed to undertake a comprehensive program of ‘education’. This task was given to 
the Director of the Economics Department, Leonard Rist. With this in mind, Meyer encouraged 
Rist to engage ‘the copper people’ at Kennecot and Anaconda in order to attempt to gauge the 
viability of Chilean production for export, with a view to exploring the conditions under which 
lending to Chile could repair the Bank’s already fragile reputation. 
Rist had a background in finance, having worked for the investment bank Blair & 
Company in New York under Jean Monnet, before moving to Paris to take up a role with J.P. 
Morgan & Co. He sought to sound out financiers’ ideas about creditworthiness, with the 
express intention of giving the ‘New York group’ the feeling – arguably not unfounded - that 
they were participating in the development of the Bank201.  As Rist well understood, the issue 
of Chile’s international debts, in default since 1931, was of the highest priority. At the end of 
the financial year of 1946, the total outstanding external debt amounted to $281,220,453 of 
which $144,466,050 were owed to US bondholders.202  
Unless the Bank were to deploy commercial practices in establishing the 
creditworthiness of an applicant, it was likely that it would not be able to establish its own 
creditworthiness. Potential borrowers could not be assessed in the way that had informed the 
prospectuses of the bond issues of the 1920s: through the simple enumeration of foreign trade 
balances, exports, imports, debt, budget and monetary structures and practices would not 
suffice. Hard conditions relating to the labour policy, foreign ownership, and the repatriation 
of profits would have to be established. Even more importantly, arrangements would have to 
be made for the resumption of payments on defaulted bonds. 
Along with fostering the renegotiation of lapsed payment schedules, the Bank would 
have to build a more comprehensive and convincing picture of Chilean creditworthiness to 
present to bond investors. It would have to concern itself with policy and with the minute 
detail of projects as well as what Rist describes as the “...social pressures, on the political 
aspect of things, within the country, on the external political pressures that it may be subjected 
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to.”203 Otherwise, the Bank risked gaining the same reputation as the Export-Import Bank - 
that it would lend to Latin American countries regardless of their defaults.204 
The Executive Directors were in revolt over the usurpation of their authority implicit 
in Meyer’s downplaying of the readiness of the Chilean application and Rist’s efforts to find an 
accommodation with conservative investors. They began a public relations campaign of their 
own, briefing the media against Meyer’s management. On the 3rd of December 1946 Collado 
gave a speech to the Investment Bankers’ Association, in which he argued that there was 
already a big enough market for the Bank’s bonds. It could only get broader and deeper, when 
the remaining thirteen states of the union permitted their financial institutions to purchase 
Bank securities. It appears that this was the final straw for Meyer, who resigned the following 
day with a parting shot to the effect that he could “...stay and fight these bastards, and 
probably win in the end, but I’m too old for that.”205 
With Meyer’s departure and the death of his Vice President, Harold D. Smith, the way 
appeared to be clear for Collado. Luxford felt that Collado had the backing of the US through 
the NAC: “I'm certain that Collado did not come into this fight without the backing of NAC. He 
was not carrying on a private little fight of his own. He was in here battling with the authority 
of NAC [...] In other words, the Meyer-Collado fight was not something where Collado didn't 
have the backing of the United States.”206 According to Demuth, the objective was to present 
the situation in such a way that the easiest solution appeared to be to make the US director 
temporary president, upon which he would rapidly issue bonds and carry out the Bank’s 
inaugural lending and on the basis of these achievements, be asked to assume the presidency 
on a permanent basis207.  
With no small irony, even in the course of Collado’s campaign, his position as US ED 
required him to oversee the process of Meyer’s replacement and make approaches to 
potential rival candidates. One of these was John J. McCloy, a pillar of the American political 
and business establishment. He was familiar with several existing staff members including 
Richard Demuth from his time in the Pentagon as Assistant Secretary of War208; he had 
previously worked on Wall Street for Cravath, Swain, and Moore under Chester McLain (the 
IBRD’s General Counsel); and he had been in frequent contact with Meyer – who, with the help 
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of McLain, had been grooming him to accept a nomination for the Presidency. A partner of the 
Millbank, Tweed Wall Street law firm209, and an ex-employee of Chester McLain at Cravath, 
Swain, & Moore, McCloy had an exceptional network of contacts in the world of high finance. 
These included no meaner personages than Harold Stanley of Morgan, Stanley & Co.; Baxter 
Jackson of the Chemical Bank; Randolph Burgess (who at the time was vice-chairman of 
National City Bank); George Whitney, president of J.P. Morgan and Co.210; and Freddie 
Warburg, whose farm in Virginia he frequented in seeking advice on the IBRD. All advised him 
to take the role – subject to conditions. 
These conditions had been elaborated with the help of Eugene Black, vice-president of 
the Chase National Bank, which McCloy had represented while in his post with Cravath, Swain, 
& Moore.211 Black argued forcefully that McCloy would have to wrest managerial power from 
the executive directors. Any loan applications would be made to the management, with no 
obligation to seek a prior indication of the American position. All administrative matters would 
be the prerogative of the management and any hiring and firing of personnel would be the 
preserve of the Bank’s president212. Accordingly, when McCloy began his negotiations with the 
EDs in February 1947 after two months of vacillation, the general principle of non-interference 
by the US government in loan negotiations was foremost in discussion. 
As it became clear that the EDs, inspired by the UK’s Sir James Grigg,213 were about to 
elect Collado as temporary president at a specially convened meeting, a number of senior 
management threatened to resign. These included McLain, Richard Demuth, and Aron 
Broches,214 who had been prominent in a faction organising against Collado. At the State 
Department’s behest, Collado postponed the EDs meeting, and the Department informed 
McCloy that they would accept his conditions215. With Collado ousted after an executive 
meeting on the 28th of February, the EDs offered McCloy, Garner, and Black a verbal 
agreement that management would undertake their roles as they saw fit without interference.  
Control over recruitment was particularly important for McCloy in terms of the US 
ED: the president would nominate a candidate as Collado’s replacement, and that was to be 
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Eugene Black.  To complete a management group which included Chester McLain, ex-Guaranty 
Co. banker Robert Garner was to be recruited from his position as financial vice-president of 
General Foods216. These four would constitute the ‘intellectual doers’ who would run the 
Bank.217 
The structures and procedures of the Bank as laid out in the documentation of the 
second annual meeting of governors of the IMF and IBRD in September 1947 exemplify the 
contrast to those laid out in the 1946 meeting and express managerial control over lending 
procedure and organisational decision-making with great clarity. The constraints on the ambit 
of the President’s decision-making by the EDs general ‘direction and control’ were replaced 
with a decisive statement to the effect that “The President is the chief executive officer of the 
Bank”. The responsibilities which now fell to Garner as Vice President were an even greater 
blow to the capacities of the EDs: not only did he “act as a general manager with responsibility 
for assuring the effective operation of other offices and departments”, he would “...direct the 
formulation of policy recommendations for the President.”218 
The greatest problem facing the Chilean loan application was the change of personnel 
at the Bank with the appointment of John J. McCloy and the resulting transformation of 
decision-making procedures. In his address to the governors on the 12th of September, McCloy 
was able to state that management had been offered the “unstinted support and assistance in 
all its efforts by the Executive Directors” who had relegated ‘administrative matters’ to the 
management while concerning themselves solely with issues of policy. In practice however, 
policy matters required their seal of approval rather than their active participation. 
Garner had rapidly implemented an organisational structure which backed this 
managerial authority with the conventional features of a unitary, centralised organisation such 
as he had presided over at General Foods. Each of the functional departments had its specified 
remit, internal hierarchy, and a director reporting to Garner. This left little scope for the 
intervention of the EDs in either day-to-day matters or general strategy and direction: all 
matters of policy from bond marketing to economic research were clearly demarcated as 
falling within the purview of McCloy, Garner and their managerial team. 
With managerial control established at the expense of the EDs, a further conflict was 
initiated – which Chwieroth has identified as the ‘battle of ideas’ between the academic 
economists of the Research Department under Leonard Rist, and the bankers and engineers of 
the Loan Department under Charles C. Pineo. 
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The Bank had been through a crisis of management, the resolution of which had re-
constituted the politics of governance of the Bretton Woods order, before a single loan had 
been made. The nuts-and-bolts of the lending procedure were essentially untested, and the 
new team was determined to rescue the reputation of the Bank. 
The French loan was authorised on the 9th of May 1947, before the first bond issue, 
with the application processed with markedly greater rapidity than in the Chilean case. Richard 
Demuth again offers striking candour on this matter:  
 
“...Mr. Garner [...] realized that the Bank’s reputation was at a low ebb and action had to 
be take, so he both organized the marketing campaign [...] and he decided to proceed 
rapidly with a number of European loans. Nobody at that time had any assurance that our 
loans to Europe would be repaid, but there was a desperate situation there [...]and McCloy 
decided that action had to be taken, and we made 500 million dollars of European 
reconstruction loans, on faith to a very large extent, without reasonable prospects of 
repayment that could be documented”.219 
 
This would appear to support Chwieroth’s argument that US officials were indifferent 
about the form which lending to Europe took, and that the management of the Bank was able 
to utilise the interpretative authority conferred upon it by Congress to set its own direction. As 
I have observed above, it is his argument that Bank lending practices should not be attributed 
to the ‘constraints’ of private capital markets which is problematic. 
Chwieroth’s account shows that the Bank became an actor in its own right in a way 
which was driven by the agency of management in institutionalising a set of norms which most 
closely corresponded to the norms of their prior professional and educational environments. 
There is little doubt that these norms shaped the parameters of debate between the Research 
and Loan departments. For example, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan was recruited to the IBRD from 
the University of London via the ERP, and argued for a ‘general programming approach’ and 
lending in local currencies – as opposed to a business and commercial banking derived 
method. In lending for specific projects, the Bank would not be able to finance a sufficient 
quantity of a borrower’s total investment in order to influence their overall development 
policy. Failing to recognise that all capital was fungible, was “not a question of 
misunderstanding, it’s a question of not understanding at all.”220 
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For Chwieroth, Rosenstein-Rodan was the opposite number to Vice President Robert 
Garner, who sat as chair of the Staff Loan committee. Drawing on Oliver’s account of his years 
with the Bank, redacting “terms like ‘capital output ratio’ out of reports, calling them 
‘economeeze’”221, Chwieroth contends that Garner fit Rosenstein-Rodan’s depiction of a 
banker who neither understood nor sought to understand economists and economics at all. 
Garner was sympathetic to the Assistant Director of the Loan Department’s calls to remove the 
Economics Department from its position of responsibility for Bank lending operations222. 
Precisely as Chwieroth argues, Garner won out because he was in a strategically 
stronger position to advance his ideas, as Vice President of a new regime dominated by 
investment bankers and Wall Street lawyers. Rosenstein-Rodan was pragmatic enough to 
recognise that the Bank adopted its project-oriented approach to lending because of the 
appeal to management of a method which appeared more concrete and low-risk.  
More importantly though, and contrary to Chwieroth’s argument, Rosenstein-Rodan 
accepted that it was a necessity to adopt a method to which bankers were accustomed.223 
Although the consolidation of this approach to lending as standard Bank practice would see 
him leave his post in the course of the 1952 reorganisations, he was sanguine about the 
motivation. The Bank, he felt, had to be extremely careful in its operations, even when they 
were aware of strategic shortcomings because: 
 “...issuing bonds in Wall Street has to take into account the mentality 
of other customers, and this should be a slow educational process which must 
necessarily take several years. Therefore the Bank ought to proceed in a 
cautious way, establish its good will and its creditworthiness for its bonds.”224 
  
 Both advocates of program lending and advocates of project lending recognised the 
importance of a conservative approach to creditworthiness, and a strategy of lending which 
was legible to potential investors. As I have pointed out above, the European loans expressed 
the interest of the New Deal coalition, of which financiers were an integral pillar. Within the 
Bank, their most significant proponents had a Wall Street background. Garner in particular was 
known to harbour hostility towards the ‘liberals’ at the Bank, whose ideas he considered to be 
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a legacy of Collado and “Morgenthau and those clucks”225; while an individual tainted by a 
history of government service would be derided by McLain as a ‘longhair’.226  
Their former clients were reassured by the familiarity of the anti-‘liberal’, 
commercially-oriented attitudes of the new management and were able to be more forthright 
in their discussions of the problems of international lending as they saw it, as linkages between 
the Bank and the ideas of its founders became more tenuous. The Treasury and the wider 
Truman administration felt that they could work with McCloy, - but according to Luxford, the 
‘bankers on the street’ had wanted a clear-cut victory and were of the opinion that whatever 
the Treasury thought, the appointment of McCloy and his team did not constitute a 
compromise227.  
The re-orientation of the IBRD towards the financial community expressed nothing less 
than a pragmatic process of working-out the nuts-and-bolts of how the Bretton Woods regime 
would be governed in practice. Both state officials and private investors found their interests 
expressed in the operations of the Bank, and the shift from programmes to projects should be 
seen as a strategic working out of the processes through which the international order of the 
post-war era would be constructed and policed. 
The notion that what transpired in the ‘clear-cut victory’ of management over the EDs 
emerges from the various rounds of interviews conducted with Bank staff under the rubric of 
the Oral History Programme of the World Bank Archives, in conjunction with Columbia 
University and the California Institute of Technology – and both the Brookings Institution 
histories which draw heavily upon them. These depict transition from the post-Savannah Bank 
to the McCloy presidency via the Collado interregnum as a financiers’ insurgency against New 
Deal ‘longhairs’, an inter-elite struggle to capture the leadership in which the decisive victory 
was delivered by means of a ‘McCloy coup’.  According to this perspective the autocratic 
governance of the Bank in the period which followed saw the management impose the will of 
Wall Street on the practice of the institution and on its members. 
The figure of Eugene Black provides both a partial affirmation and an important 
challenge to this narrative, in as far as his function in the institution transcended the 
dichotomy between agents of the state and agents of ‘the market’ which is retained in the 
Brookings histories and Chwieroth’s account. Renowned as a bond salesman on Wall Street 
and in government circles, Black united his role as an ED, the NAC’s interlocutor with the Bank, 
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with his role as interlocutor for the Bank with the financial community, eliding the ‘state’ and 
‘financial’ constituencies ostensibly battling for control of the institution at a stroke. 
Although the Bank’s director of marketing, E. Fleetwood Dunstan, had been installed in 
an office in New York; obtaining important regulatory concessions and developing an 
underwriting syndicate was largely attributable to Black’s ability to draw on his exceptional 
connections in an informal role as the Bank’s ‘real’ director of marketing.  In May 1947, the 
Comptroller of the Currency permitted national banks of the Federal Reserve System to 
purchase IBRD bonds to the value of 10% of their capital and surplus228. Complimenting this, 
Black and McCloy elaborated a ‘Memorandum with Regard to the Legality of the Bonds for 
Investment by Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, Insurance Companies, and Trustees in Certain 
Jurisdictions’ with a view to guiding state officials to secure interpretations of state legislation 
that would allow insurance, savings banks, and trust funds to participate. Crucially, Black was 
able to obtain the exemption of Bank securities from the 1933 and 1934 Banking Acts, through 
the formality of NAC consent rather than the legislative changes required for general 
permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission229. These achievements meant that 
commercial banks which were otherwise precluded from dealing in bonds of foreign 
governments, municipalities, and parastatals could deal in Bank securities. It was now possible 
to invest savings from all levels of American society in the bonds of the IBRD. 
On the 15th of July 1947, four months from his appointment, the bond issue was made 
and rated ‘AA’ by Fitch Investors’ Service and ‘A’ by Standard and Poor’s Corporation230. So 
effective had Black and McCloy’s sales drive been, that the issue attracted a high number of 
speculative investors – purchases from individual investors had taken place to a higher degree 
than expected.231 Although Chwieroth focuses on the AAA rating, achieved in 1958, this 
illustrates that the Bank was engaged in what was effectively a process of negotiation for the 
support of the financial community almost from its inception. This suggests that, contra 
Chwieroth, the programme loans made to Europe were not received poorly by the financial 
community. 
Settling foreign debt defaults was far more important to potential investors than the 
type of loans that were made. Black’s ideas about lending had been shaped from the outset by 
his knowledge of the history of foreign bond markets. His colleagues were in full agreement 
with him that there could be no lending to countries which were in default if the Bank wished 
to engage productively with private capital. There would be no chance of retaining the ‘AA’ 
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rating if lending took place which undermined the positions of the various bondholders’ 
protective committees. 
This had been an important reason why Collado’s attempts to drive through the 
Chilean application had caused such outcry. The Export-Import Bank had been the principle 
source of capital for Chile since the 1931 default, and was accordingly negatively viewed from 
the office blocks of Wall Street. As a result, getting Chile to make a settlement with the US 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Committee (FBPC) was effectively a precondition to lending.  
Existing Chilean bonds were subject to a 90% discount. Former colleagues and peers 
had prompted Black to be quite explicit with the effect that he “told them that I wouldn’t be 
willing to do it until they had made a settlement on their debt.” In the process of the 
negotiations, Black received a telephone call from an un-named ‘important’ New York bank 
“...which said that they had heard that we were about to make a loan to Chile, and if we did 
make it they presumed that we would write the loan off to 10 cents on the dollar.”232  
At this juncture the Bank’s own creditworthiness was at stake as much as Chile’s, and 
the report submitted to the working party adopts the position that Chile’s method of handling 
the default had been problematic, and endorsed complaints to this effect on the part of the 
FBPC.233 The application had been referred from EXIMBANK to the newly-founded IBRD, and 
this potentially transformative source of investment capital was now effectively embargoed. 
 The causes of the default were widely accepted as international, or at least 
intimately related to phenomena which did not have their origin in Chile. The political 
economy of Chilean development had been decisively shaped by the default – both in terms of 
its relations with the wider global economy and from a domestic perspective. These facts were 
accepted by the Bank, and the debacle of foreign lending in the later 1920s was understood in 
the 1940s as a period of excess and error in the financial community.  This attitude towards 
Chilean bonds was not a novelty, but the institutionalisation of the demands of the FBPC in an 
international body sharpened the Chilean position. This was particularly the case as the 
interests of financiers, US business, the US government, and the IBRD were linked by the issue 
of the Chilean default. 
For Chile, new lending was an urgent necessity: the cost of living index leapt upwards 
by 31% between September 1946 and September 1947234, while a persistent net balance of 
payments deficit ($77m from 1945 to 1952) had been exacerbated by an embargo placed upon 
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all credit to Chile by Assistant Secretary of State Braden (whose father had founded the Sewell 
mines, where Kennecott was struggling with strike action), unless strikes were settled in such a 
way as not to favour labour and taxation policies were ‘simplified’.235 
The Chilean government at the time of the application was a coalition formed by 
Congress in the aftermath of an inconclusive election. President Videla’s cabinet contained, 
apart from his own Radical party; Communists, Liberals and independents. The coalition 
endorsed a populist programme promoting industrialisation and the nationalisation of 
strategic industries, insurance, and lowering rents, in conjunction with creating a state bank to 
control credit and target inflation.236 This enabled the government to harness the strength of 
the union movement in areas such as copper mining and nitrate production, as a 
counterweight to the transnational might of the American corporations which dominated 
these sectors.237  
While foreign ownership of these strategic industries constituted a problem for the 
Chilean government, it enabled Videla to stress the threat of a costly capitulation to 
Communism in an effort to extract new lending. US citizens and institutions held the lion’s 
share of Chile’s foreign debt and the US was Chile’s single most significant trading partner. US 
officials demanded regular payments on foreign debt and non-discriminatory treatment of 
their companies, and Chilean officials intimated that additional revenues might have to be 
sought from the copper industry if credit was withheld.238  
American businesses’ complaints carried considerable weight with the Bank: On the 
basis of his discussions with the ‘copper people’ – Kennecott and Anaconda – in New York, 
Leonard Rist pointed out that these were “practically the same people who would buy our 
bonds tomorrow.”239  
Bondholders’ complaints relating to Chile’s diversion of revenues from the copper 
and nitrate industries into government spending programmes were also decisive in influencing 
the Bank’s stance. Although Chile complied with the demands of the State Department and the 
US copper firms in simplifying its taxation practices, legal provision had been made by the 
Chilean government in 1932 to expedite service of foreign debt by transferring profits from 
sales of nitrates, and government taxes on income, copper, and petroleum. As of the 31st of 
December 1944, 90% of dollar bondholders, 99% of their Sterling-denominated counterparts, 
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and 94% of their Swiss peers had agreed to this arrangement and had duly been receiving 
interest payments.240 The holdouts’ chief complaint was that the Chilean government had 
founded Fomento - the very body which would have benefited from the loan that the 
government was attempting to contract with the Bank – on the basis of revenues from 
strategic industries which, under the terms of a 1935 memorandum between the Chilean 
Special Financial Commission and the FBPC, were payable to foreign bondholders in their 
entirety.241 
The conjunction of US business, state, and financial interests is exemplified in a letter 
from US Ambassador Claude Bowers to president Videla in September 1947, to the effect that 
“the slowing down of production inspired by Communists was a matter of deep concern to 
American bankers investigating the possibilities of investment.”242 
Pressure from the Bank, the State Department, and the FBPC, prompted the Chilean 
Congress to give the President special powers to designate areas in which miners were striking 
as ‘emergency zones’. Approximately 1,500 unionists were deported (with their families) by 
the military from these areas, and under the Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy in 
September 1948243, Communist party members were prohibited from voting and some 
members were interned in concentration camps. 
The final obstacle to IBRD lending was overcome through an agreement to re-
schedule outstanding US private debt with the FBPC, which was publically announced on the 
24th of March 1948.244 Similar agreements had simultaneously been made with the Association 
Suisse des Banquiers and the Council of Foreign Bondholders of Great Britain. 
The following day a meeting of the EDs was chaired by Robert Garner at which two 
resolutions were passed, with a single abstention, to accept the President’s recommendation 
to make loans to Fomento and Endesa totalling $16m. The press release notes that in 1947, 
the Chilean government undertook a change in monetary and financial policy. Deficit financing 
ceased, the money supply correspondingly tightened, and expenditures were ‘consolidated’ in 
line with receipts from taxation. These measures, the Bank noted, “...are increasing indications 
that an adequate policy is being pursued and that stable economic conditions will be achieved. 
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Such conditions might strengthen the foreign exchange position, and Chile has expressed the 
hope that private capital be directed towards investment in industrial and agricultural 
development.”245 
 
Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have sought to develop a non-functionalist perspective on the role of 
the Bank in the development and governance of the Bretton Woods order. To this end, I have 
drawn upon the insights offered by Chwieroth’s ‘strategic constructivism’ in terms of the 
importance of internally articulated debates and the significance of the processes of 
management and lending in the determination of the form of governance of the post-war 
order. My objective has been to demonstrate how these debates and processes are rooted in 
the social relations of the broad Fordist compromise, and express the inclusion of financiers 
rather than their ‘repression’ by government. 
The staff testimonies which support Chwieroth’s intervention (and the Brookings 
histories) suggest that a ‘battle of ideas’ did indeed take place, and that the ‘interpretative 
authority’ of the management was a major factor in the decision to make general purpose 
loans to Europeans.  The recruitment of a new managerial team from the world of New York 
finance was extremely important in the struggles which occurred around these issues, but its 
real significance lies in the transformation of the management relationships of the Bank upon 
which their recruitment was made contingent. This was nothing less than a re-configuration of 
the relationship of the management to the EDs – of the Bank to member states - visible in the 
reorganisation of the Bank’s policy and decision-making structures.  
Without distancing the Bank from the New Deal administration in this way, it would 
have been impossible to draw on financial markets to support Bank activities. The turn to the 
project approach was not a transition made on the basis of the ability of a group of 
commercially-minded Wall-Streeters to overcome the Bank’s academic economists with the 
assistance of a contingent change in personnel. It was made on the basis of the Bank’s 
capitalisation problems. 
This did not confer ‘autonomy’ upon the Bank: it necessitated the transformation of 
institutional strategy. The infrastructural power of finance was thereby institutionalised in the 
Bank, as the project approach was adopted on the basis of its similarity to commercial 
investment practices. This is not to say that the new management pursued the interests of 
financiers to the exclusion of the aims of the Bretton Woods settlement. Rather than a zero-
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sum conflict between state and market these cases demonstrate that while the Bank was a site 
of contestation it was also a site of pragmatic accommodation between bankers and state 
officials. Bank action therefore functioned to simultaneously support the objectives of its 
major donors, re-constitute the international market for foreign bonds, and to support its own 
creditworthiness.  
Further, the Bank was an agent of the construction of a regime of international 
governance which reflected and reinforced these social relationships, and those of the 
economies of the periphery which supported them. This is evidenced by the practices of 
management in strategically managing these interests by deploying appropriate tools – hard 
conditionality on debt-defaults and project lending in Chile, and balance-of-payments support 
through programme lending in Europe. 
The transition to project lending was not due to a ‘coup’, or to a ‘battle of ideas’ in an 
institution insulated from external pressures by ‘interpretative authority’. It reflects the 
pragmatic working-out of a concrete politics of governance which reflected the social 
relationships of the New Deal in which the Bank was anchored. 
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Chapter 4: The Turn to ‘Development’: Making the World Safe for 
the Dollar. 
 
In Chapter 3 we have seen that the imperatives following from the foundation of the 
Bank on the basis of private financial capital quickly challenged the ideas of its architects 
concerning how it would operate. We have seen, in conflict between Bank management and 
the Executive Directors over the Chilean loan, the way in which the Bank’s financial 
imperatives mediated its capacity to act on the hegemonic US agenda. The Bretton Woods 
regime may be re-conceptualised, on this basis, as an order in which the infrastructural power 
of American finance was institutionalised at the international level. 
The most striking feature of the nineteen years under discussion in this chapter, from 
1949 to 1968, is the ‘turn to development’: the expansion of Bank activities beyond Europe, to 
South American, African, and Asian members. I will show that pursuit of the ‘development’ 
agenda should not be read as a simple extension of the ‘embedded’ liberal nature of the 
financially repressive post-war regime. It was a contingent aspect of management’s pursuit of 
the Bank’s operational imperative to secure its capitalisation. Only through the foundation of 
the affiliates, the IDA and IFC, and the transformation of its lending processes to reflect the 
practices of the commercial banks that bought its bonds could the objective of expanding 
concessional lending to low-income members could be facilitated without damaging the Bank’s 
own all-important creditworthiness. In the process, the agenda of the Bank became 
increasingly closely interwoven with that of the US. Yet, by the end of the period, a new 
contradiction would emerge from the realisation of the objective of multilateral convertibility 
which both the Bank and the US had pursued, which would threaten the Bank’s ability to 
perform its role as an institution of global governance.  
I will show that the objectives of the Bank, private finance, and member states were 
not implacably antagonistic, as the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis contends. The epochal 
objective of the American state was to centre a multilateral trading order upon the dollar. The 
Bank’s objective was to secure its capitalisation by diversifying its sources of borrowing, and to 
obtain the subscriptions pledged by members New Hampshire in 1945. The objectives of 
financiers were to enforce commercial discipline on defaulted debtors, and to reconstitute and 
develop international capital markets as sources of liquidity and venues for profitable 
investment. I will argue that these objectives were mutually reinforcing, although their 
increasingly close interrelationship gave rise to a major contradiction with the development of 
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the Euro-dollar markets in the later 1960s. Crucially, their attainment remained mediated by 
the imperatives of financiers throughout. 
The drive to turn the Bank into a development agency can be seen to have two 
sources. Firstly, President Truman’s speech at his second inauguration in 1949 laid out a 
foreign policy vision in which the security of the heartland of the post-war order was linked 
explicitly to the development of the wider non-communist world. The administration remained 
eager, in spite of Collado’s acrimonious departure, that the Bank expand its operations in 
support of this epochal governance objective. Secondly, while Marshall Plan funds supplanted 
it in Europe, the Bank was threatened with irrelevance by the commencement of negotiations 
in the UN to found a special low-conditionality fund for economic development which would 
enable low-income borrowers to escape the Bank’s financial discipline. 
These pressures shaped the Bank’s problematique in the 1950s and 1960s. Its ability to 
meet these objectives was nothing less than an existential question for it as an agent of global 
governance – and thereby for the wider Bretton Woods regime. Retaining the support of its 
major donor, on the one hand, and avoiding marginalisation in favour of a new institution, on 
the other, required the Bank to draw upon the capital of private investors. Before its 
principals’ needs could be met it would undertake significant transformations in three 
associated areas, resulting in a total transformation by the early 1960s. 
Firstly, a major structural reorganisation was undertaken in 1952 to support the 
institutionalisation of the commercially-oriented ‘project approach’ as a lending model. This 
was a pre-requisite of the second area of transformation: the way the Bank funded its 
operations. Combining the project approach with strategic programme lending enabled the 
Bank to simultaneously meet its own objectives, and those of the US, without sacrificing its 
creditworthiness. 
Secondly, management worked to achieve significant diversification of the Bank’s 
investor base with a view to securing sufficient operating capital to expand its lending 
activities. Through diversification, the Bank could better guarantee the security of financing 
against currency fluctuations and individual capital controls – particularly as the US struggled 
with its balance of payments deficit. 
Thirdly, the way in which the Bank disbursed its monies was significantly altered 
through the foundation of two affiliated lending organisations under the umbrella of the 
‘World Bank Group’.  
In exploring these developments, I will show that the Bank’s financial imperatives 
shaped its strategy in the 1950s and 1960s to a much greater extent than the agency of 
presidents and development economists. 
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Focusing on the complementarities of the objectives of the US, financiers, and the 
Bank; and the way in which the development of the US’ hegemonic agenda was mediated by 
the imperatives of financiers helps to avoid a contradiction which bedevils the ‘coup thesis’ of 
the Brookings histories. This is the sharp dichotomy which it sets up between state and market 
– where the Bank was captured by market interests. Following the McCloy coup, so the story 
goes, the Bank acquiesced to a strategic development agenda handed down from the State 
Department in support of the imperatives of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.246 
This neglects the imperatives of the transition to management governance of the Bank under 
McCloy, and thereby misreads its character and purpose as a blow struck for the market 
against the state. More problematic still returning to the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis in this 
way suggests that the ‘turn to development’ was a reflection of the dominance of the 
imperatives of the US state, re-asserted at the expense of those of financiers in pursuit of the 
stabilisation of its hegemony in the post-war regime.  
As a counter to the depiction of the Bank as an agent whose actions were defined by 
the agenda of its principles, Chwieroth’s focus on the internally articulated processes of 
change which were at work inside the Bank across the period helps to illuminate the central 
failing of the Brookings thesis. Through focusing on the development of the project approach, 
he is able to demonstrate that the technology of institutional governance which was required 
to make development lending – and the continued centrality of the Bank to the post-war 
regime – acceptable to Wall Street and the US was not dictated by either. The technique of 
conditional lending for defined, productive projects rather than for broad-brush balance of 
payments support was a key step in the elaboration of the development agenda, and was 
adopted by the Bank in its specific form through the strategic agency of management. 
I argue that Chwieroth over-states the autonomy of the Bank in pursuit of its own 
institutional objectives. In arguing that this transformation was effected through essentially 
internal processes of strategic change, Chwieroth divorces the ideas underpinning the project 
approach from the imperatives which necessitated its adoption. In his account, institutional 
change is linked to external social relations only via the ideational socialisation of the 
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managers who advocated them in particular professional and epistemic communities. Where 
the interests of the Bank and external forces coincided, this was due only to the ideational 
harmony of the epistemic communities which guided them. Therefore, the adoption of 
commercially-oriented norms of lending was due to the agency of management alone. 
The observation that the central transformation in the Bank’s process during the ‘turn 
to development’, through which the character of development lending was constructed as 
conditional and based on ‘productive’ projects is a key insight, which I will take as my starting 
point in this chapter. Yet, as I will show, the fact that the programme loan model endured 
alongside the project approach until 1957 illustrates the interweaving of US, Bank, and 
financial imperatives. Further, locating the impetus for the adoption of the project approach 
overwhelmingly in management agency suggests that the elaboration of project lending as the 
key practice through which ‘development’ was realised was only one of an array of possible 
choices, in spite of the existence of powerful social interests which sought to pressurise the 
Bank from ‘outside’. The fact that it concurred with the commercially-derived understanding of 
sound lending practice was a matter of choice and ideational coincidence. Here, the power of 
ideas floats free of the anchor of social interest. 
I wish to clarify the material basis of the transitions identified by Chwieroth, in order to 
illustrate how the agency of management was limited and shaped by the imperatives of the 
social forces in which its power as an institution was rooted. The turn to development was not 
impelled exclusively by the imposition of the agenda of the US and the Damascene conversion 
of Wall Street bankers and lawyers into humanists. Nor was it driven by the power of ideas and 
professional norms of managerial entrepreneurs. Each of the transformations undertaken to 
the Bank’s processes of lending, and institutional structure, reflects the way in which the 
objectives of members and the Bank itself were shaped by the reliance upon financiers for 
capitalisation. At every turn, the agency of Bank management would be mediated by the 
imperatives of finance.  
The ‘turn to development’ was a contingent aspect of Bank strategy. Firstly, I will 
explore how getting access to European capital markets entailed the closer and increasingly 
contradictory interweaving of the Bank’s institutional imperatives with the objectives of the US 
government and those of US financiers. The objective which united all these requirements was 
the attainment of multilateral convertibility, and the Bank pursued strategic lending and non-
lending in support of this aim.  
Secondly, I will present the institutional transformations which were required in 
adjusting to the new problems posed by the Bank’s success in promoting these interrelated 
interests. The foundation of the affiliates is conventionally taken to exemplify the Bank’s re-
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configuration as a development institution. However, I will show that the International Finance 
Corporation represented an effort to set forth a long-held commitment among Bank 
management to the primacy of private capital in development. The International Development 
Association also had its genesis in an effort to retain the Bank’s primacy in multilateral aid 
transfers in the face of proposals to expand the UN’s role in this field. Both are best 
understood as an effort to accommodate the contradiction caused by the Bank’s success in 
facilitating the achievement of conditions whereby it could diversify its borrowings. 
Ultimately, the affiliates which formed the vehicle for this ostensible strategic change 
became the source of a renewed crisis for the Bank as they reinstated the influence of 
members’ legislative bodies over the institution’s budget which McCloy and Garner had fought 
to resist. 
 
1: Securing the Bank’s Capitalisation 
Europe’s liquidity problem was the central problem of the 1950s for the Bank. For this 
reason, issues of ‘development’ were viewed by Bank management in the Black era through a 
primarily European prism. A minority of the forty-eight members had paid their pledged 18% 
tranches in full, and Bank bonds could not be marketed in most European financial centres due 
to emergency restrictions on investment. The problems facing members such as Brazil, Mexico, 
and Chile were also placed in a European frame: how could the conditions be created whereby 
their ‘traditional’ trade with the countries of that continent be resurrected? By far outstripping 
these issues was the problem of European recovery: it was imperative to get European 
producers selling in dollar markets again. Bilateral arrangements between currency blocs, and 
the stolid arrangements for capital transfers within the sterling and gold areas posed two 
major obstacles to the Bank. 
 Firstly, it meant that its lending capacity was limited to the US guarantee, and 
secondly, that it was only able to supplement paid-in US resources with recourse to the New 
York capital market. The paid-in portions of the largest members’ subscriptions would not be 
released until the balance of payments condition of European members had improved 
satisfactorily to permit the achievement of multilateral convertibility. In this section, I will 
illustrate the strategic efforts made by Bank management to facilitate these conditions – to 
which end it would be forced to court both the US government and private financial capital 
assiduously. Their complex interrelationship in Bank strategy was manifest in a focus on 
European matters relating to debt default and blocked currency balances, exemplified by the 
engagement of the IBRD and the governments of Greece and Yugoslavia; and efforts to break 
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into the sterling currency bloc, exemplified in the Australian case. Addressing these cases 
would require a strategic admixture of the project and programme approaches to lending. 
These cases were central to the Bank’s ability to satisfy US and investor interests. A 
hard line stance on Greek debt defaults was combined with a flexible approach to Yugoslavia’s 
defaults which enabled the Bank to support the US’ overlapping security and monetary policy 
objectives. This strategic calculation proved essential to improving the Bank’s access to the 
member subscriptions it desperately needed, while helping to foster moves in the direction of 
convertibility which could see those subscriptions realised as loan-able resources and 
guarantees which might offer further leveraging opportunities in capital markets. 
In January 1951, all Greece’s long-term external debts were in default apart from $128 
million in post-world war two credits from Britain and the US. These concerned loans 
contracted as far back as 1881. The Bank estimated that the outstanding publicly funded 
external debt to private sterling, franc, and dollar creditors was $325 million. 247 The Bank 
position was clear: Greece was not eligible for IBRD lending. The clarity of the Bank’s position 
was derived from the fact that “The American foreign bondholders’ council was very, very 
tough on the Greeks, writing very harsh reports about Greece’s unwillingness to pay despite its’ 
recovery.”248 
The American interest was clearly expressed in 1947 by Under Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, who informed Congress that “a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open up 
three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the 
corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east.” 249 The same year, following an 
investigation conducted at the request of the Greek government, US Congressman Paul A. 
Porter reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that an American recovery mission 
would need $300 million in the next financial year to fend off a either a return to fascist 
governance or communist revolution.250 
Financial imperatives were equally clearly expressed. Although the Greek economy 
remained in a parlous state following its liberation from Bulgarian occupation in 1944, and 
Bank management were clearly sympathetic to the anti-communist objective in Greece, their 
inability to authorise lending in support of this remained quite straightforward in the opinion 
of Bank vice president Robert Garner. In 1961, drawing on the Chilean example to explain the 
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importance of the hard Bank line to the success of its on-going relationship with financiers and 
the impact of not making a settlement, Garner explained that: “Having established the 
precedent with Chile, the objections were less vociferous. The only one that I know of that 
hasn’t taken any real steps towards settling their obligations is Greece. That is still unsettled, 
and the Bank has never made a loan to Greece.”251 This hard-line stance, while not directly 
supportive of the anti-communist effort, certainly went a long way towards reinforcing the 
perception of the Bank’s probity among financiers. Greece would not see any funds from the 
Bank until 1967. 
The necessity of appealing to both sets of imperatives is evident in the differential in 
treatment between Greece and Yugoslavia. The hard-line approach was necessary in Greece 
due to the way in which the Bank engaged with the case of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav 
application linked not only American monetary and security interests, but the Bank’s interest 
in obtaining paid-in subscriptions from European members whose currencies were still not 
convertible. In order to meet these objectives, the Bank took a far more lenient stance on the 
Yugoslavian defaults. Like Greece, Yugoslavia had defaulted on its private external dollar bonds 
in 1932, although it had been able to maintain partial service until 1939, total default took 
place in 1941 on bonds to the value of $56,252,331. 252 
As Mason and Asher have noted, Eugene Black was quick to spot the opportunity that 
this potential crisis for the nascent post-war American sphere of influence in Europe afforded 
the Bank: US and Western European political interests in the survival of Tito’s regime could be 
linked with hitherto thwarted trade interests in such a way as to provide for the release of the 
18% paid-in subscriptions still outstanding among many European members. 253 During the 
early to mid-1950s, the scope for the IBRD’s lending was extremely straitened by the bilateral 
and bloc-oriented monetary practices of the era. Already in 1951 a number of other 
prospective loans - to Iceland, Iraq, Pakistan, and Finland – were proving difficult to fund. 
Britain, France, and Belgium had previously refused to allow their 18% subscriptions to be 
drawn, expressing concerns about the balance of payments impact of the use of their funds for 
procurement in fellow European Payments Union (EPU) economies. 
With the twin objectives of securing European members’ capitalisation and reinforcing 
moves toward multilateral convertibility among European currencies in mind, Black took the 
extraordinary decision to work out a deal in principal with the Yugoslav ambassador in 
Washington, bypassing the FBPC. Against the precedent set in Chile and replicated in Greece, 
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Yugoslavia simply had to agree in writing to the Bank that a settlement would be made by a 
specific date.254  
The latent leverage upon European members could be realised with this agreement 
and lending could go ahead due to the tough stance taken on Chile and Greece, and the 
apparent gravity of the security dimension to the situation. As 80% of the equipment required 
by the 25 projects identified in the Yugoslav plan was sourced from Europe, Black refused to 
loan Yugoslavia more than $12m of a proposed loan of $28 million unless Western European 
countries agreed to permit the use of their 18% subscriptions – or allow the Bank to raise 
funds in their capital markets. 
‘Special Releases’ from twelve European countries followed the Yugoslav loan.255 Yet 
the $200m that the payment of outstanding subscriptions had secured was only a short-term 
shot in the arm for the Bank’s lending programme. 
Although they permitted greater flexibility in terms of lending to members who were 
not creditworthy in dollar terms, the special releases could not displace capital market 
borrowing as its principle source of funds for this purpose. Lending to peripheral European 
countries which might have been creditworthy in their own or other local European currencies 
remained entirely dependent on the release of the 18% paid-in local currency portion of the 
member’s subscription, and the Articles of Agreement required the individual governor’s 
approval of further lending in that currency and its conversion into other currencies, while 
loans could also be tied to specific conditions relating to procurement.  
The inability to re-lend during the first decade had cost the Bank in unearned interest 
and the lending ceiling was still fast approaching. As Kraske points out, the eventual release of 
the remaining 18% paid-in capital subscriptions in multilaterally convertible form in 1957 was 
dependent ultimately on the accumulation of large dollar balances outside the US, and the 
recovery of the balance-of-payments positions of members.256 
For this reason, the Bank’s objective was to facilitate the accumulation of the dollar 
holdings of strategic trading partners, and this determined management’s strategic 
engagement with Australia. Although Chwieroth is correct to note that the arrival of Wall 
Street alumni drove the turn towards projects in the Bank’s lending, it is important to 
emphasise that the program loans continued – and that this neither represented the last 
hurrah of the New Deal ‘longhairs’, nor did it conflict with the interests of private financial 
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backers. As Mason and Asher point out, a further sixteen program loans to the value of $1,055 
million were made across the period 1950 and 1957.257 
Such strategic mutability in the Bank’s lending practice is underscored by its 
engagement with Australia during the 1950s. Australia appeared to be an unlikely candidate 
for a Bank loan, as it was highly creditworthy. Having never defaulted on its foreign 
obligations, it was thought to be a dynamically expanding economy in which high returns on 
investment could be found. Robert Garner, the Bank’s General Counsel, considered it 
“embarrassing”, to enforce the project approach with members such as Guatemala or 
Pakistan, when such large volumes of capital had been handed out to a wealthy government 
which was independently active in the private capital markets of New York with little scrutiny 
and for such general purposes.258 
Australia’s application nonetheless estimated that its capital needs ran to $250 million, 
of which $100 million was required immediately to sustain dollar imports259 required for a 
development strategy designed to support population growth and production of raw materials 
for export to the dollar area.260 A report on the Australian development programme noted that 
“The Bank has not had an opportunity of studying the development projects which make up 
these programs nor of discussing them with the State and Commonwealth authorities and the 
business enterprises who will in fact carry them out [...] the mission did not make a technical 
examination of the projects.”261 As the relationship progressed further, a Bank study of the 
Australian economy observed that the conditions upon which the loan of 1950 had been 
predicated had not obtained, and that damaging inflation had undermined the government’s 
growth strategy. Nevertheless, it went on to suggest that since “[t]he Australians are a 
competent people with an ability to get things done once they have set their mind to it”, a 
further $50 million credit should be extended.262  
The contrast with the Greek case is illustrative of the wider importance of lending to 
Australia: whereas Greece was the cornerstone of the Truman doctrine for U.S. security, 
Australia was a key piece of the international monetary jigsaw with the capacity to strengthen 
                                                          
257 Mason, E.S., and Asher, R.E., 1973. Pg.264 footnote 7, 269-75, cited (incorrectly as 11 program loans) 
in Chwieroth, J., 2006. Pg.26. 
258Oliver, R. W., Interview with Davidson Sommers, The World Bank/IFC Archives Oral History Program, 
Columbia University, 2nd August 1961. Pg.29-32. 
259 IBRD, Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on the Proposed Loan 
to the Commonwealth of Australia, Washington D.C., August 18th 1950. Pg.1 
260 IBRD, Australia: Economic Report, Washington D.C., August 17th 1950. Pg.16 
261 IBRD, Description of Australian Development Programs, Washington D.C., July 3rd 1952. Pg.1 
262 IBRD, The Australian Economy, Washington D.C., June 27th 1952. Pg.iv. 
117 
 
 
sterling area dollar reserves and thereby facilitate the transition to a fully convertible 
international monetary system. 
The strategic combination of program and project lending in the early years reflects 
the Bank management’s simultaneous engagement with financiers and donor members. These 
interests, who had found common ground in these early program loans from a broader 
strategic viewpoint, focused upon the easing of constraints to international trade and 
transfers. The most concrete expression of this took the form of the Bank’s efforts to ensure 
that the international monetary regime would be centred upon the dollar. Beginning dollar-
based relationships with countries that were part of rival currency blocs and improving their 
dollar holdings would contribute to their return to multilateral convertibility and secure the 
primacy of trade in dollars. 
 
2: A Victim of its own Success? 
Successful pursuit of a strategy aimed squarely at replenishing the dollar holdings of 
European borrowers, re-orienting Sterling bloc members toward the dollar, and enforcing 
discipline on defaulted debtors had significant consequences for the form, lending processes, 
and structure of the Bank. In support of these aims, the first decade had been a period in which 
the Bank had worked desperately to broaden its investor base and expand the market in IBRD 
securities. Two major consequences followed from these strategies.  
Firstly, non-European members sought to supplant the Bank through the UN: 
developing members clamoured for funds, and the Bank had to act quickly to deflect their 
critique and absorb their demands in order to retain its primacy in the governance of the early 
Bretton Woods order. 
Secondly, support for dollar-based multilateral convertibility played a role in the 
development of the conditions for the foundation of the Eurocurrency markets. This caused 
two further problems for the Bank: US efforts to control the expansion of dollar balances 
outside its borders saw the Bank excluded from the US markets while Congress refused to fund 
the International Development Association (IDA) on the basis that it would exacerbate the 
budget deficit. Secondly, while the threat from the UN had been absorbed the threat posed by 
the Euromarkets could not be so easily accommodated: middle income borrowers began to 
develop a debt profile which boded ill for the future. 
 Ultimately, the Euromarkets would supplant the Bank among middle income 
members, laying the foundations for the debt crisis of the 1980s. In this section, I will explore 
the path to this outcome, illustrating firstly the Bank’s success in its ability to translate the 
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interests of financiers and the US into a coherent politics of governance in the early Bretton 
Woods period. I will then turn to the institutional transformations which were required as a 
condition of this success, before discussing the pathological outcomes which they were unable 
to avoid. 
Paying Dividends: the Success of the Diversification Strategy 
Initially, the Bank had been able to borrow solely in New York and Switzerland – the 
only capital markets which were able to offer convertible currencies. Beginning with the $250m 
bond offering of 1947 the IBRD had long been a major borrower in the New York money 
markets – between 1946 and 1964 the Bank was one of the two largest issuers of securities, 
the other being the Canadian government. Between them they were responsible for more than 
half of the $14bn of new foreign issues in this period263. 85% of bank bonds issued to 1957 
were denominated in dollars264, and since borrowers were demanding dollar funds during this 
period of intense capital shortage and limited convertibility, this was not immediately 
problematic – for those states which were considered dollar creditworthy265.  
Eugene Black and Robert Garner had enjoyed significant success in persuading US and 
Canadian state legislatures to permit their financial institutions to purchase Bank securities. 
The 1951-2 Annual Report placed the sum of bonds purchased by investors during that year at 
$175.3m. Two issues had been made in the US totalling $150m, supplemented by one in 
Switzerland for CHF 50,000 ($11.6m) and one in Canada of C$15m. Sales from portfolio 
contributed $23.4m.266 Black had issued a similar plea to the board of governors in 1949 – to 
take legislative action in their home governments to make Bank bonds saleable to central 
banks and more broadly, to institutional and individual investors outside the US.267 
This was taken up enthusiastically in Germany, where only mortgage banks were 
barred from investing in Bank paper, and a healthy market developed among private 
individuals and the banking system. From 1950, IBRD dollar bonds were traded on the Paris and 
Amsterdam stock exchanges and with a sterling issue in London in 1950 and a guilder issue in 
Holland in 1954, the Bank was already an established actor in the international capital markets 
by the mid-1950s. In 1951 the Bank had $536.7m in direct and guaranteed obligations 
outstanding, 20% of which – approximately $130m - was held by investors outside the US. The 
majority of the approximately $50m in bonds denominated in other member currencies was 
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held by non-US investors, alongside an estimated further $69m in dollar bonds. In contrast to 
the American market, the principal foreign purchasers were central banks268. Across the period, 
the significance of European capital markets would increase significantly: in 1968, long term 
bank borrowing in West Germany exceeded funds raised in the USA269. 
Expanding participation in bond issues and sales from the Bank’s portfolio in European 
capital markets was the main reason that the houses of Morgan Stanley and First Boston were 
selected as underwriters of the IBRD’s bonds270. The Parisian affiliate Morgan Grenfell gave the 
former strong links with Europe, and was renowned as a wholesaler. First Boston had one of 
the leading retail systems of any US bank outside the USA. The transition from the 1947 model 
of bond sales organised through a vast syndicate of almost 1700 security dealers in 1947 to 
direct negotiated sales to a preferred underwriter reflected an effort to find the issuing process 
which would give the Bank the best start in creating and maintaining an international market in 
its bonds271. Looking back on the period in 1961, the first Treasurer, Daniel Crena De Iongh 
reflected that “if all that hadn’t been done, now that the American market is, at present at 
least, not so favourable, and the balance of payments is not so favourable, the situation of the 
Bank would really be very, very different at present.”272 
This represented an enormous success for the Bank. Figures compiled by Mason and 
Asher in their history of the Bank’s first quarter-century show that net borrowings outstripped 
subscriptions as a source of income for the first time on June 30th 1958, from which point on 
they remained the largest source of income. Sales from portfolio similarly outstripped and 
continued to exceed subscriptions from 1964. Both of these remained individually larger 
sources of revenue than income from operations, and repayments from principal only 
marginally outstripped sales of the Bank’s loans in 1971 – although remaining less than half the 
value of net borrowings in that year.273 They argue that the period since the mid-1950s was 
characterised by a decline in the relative importance of the US markets as a source of 
borrowing. This is certainly true – across the period from 1955 to 1971, the Bank borrowed in 
Belgian francs, Canadian dollars, Deutschmarks, lire, yen, Kuwaiti dinars, Dutch guilder, Libyan 
pounds, Swedish kronor, and sterling, although its non-dollar borrowings were by far the most 
frequent in Swiss francs. By volume, Deutschmarks were the most significant – although only 
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slightly more than one quarter of dollar borrowings – and the German capital market was 
tapped more consistently than the Swiss from 1965 onwards274.  
Black had wanted to transform the way in which Bank paper was viewed, commenting 
that “I invented a word I’m not sure is in the dictionary. We tried to do what we called 
‘pedestalize’ our bonds.”275 The government bond sector of the US capital market had begun to 
decline, and Black was concerned that going to the market in the US too frequently would 
result in the Bank paying higher rates. Accordingly, he sought to persuade other governments 
to hold IBRD bonds as part of their reserves. The Bank’s short-term issues were particularly 
important in developing the European market for its bonds and notes. Between 1956 and 1958 
the Bank made seven issues, the first of which was a $75m two-year bond offered for sale 
entirely outside the US. The Bundesbank snapped up $17.5m, sixteen other central banks 
bought $52m, with private purchasers taking the balance. From 1958, private purchasers were 
excluded from the market, as the Bank was confident of its ability to sell these short-term 
instruments to central banks – and could afford to pay a lower rate of interest. In 1966, these 
short term issues had become bi-annual and were worth more than $200m per year, and were 
placed directly with central banks, governmental institutions and international 
organisations.276 
Yet Black and Garner’s successes in the US and Europe had contributed to a problem 
for the Bank, which had been brewing amongst prospective borrowing members from the very 
outset when South American governors had expressed their concerns to Emilio Collado that 
lending to Europe would prevent developing economies from gaining access to the capital they 
needed. 
Deflecting Critique from the South: the IFC & IDA 
In the 1950s a debate over development financing developed rapidly at the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Hans Singer, of the UN’s Department of Economic 
Affairs, was receptive to the complaints of South American members who were concerned that 
as their economies grew, they would not be able to continue to benefit from concessionary 
financing.277 Singer and V.K.R.V Rao argued for the development of a Special United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) on the basis of the success of the large-scale 
transfers of Marshall Aid, and the observation that as the 1950s progressed, the terms of trade 
were tipping in favour of industrialised countries. In that year, further pressure was built up by 
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the adoption in the UN General Assembly of resolution 520A(IV) which required that ECOSOC 
submit a plan for the establishment of a grant-based or low-interest long-term financing body 
which could be tasked with financing non-self-liquidating projects by 1953.278  This was 
supported by a report co-authored by eminent economists including W. Arthur Lewis and 
Theodore W. Schultz, who criticised the Bank heavily for its foreign exchange focus.279 
The Bank was highly critical of the SUNFED proposal, and was joined in seeking to 
deflect serious discussion of the matter by US representatives who extolled the virtues of 
private enterprise – and the IBRD – as potential catalysts for growth. From 1953, the 
Eisenhower administration attempted to link the foundation of a grant-aid body to savings 
from multilateral disarmament.280  
The pressure built on the Bank and the US from the South. Speeches at the Bank’s 
1954 annual meeting by Luis Machado of Cuba and other South American members drew upon 
an idea which had a long heritage in the Bank: a vehicle for investment in private enterprises. 
This idea had been debated as far back as 1948, during the elaboration of the Truman 
Doctrine. It had been advanced in the NAC and the US Department of State, as well as among 
the McCloy-era Bank’s top management, and in time, would come to unite the interests of 
financiers, US state bureaucrats, and the Bank itself. 
McCloy, Demuth, Garner, and Black met frequently with US government officials to 
discuss a fund which could be offered to private enterprises in the form of equity as well as 
debt obligations – without government guarantees. This idea reflected a deeply-held 
conviction amongst the management to the effect that governments couldn’t possibly run 
industrial enterprises effectively, and that a Bank affiliate could encourage members not to 
divert resources into the public management of industry. Bank management succeeded in 
convincing Truman’s Advisory Board on International Development, chaired by Nelson 
Rockefeller, to adopt the idea of an ‘International Finance Corporation’ as a method by which 
the Point Four Program could be promoted.281 
Popular as it was with borrowing members, the nascent IFC was initially considered by 
the US government and financiers as an essentially ‘socialistic’ undertaking: the provision of 
monies to a private enterprise in the form of equity investment by a public institution was 
equated to public ownership. 282 Financiers feared that the aspects of IBRD which they had 
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lobbied against in the 1940s had returned under the Black presidency, and could potentially 
offer unwelcome competition for US investment banks. 283 
Financiers’ criticisms gained important concessions from Black which would remove 
the major stumbling blocks – but ultimately stymie the IFC’s operation. Firstly, its capitalisation 
would be reduced from $450m to $100m; and secondly, it would not offer finance on an 
equity basis. Thirty countries took up membership on July 20th 1956, contributing $78,366,000 
which rose to fifty-one member contributing $92m by September the following year. 
Therefore it was almost entirely hamstrung from the outset: its small capitalisation 
rendered it irrelevant to the large enterprises for which it was intended – those which needed 
the mobilisation of foreign capital. The terms it required were considered excessive284 and a 
$2m limit on individual investments rendered them marginal in terms of profitability and their 
contribution to the development of the industrial sector in question. Appeasing the Treasury 
and New York’s financiers meant that the IFC endured a miserable start, and it invested only 
$44m in its first decade. Most of its investments had gone to South American borrowers, but 
only 32 investments had become effective and only 13 of these turned a profit. 285 
However, the IFC would become the Bank’s main instrument for dealing with private 
enterprise. Although the Kennedy administration oversaw the rationalisation of economic aid 
practices through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 – founding the Peace Corps, centralising 
programmes in USAID, formalising the Alliance for Progress – in 1961, appropriations for 
development assistance declined by more than $300m. This meant that it was more important 
than ever to engage more closely with American financiers and bureaucrats who had 
perceived its equity investment as ‘socialist’. Their reassurance took the form of an 
amendment to the IFC’s Articles of Agreement to the effect that it would not exercise voting 
rights for managerial control.286 
This was a significant success: in1962 the IFC was able to hire George Woods, chairman 
of the IBRD’s chief underwriters the First Boston Corporation and subsequent IBRD president, 
as an advisor. Alongside him were Dr. Hermann J.Abs, director of Deutsche Bank A.G 
(Frankfurt); Viscount Harcourt, MD of Morgan, Grenfell & Company (London); Mr. Andre 
Meyer, Senior Partner with Lazard Freres & Company (New York); and Baron Guy de 
Rothschild, partner of de Rothschild Freres (Paris).287 As President of the World Bank Group 
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from 1963, a central plank of George Woods program was to expand the scope of Bank lending 
to include more industrial projects. Overcoming the final obstacle to making the IFC a more 
attractive partner required giving the IFC access to greater leverage: Woods successfully 
amended the IBRD charter in 1964 to offer Bank lending to the IFC, giving it a leverage ratio of 
4:1, with the first loan taking place in 1966.288 
 However, this was also the period – 1956-1961 – when the Euromarkets were taking 
off. US and European multinationals were able to find finance in the dollar markets of London 
without the complications of the IFC’s awkward hybridity. Even though the IFC’s annual 
commitments grew rapidly under Woods, the development finance corporations (DFCs) it 
aimed to fund were seen as competition to the IBRD so efforts were focused on investment in 
basic manufacturing industry: until 1971, DFCs received a total of $53,174,705, compared to 
manufacturing industry’s share of $443,420,156.289 
Deflecting borrowers’ criticism and accommodating their demands for concessional 
financing therefore demanded an alternative solution, however popular the IFC may have 
eventually proven with financiers. The IFC had delivered only a trickle of capital in its first 
decade, and the agitation in the UN in the aftermath of the Singer group’s proposal for a UN 
administered special concessionary development fund continued to threaten the Bank with 
marginalisation – and by extension, strengthen the hand of developing countries while de-
coupling them from anti-communist development strategies. From the mid-1950s, the debate 
turned to the foundation of another international body to finance projects which could not be 
undertaken on a loan basis. In doing so, yet again, the execution of the Bank’s strategy would 
be mediated by the imperatives of finance. 
The foundation of such a body had also been mooted in the 1951 US International 
Development Advisory Board report which had promoted the foundation of the IFC. It was 
viewed positively by the US as it would prevent the emergence of the SUNFED proposal’s one-
country-one-vote system in the UN and help to preserve US influence in development 
finance.290 As far as the Bank was concerned, it could only meet the pressure to lend to 
developing members through the foundation of a new affiliate: the credit risk entailed by IBRD 
lending to less creditworthy members was too high. If the Bank, having obtained private 
capital at market rates, were subsequently to lend at lower rates, its own creditworthiness 
would suffer. Further, as the 1950s progressed it became that the developing countries carried 
                                                          
288 Haralz, J., in Kapur, D., Lewis, J.P, and Webb, R., 1997. 
289 Mason, E.S., and Asher, R.E., 1973. Pg.355, Table 11-3. 
290 Gwin, C. ‘The International Development Association’, in Kapur, D., Lewis, J.P, and Webb, R., 1997 (A). 
Pg.384. 
124 
 
 
an increasingly large debt-burden, while European members would shortly be able to turn 
away from the Bank to seek funding in private capital markets themselves. 
For the Bank to be able to continue to tap private capital markets, any affiliate which 
would take on the task of lending to higher risk members for projects with lower returns would 
have to be entirely distinct. It was particularly important to clarify the different financial status 
of the IBRD and the proposed International Development Association (IDA) – the foundation of 
which was agreed at the Bank’s annual meeting of governors in 1959291  – to assure investors 
in Bank bonds that their interest would not be diluted by diverting funds into soft lending 
channels.292 
As a result, the IDA would have its own charter. This also meant that member 
parliaments would not have any opportunity to amend the charter of the IBRD itself in the 
course of processes of ratification. However, as Mason and Asher point out, the ‘affiliate’ 
status of the IDA was an “elaborate fiction”: in reality it was simply a fund administered by the 
IBRD but the illusion had to be maintained for the sake of the IBRD’s creditors, and to maintain 
its position of eminence as a development finance institution. 293  
With the advent of the IDA, the profile of the Bank Group’s lending was transformed: 
with significant contributions from the IDA, one third of total lending across the 1960s was 
undertaken in India and Pakistan. From 1961-69, IDA lent $1,847m to low income members 
against the IBRD’s $1,462m. Of the IDA low-income category $1,044 was lent to India alone. 
While the IBRD committed no funds to program lending, the IDA lent $555m of a total of 
$2,218m for these more general purpose applications.294 Mason and Asher note that across 
the 1966-1970 period, the IDA accounted for over 25% of combined Bank/IDA activity in new 
loans and credits. Of this share, Africa’s proportion increased to 25%, while the Western 
Hemisphere department disbursed 3% of the IDA total. 20-25% of IDA resources were spent in 
the agricultural sector, compared to only 10% of the IBRD, while the IDA also devoted a larger 
proportion to education.295 
It is precisely this transition which leads the Brookings historians to depict the 
funnelling of non-project lending through the IDA as a transformation of the character of the 
Bank Group into that of a ‘development institution’. These struggles were taking place across 
the period which Chwieroth depicts as a ‘battle of ideas’ between internal constituencies 
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advocating ‘project’ or ‘programme’ approaches to lending, from which the Wall Street-
oriented project constituency emerged the victor. 
However, I argue that this should be seen as a strategic move to stabilise the Bretton 
Woods order: management was able to sustain the orientation of the IBRD towards its private 
investors by incorporating IDA as a distinct entity, and secure the support of both the US and 
private finance through its efforts to foster private international investment through the IFC. 
Simultaneously the clamour from borrowing members for higher capital transfers for less 
directly productive purposes was successfully absorbed, and the Bank was able to retain its 
position at the heart of the Bretton Woods regime. It was the necessary social instrumentality 
through which these various political interests could be translated into a more-or-less 
coherent politics of governance.  
The stabilisation of the interests of the US, private finance, Bank management, and 
vocal middle-income borrowers which Black and his cohort appeared to have achieved in the 
early 1960s was short-lived. In the course of the Woods presidency, contradictions would 
emerge from this settlement which, in conjunction with wider developments in the 
international financial system would undermine the Bank’s centrality to the Bretton Woods 
regime. 
Pathologies of Success 
The diversification of the Bank’s borrowing had increased its working capital, and the 
foundation of the affiliates appeared to have secured its position as the foremost source of 
development finance. However the processes which it had supported and encouraged in order 
to achieve these aims created new contradictions which caused an institutional crisis. 
Firstly, the basis of the IDA’s capitalisation in public finance re-asserted the leverage 
which donors’ legislatures had given up in the course of the struggle over the presidency of the 
institution and the negotiations on the Chilean loan of 1947. This would come to jeopardise 
the centrality of the Bank to the Bretton Woods regime in conjunction with a second factor – 
the development of the Euromarkets on the basis of the rising volume of dollars held in British 
and European banks. As the Kennedy and Johnson administrations battled to contain 
international movements of dollar-denominated capital, the Bank sought to facilitate it. I will 
discuss the impact of the explosion of Eurodollar lending in greater depth in Chapter 5, but I 
will close this section with an illustration of the way in which the Bank began to find itself 
supplanted as a lender towards the close of the Woods presidency. 
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An unintended, although perhaps not unforeseeable outcome of the attempt to 
defend the creditworthiness of the IBRD by founding the IDA, was that the legislatures of large 
donors had greater leverage over the institution than ever before. 
The affiliate was to be capitalised with public monies. The Articles were brought into 
force on September 24th 1960, and by December 31st the following year, 56 members had 
subscribed, bringing its total capitalisation in convertible form to $757m of a total 
$912m.296Subscriptions were based upon 5% of IBRD subscriptions at the close of 1959, and 
members were to be categorised as Part 1 or Part 2 – contributors and borrowers respectively, 
based on per-capita income figures. The charter allowed the IDA to lend to public international 
or regional organisations, governments, and public or private entities in the territories of 
members. This wider mandate was nonetheless modified by a specific project provision – 
which was itself qualified in a similar way to the project clause in the Bank’s AAs: paragraph 14 
of Article V Section 1(B) permits financing for other purposes than specific projects under 
special circumstances.297  
President Woods had noted in his inaugural speech in 1963 that the loan ‘pipeline’ was 
full: although undisbursed, project preparation was proceeding at full bore. This followed an 
enormous drop-off in loan disbursement in the year from June 1962, to a dispiriting $442m. 298 
Lending was slowing down to an unacceptable rate in relation to repayments. The Bank’s 
reserves were building rapidly: almost $1bn had accumulated through repayment. Attempting 
to cut these reserves by slashing interest charges or paying a dividend was potentially risky in 
respect of the on-going necessity of financiers’ support – they were to be justified by riskier 
lending.  
The liquidity sluicing into the IBRD’s reserve funds was not paralleled in the IDA: when 
Woods joined in 1963, it had almost run out of funds – two years before the end of the 
anticipated five-year cycle. Irving Friedman’s Economic Department had completed a study for 
Woods which suggested that the developing countries could make productive use of up to 
$3bn more per year than was currently being supplied in all forms of ODA. The net flow of 
long-term capital from the industrialised countries was not reflecting the significant growth in 
their incomes at this point: it was stagnating at around $6bn.299  
By the mid-1960s, these problems would lead Woods to become entirely preoccupied 
by the IDA.300 During the first replenishment, Black had been able to gain the Kennedy 
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administration’s support by settling for $750m over three years (rather than the $1.5bn he had 
initially sought), in exchange for a token reduction in the US share of this deposit – from 
42.34% to 41.89%.301 However, in view of the decline in levels of ODA, Woods set as a target 
an increase in the amount of long-term financing available at concessional rates to $1bn per 
year for the second round of replenishment of the IDA’s capitalisation. 
Such an increase combined with the expansion in the lending program and ambitions 
to increase un-tied transfers set Woods at loggerheads with Congress in 1964, as net lending 
to the developed industrial countries became negative for the first time. With the US mired in 
conflict in Vietnam, and struggling to develop effective policy in relation to the balance of 
payments deficit, the second replenishment could ‘only’ achieve $400m per year. Worse, this 
would only come into effect in 1969 due to protracted negotiations which ensued as Congress 
demanded balance of payments safeguards and a further reduction in its share of the 
contribution, to be agreed at the ‘end of the queue’ after other Part 1 members had agreed 
their contribution.302 Accordingly, Woods elected to transfer approximately $200m to IDA 
across 1964-66.303 However, the delay meant that IDA commitments would drop to $107m in 
fiscal 1968, Woods’ last year as President.304  
His preoccupation with expanding IDA activities was motivated by a second, more 
structural problem which had been thrown up in the wake of the achievement of multilateral 
convertibility. With the growth of the Eurocurrency markets, middle income developing 
countries who were historically some of the Bank’s biggest borrowers had been able to avoid 
Bank conditionality and obtain finance directly from private banks. 
As Woods had noted in his inaugural speech to the governors, the level of debt which 
they were contracting was not problematic in itself. The potential problem lay in the structure 
of the debts: much of the borrowing had been undertaken through short-term instruments 
which concentrated repayment obligations to a troubling degree. During the later years of the 
Black presidency and the first year of Woods’ term a further seventeen countries joined the 
Bank, sixteen of which were African countries – an entirely new class of debtors. 
Rising levels of debt service payments among membership became a concern related 
to the ease and type of financing available in the booming Euromarket: the 1963-64 Annual 
Report notes that “...some countries have assumed obligations which, although not necessarily 
excessive in total amount, are concentrated too heavily in the short term.”305 A study authored 
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by the Bank’s Economic Department for the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 noted that from 1955 to 1962 the level of public and 
publically-guaranteed debt across a sample of 37 ‘developing’ countries had increased from $7 
billion to $18.2 billion. The level of amortization and interest payments incurred by this group 
of countries had increased by a far greater factor – from $0.7 billion in 1946 to $2.4 billion 
annually.306 Of this group, seven African countries were among the most highly indebted, 
where the growth of service payments on their external public debt was also among the 
fastest, although the region with the highest proportion of debt to be paid within five years 
was Latin America, where it ran at 55%.307  
The Bank/UNCTAD report observes that the debt service payments were constituted in 
large part by amortization payments – and that this was due to the fact that the majority of 
debt consisted of medium and particularly short-term privately-held maturities in contrast to 
the ‘traditional’ public international debt structure308.  
The expansion of this borrowing was fuelled by the expansion of the Eurodollar 
markets in response to the US’ attempts to control its balance of payments deficit. Both the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations struggled to develop a coherent and effective strategy, 
applying a combination of restrictive monetary policy in support of the dollar, and loose fiscal 
policy in an attempt to overcome the effects of the 1950s recessions. The outflow of dollars 
was beckoned by the lower interest rates available in the Euromarkets – US MNCs and 
commercial banks would borrow cheaply in London and spend in the US, contributing to 
inflation.309  
As this trend gathered pace the Bank became a victim of the disintermediation 
tendencies unleashed by the monetary practices of the US under Kennedy and Johnson in 
support of the dollar’s role as a reserve. Efforts to make depositing funds in US Treasury bills 
more attractive than commercial bank deposits by lowering the maximum rate of interest paid 
by US banks under the New Deal’s Regulation Q, and increasing the cost of investing in foreign 
stock and bonds through the imposition of a 1% Interest Equalisation Tax - thereby contracting 
credit310 - simply drove still greater volumes of deposits into the Eurodollar market where the 
IET did not apply. 
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These practices, as Seabrooke has it, meant that US policy in relation to the Bretton 
Woods order constituted an effort to “not to internalize monetary or financial ‘negative 
externalities’ in order to provide a stable international monetary system, but to create dollar-
denominated assets to achieve positive externalities for US interests.”311 The lack of external 
restraint on the US enabled the price of adjustment to be exported to minor deficit countries, 
as huge volumes of Treasury IOUs were created in Seabrooke’s terms ‘under the guise of 
convertibility’312, and private intermediaries borrowed short to lend long, without any 
particular concern about the value of the dollar or the creditworthiness of debtors. A boom in 
lending to developing countries took place which was cause and consequence of the enormous 
expansion of US banks beyond Europe and the Caribbean – from 143 branches to 399 across 
the 1965 - 1975 period313 – bypassing the Bank.  
Attempts to maintain the US’ policy autonomy by enabling it to sustained its payments 
deficit and an overvalued dollar, expressed an incipient monetary crisis. The efforts of the US 
to discourage foreign investment through measures such as the Johnson administration’s 
voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Programme could not offset the pressure on the link 
between the dollar and gold created by the rapid expansion of foreign dollar holdings. Dollar 
holdings outside the US had increased by almost $10bn from 1949-1958, from a shortage to a 
glut in the space of a single decade.314 In 1968, Johnson was forced to enact a raft of measures 
in the face of huge gold outflows, which effectively closed US capital markets to foreign 
borrowers, including the Bank, which suffered enduring scepticism in relation to the quality of 
its paper. 
A direct contradiction had emerged between the imperatives of the US and the 
imperatives of the Bank. US contributions to the Bank, and particularly to the IDA, were seen 
as factors in the deteriorating US balance of payments. During the Eurodollar boom, president 
Woods was forced to advise the governors of the Bank and IDA that finding the requisite 
monies to fund the continued operation of the Bank was a ‘dominant continuing problem’. 315 
Having begun with a significant surplus, the Woods era came to a close in such straits that the 
president was, according to Richard Demuth “...afraid the Bank wouldn’t get repaid and that it 
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would go bankrupt.”316Aaron Broches similarly noted that although the US was ‘happily’ voting 
in the Bank in favour of a greater loan programme, at the end of his tenure Woods “...became 
concerned that the Bank might not be able to borrow the funds it needed to meet its 
obligations to it borrowers.”317 
In sum, sovereign creditworthiness at existing terms of lending was becoming 
problematic by the mid-1960s, and across the following three years Bank annual commitments 
declined from over $1 billion to approximately $850 million. Bank terms of lending were forced 
to reflect the rising costs of its own borrowing: during the later 1940s, the Bank lent at 4.5%, in 
the later 1950s at 5.5%, climbing in the later 1960s to 7% interest.318 Net transfers declined 
from $242.64 million in 1961 to $41.63 million in 1962, peaking in 1967 at $171 million before 
declining to $23.14 million in 1969 and dropping to a negative net transfer of -58.85million in 
1970. 319  
Realising the objectives of its stakeholders in the early years had required the Bank to 
facilitate the creation of a multilateral trading order centred on the dollar, and a profitable 
international capital market. Ultimately, successfully translating the interests of members and 
financiers into a more-or-less coherent strategy of governance had created a new 
contradiction rooted in a dollar glut, which inverted the post-war liquidity crisis to which 
Bretton Woods was a solution. Making the world safe for the dollar had set processes in train 
which would bring the Bank to a profound crisis of relevance. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the interweaving of state and financial 
interests with the Bank’s strategic objectives, and the impact the achievement of these goals 
had on the Bank’s role in the governance of the Bretton Woods order following the 
achievement of multilateral convertibility. 
The Bank had actively sought to create the conditions for the re-emergence of 
international financial mobility, while the American state battled to contain it. Therefore, the 
diversification of the Bank’s borrowing increased its working capital, but the processes which it 
had encouraged in order to achieve this aim had outcomes which caused an institutional crisis. 
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 This allows us to re-conceptualise the period in a way which captures the agency of 
the Bank in mediating the relationship between private finance and members – particularly the 
US – with the aim of consolidating its position in a framework of international financial and aid 
governance. 
The ‘turn to development’ should be seen not as a moral imperative, but as a 
contingent aspect of the Bank’s strategy. The focus on European reconstruction and financial 
discipline with a view to facilitating processes supporting the attainment of multilateral 
convertibility was intended to resolve the twin issues of capitalisation with which the Bank 
continued to struggle.  
Firstly, it needed to obtain the funds pledged to it by members. These were useless if 
they could not be lent, so management exercised the inducements afforded by lucrative 
procurement agreements among members of the European Payments Union, and the leverage 
offered by in strategic cases where Bank interests coincided with those of the US such as 
Yugoslavia, to gain ‘special releases’ and access to national capital markets.  
This was the key to the second capitalisation problem: diversifiying the Bank’s 
borrowings. Building up dollar balances in Europe and members of the Sterling bloc supported 
the US aim to centre the new multilateral order on the dollar, and helped to lay the 
foundations for the development of the Eurodollar markets. These had two benefits: the 
ability to draw on large institutional investors handling the financial products of the US 
working and middle classes, and secondly, it afforded some security from US efforts to control 
their balance of payments deficit by excluding the Bank from the capital markets of New York. 
These successes entailed the transformation of the Bank’s institutional structure 
through the foundation of the affiliates – the IFC and IDA. Declining ODA flows and the early 
focus on European reconstruction had driven non-European borrowers to seek to supplant the 
Bank through the UN, to which the affiliates were a defensive reaction. By founding separate 
institutions as part of a ‘World Bank Group’, the Bank could retain its new-found ability to tap 
global capital markets while retaining its ability to play a leading role in ‘development’ 
financing. 
Ultimately, these transformations – to the international financial system, and the 
structure of the Bank – would pose two problems which constituted an existential threat to 
the Bank. Firstly, the IDA required budgetary appropriations from the legislatures of donor 
members – restoring the state power which McCloy had sought to evade. Secondly, the 
Euromarkets began to supplant the Bank among middle income members – which began to 
develop a debt profile which threatened to undermine the private international banking 
system. 
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These problems constituted nothing short of a crisis of relevance. The Bank was no 
longer the most important of the Bretton Woods institutions in terms of international liquidity 
provision, and it was rapidly losing out to private capital markets while growing scepticism 
towards foreign aid among major donors had brought the concessional lending its members 
had demanded to a halt. 
Overcoming the pathologies of the Bank’s success in making the world safe for the 
dollar and adapting its structure and procedures to suit the changing demands of governance 
in the maturing Bretton Woods order would require renewed engagement with financiers and 
the development of new techniques of management. Under Robert McNamara’s presidency, 
these processes and tools would form the roots of neoliberal governance which, from their 
origins in the ‘basic needs’ agenda, would outlast the Bretton Woods system itself. 
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Chapter 5: Carabosse’s Curse: Basic Needs and The Origins of 
Structural Adjustment. 
 
“You two brats shall grow up politicians; your every thought and act shall have an arrière 
pensée; everything you determine shall not be for its own sake or its own merits but because of 
something else.” 
J.M. Keynes; speech at closing session of Savannah conference. 
 
In Chapter 4 we have seen that the Bank’s ‘turn to development’ was a contingent 
feature of management’s pragmatic negotiation of the imperative of capitalisation.  As the 
Bank sought to secure its access to private American capital, its strategy became more closely 
intertwined with the US hegemonic agenda. The re-emergence of international financial 
mobility was at first a blessing. Yet it became clear in the course of the 1960s that it had 
opened a contradiction between the Bank and the US. Outflows of dollars into the Eurodollar 
market through banks and MNCs exacerbated the US balance of payments deficit, and their 
recycling exacerbated inflation. In turn, this lead to pressure to decrease aid spending as the 
Johnson administration battled to reduce the deficit and contain newly-mobile American 
capital. This all but choked the IDA during its replenishment negotiations. Worse, the easy 
availability of liquidity in the Eurodollar market meant that middle income borrowers could 
obtain finance directly and bypass the conditions placed on the Bank’s loans. At the close of 
Woods’ presidency in 1968, these dynamics had a simple significance for the Bank: it was 
highly liquid, but the imperative of remaining creditworthy meant that it was struggling to 
lend. 
In this chapter we explore how the Bank met this crisis of relevance to its borrowers. 
Increasing the Bank’s lending programme required management to develop new capacities of 
governance through which it could enforce financial discipline. By 1968, it was becoming clear 
that management could no longer rely upon the project approach as a tool of governance 
through which to meet this institutional imperative. To this end, McNamara deployed a 
specifically American technology of management in order to make the renovation of the 
Bank’s concept of development legible to American financiers. As I will show, this entailed the 
wholesale transformation of the Bank’s structure and lending practices. The structural 
adjustment loan was the consequence of the necessity of making McNamara’s ‘basic needs’ 
lending programme acceptable to the American financial community in which the Bank is 
socially anchored. The threat posed to the American financial system by the debt crisis of 1982 
saw the agendas of the Bank and the US once again become closely intertwined. The practices 
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of neoliberal governance which were deployed in this context were built upon the foundation 
of the new capacities developed by Bank management in the course of the 1970s – not on the 
basis of US power. 
Conventionally, the transformations to the Bank’s managerial and lending practices, 
structure, and concept of development in the period 1968 – 1981 are attributed to the force of 
McNamara’s personality. In the account offered by Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, the development 
of neoliberal practices and concepts is a case of a powerful individual eventually being forced 
to yield to external pressures caused by a ‘swing in global fashions’ and losing the capacity to 
direct change within the institution ‘sui generis’.320 This focus on the undoubted personal 
dynamism of the president obscures several crucial aspects of the enormous and significant 
transformations wrought to the Bank Group during his tenure. Most importantly, it is 
exemplary of a presentation of the Bank as a passive object of US state strategy, made familiar 
through widespread deployment of the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis as a cipher for the 
governance of the Bretton Woods era; or as the victim of institutional capture by neoliberal 
intellectuals which constructed the institution as an adjunct to the US Treasury and Wall 
Street. 
By contrast, Patrick Sharma’s account of the development of structural adjustment 
focuses on the importance of endogenous bureaucratic imperatives in driving this change. The 
impact of the vast international expansion of liquidity through the Euromarkets on the Bank 
was to enhance the autonomy of its managers.321 As he points out, during the later 1970s 
McNamara’s team observed that the lack of good investment opportunities and the necessity 
of oversight of individual projects combined to reduce rates of disbursement dramatically.322  
As the project approach had reached its limits, in order to retain its authority as an 
international financial institution the Bank had to find a way in which to speed up its lending. 
By returning to the programme lending model and increasing the scope of conditionalities, the 
Bank was able to streamline the disbursement process. This absolved it of the responsibility of 
micro-management of individual projects and allowed the promotion of an export-oriented 
liberalisation package for which management expressed a preference. Although this 
overlapped with the preferences of the US, the structural adjustment loan was an innovation 
in managerial technology devised by McNamara and his team, in response to the limits of 
project lending – not as a response to the US agenda of liberalising trade and investment in the 
developing world. 
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Sharma offers an acute observation of the limits of the project approach and the 
crucial agency of management as norm entrepreneurs.  By emphasising the imperatives of the 
Bank as a bureaucracy, Sharma is able to illustrate the importance of managerial agency in 
negotiating the limits on the Bank’s capacity to act, and designing new technologies of 
governance within this framework.  Yet, by emphasising the autonomy afforded by the Bank’s 
basis in financial relations, Sharma neglects the way in which this social grounding also 
functioned to limit the Bank’s capacity to act. However, I will show that the development of 
structural adjustment lending did not only follow from bureaucratic imperatives. It was 
developed as management negotiated the limits to the Bank’s capacity set by the Bank’s social 
anchoring in American financial capital. In order to re-engage its clients, the renovation of the 
Bank’s concept of development had to be translated into action via a specifically American 
technology of management which would render it legible to American financiers. Only by 
achieving this, could management successfully draw upon the liquidity of American financiers, 
and return the Bank to its central position in the governance apparatus of the international 
economy. 
To this end, the strategy which management worked out pragmatically across the 
period 1968-1980 had three components. Firstly, in order to address the crisis of relevance to 
borrowers, the Bank would undertake massive expansion of its operations in the areas which it 
had entered under Woods in order to stave off displacement by a low-conditionality UN 
competitor. Conceptualised from 1973 as the ‘basic needs’ agenda, the Bank would aim to 
target its lending towards small farmers and promote redistributive policies alongside the 
more traditional focus on productive investment aimed at promoting growth. The hobbling of 
the IDA by Congress indicated that if such a programme were to be undertaken, it would have 
to be led by the IBRD. Borrowing operations would have to be expanded yet further. 
Therefore, as I will show, the form in which the ‘basic needs’ agenda was operationalised was 
mediated by the same financial imperatives which shaped the adoption of the project 
approach in the 1940s. 
For this reason, the second aspect of the Bank’s transformation would relate to its 
institutional structure and its lending processes. In order to render its objectives legible to the 
private investors upon whose capital it relied, McNamara’s team would have to demonstrate 
that the Bank’s commitment to financial discipline would not be eroded. A new set of practices 
was required in order to ensure that the Bank’s investments – and thereby investment in the 
Bank – remained sound. The most important aspect of McNamara’s presidency was therefore 
the 1972 reorganisation of the Bank on the basis of techniques of scientific management 
gleaned from his experience at the Ford Automobile Corporation and with the RAND 
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Corporation during his stint at the Pentagon. The new corporate structure and the use of 
quantitative performance measurement tools gave management the ability to exert greater 
functional control over Bank operations, assuaging financiers’ concerns about the ‘basic needs’ 
agenda and enabling the Bank to expand its financial operations to meet McNamara’s 
ambitious targets. 
Thirdly, in the context of the rising debt-to GDP ratios of its middle and low-income 
borrowers, conditional project lending no longer functioned as a disciplinary tool. 
Conditionality which related to an individual project was meaningless if the borrower’s wider 
policy package appeared to risk default. The close linkage between the creditworthiness of the 
borrower and the creditworthiness of the Bank compelled the rehabilitation of programme 
lending. As a consequence, the effort to directly target ‘absolute’ poverty in the developing 
world was the origin of the highly controversial practice of ‘structural adjustment’. The 
attainment of either aspect of the response to the impasse of the late 1960s required a level of 
discipline and political intervention which could not be attained through the project approach. 
It follows from this that the development of the technologies of governance most 
commonly associated with neoliberalism and the management of the 1982 debt crisis had a 
much longer history in the Bank as an institution than is commonly assumed. Structural 
adjustment was not a simple ‘off-the-peg’ solution to the debt crisis deployed by hard-line 
neoliberals on the basis of doctrinaire assumptions concerning the primacy of markets in 
development. The institutional forms and disciplinary tools which made neoliberal governance 
possible - and effective – not only pre-dated the proximate causes of the crisis and the 
ostensibly anti-state pro-market response to it. While they were re-articulated to different 
ends, they were rooted in McNamara’s ‘basic needs’ agenda – commonly conceptualised as 
the most progressive moment in the Bank’s history. 
Firstly, I will briefly explore the outline of the Bank’s new problematique: the impact of 
the expansion of the Euromarkets on the Bank, ideas about development, and Bank clients in 
the 1970s. The self-sustaining expansion of these markets posed a problem for the Bank, 
marginalising it as a lender. By borrowing directly, its clients were able to avoid the Bank’s 
conditionalities and obtain funding for balance of payments support rather than specific 
projects. Simultaneously, the inflation which bedevilled the US economy in this period was a 
significant driver of the decline in the fortunes of the IDA: Congress became markedly 
reluctant to appropriate funds for its replenishment. The outcome of these dynamics was the 
creation of an incipient debt crisis in these countries, and significant decline in their 
creditworthiness. This was a major problem for the Bank, as Sharma has noted, slowing the 
disbursement of funds to a trickle. In an effort to renovate the Bank’s concept of development 
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and re-engage its clients, McNamara undertook an extensive engagement with the academic 
community. The Bank would meet this challenge by turning itself into a ‘Development Agency’. 
Befitting its new status, the Bank would develop a new lending programme aimed at 
ameliorating the negative outcomes of the industrial modernisation projects which had 
previously dominated development finance. Most importantly, many of these loans would not 
be directly productive. This last feature posed the greatest challenge to the Bank. 
 In the second section I will discuss how McNamara addressed this challenge and 
overcame the scepticism of finance, in order to obtain the vast increase in funding required to 
return the Bank to its central role in the international order. To make the ‘basic needs’ agenda 
legible to financiers, McNamara deployed the cutting edge technology of management which 
he had encountered at the Pentagon in his work with the RAND corporation. The Bank itself 
would be restructured on the advice of elite management consultants McKinsey, and run on 
the basis of a highly centralised hierarchical system of control predicated upon the 
quantitative analysis of budgets and the productivity of staff as well as the loans they made. 
In the third section I will discuss the gradual moves toward the rehabilitation of 
programme lending - as the most important step in the development of the structural 
adjustment loan. The project loan could not deliver the massive increase in disbursement 
envisaged by the ‘basic needs’ concept. Development was conceptualised as an employment 
issue, and lending was to target the rural poor to offset migration to urban areas and stimulate 
agricultural production for export. Making loans of this type work as projects was highly 
problematic from a practical perspective, and under the rubric of ‘basic needs’ the Bank began 
to embrace the fungibility of development lending. Worse, the ease with which the conditions 
on project loans could be avoided threatened the creditworthiness of the Bank itself. Only the 
programme loan could achieve the policy leverage the Bank needed to satisfy its own creditors 
of the soundness of their investments. Basic needs and the employment-oriented 
development concept demanded macro-economic programming; and broad based 
macroeconomic conditionality in order to satisfy the Bank’s financial imperatives. The security 
demanded by investors bound the performance of the Bank to the performance of its 
borrowers. 
As I will show the roots of structural adjustment loans lie in the ‘basic needs’ agenda 
itself. This was not a radical break, a transformation following from US power. Rather, it 
stemmed from management agency in attempting to overcome the limits to the Bank’s 
capacity to act posed by its social anchoring in American finance. The shift to neoliberal 
governance was not a direct offshoot of the requirements of the market; it was an institutional 
development which reflected the imperatives of the Bank. Ultimately, through the Baker Plan 
138 
 
 
the shift to structural adjustment would see the Bank Group of the 1980s step back into the 
role of the IBRD of the 1940s. This appropriation would thereby complete the 
institutionalisation of the infrastructural power of American finance, and the transformation of 
the Bank into the politician Keynes had warned against at Savannah. 
 
1: The Bank, Development Theory, & Private Finance after the ‘Decade 
of Development’ 
 The problematique of the 1970s was defined by the new contradictions arising from 
the achievement of the multilateral trading order centred on the dollar towards which the 
Bank had striven throughout the 1950s. For the Bank Group, the impact of these 
contradictions was most obviously manifest in the fact that in spite of Woods’ efforts to 
counter the declining rate of disbursement by expanding the breadth of Bank lending to 
include sectors such as education and agriculture, the institution as a whole was more liquid in 
1968 than ever before: repayments in respect of disbursed funds were running at a significant 
surplus.  
The Bank was becoming marginalised as a lender. This was due to the impact of the 
Euromarkets on the American economy, the entry of the Bank’s largest borrowers into the 
Euromarkets, and innovation in the lending practices of private banks. As a result of these 
dynamics, ODA flows declined while debt service payments and ratios of debt to GDP in 
developing countries increased rapidly. 
In this section I will briefly sketch the factors and impact of the Bank’s marginalisation, 
and the proposals from development practitioners, academics, and the Bank itself which 
aimed to counter it through a massive increase in lending. For the Bank, the most important 
factors motivating an increase in lending were precisely those which had caused it to slow 
down in the first place.  
The Bank and the Eurodollar  
The rapid growth of the Euromarkets and the release of the dollar from its gold 
standard constraints had enormous implications for individuals, firms, and sovereign 
borrowers: through their pension funds and bank deposits as well as the bond issues of 
national states and the World Bank, the financial affairs of ordinary savers and pensioners 
were linked to the globalising network of commercial and investment banks, and multinational 
corporations. One of the most important sources of the influx of funds to the Eurodollar 
markets came from the OPEC countries in the course of the five-fold increase in oil price across 
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1970-1973. This offered a huge windfall for banks, while boosting to the US balance of 
payments through the increased receipts of the overseas oil operations and the relative 
affordability of the product of American oil majors. With the expansion of the Euro-dollar and 
Euro-bond markets during the 1960s, banking had been re-internationalised and privatised in 
advance of the wholesale liberalisation of financial transactions in the later 1970s and early 
1980s.  What did this vast expansion of credit mean for the Bank? 
Under Robert McNamara, the World Bank sought to overcome the crisis into which it 
had descended in the last months of the Woods presidency by capitalising on the explosion of 
Eurodollar credit and funnelling it to its developing members. However, the figures involved 
show that at this point, it was virtually marginalised as a creditor – particularly with reference 
to its middle income group, who were the primary IBRD borrowers. Three factors drove the 
Bank’s marginalisation. 
Firstly, the entry of the Bank’s borrowers into the Euromarkets. By seeking investment 
in private capital markets, borrowers were able to avoid the conditions which were attached 
to Bank loans, and obtain funding for more general purposes. The less the Bank was able to 
lend, the less leverage it had over its borrowers, and the less significant its role in the 
governance of the international order. More damaging still, the more exposed its members 
became to the risks of high cost short-term borrowing predicated on future returns from price-
sensitive export industries – the more the Bank became exposed to the risk of a default. The 
creditworthiness of the Bank’s borrowers was directly linked to the creditworthiness of the 
Bank itself. 
A second driver of the marginalisation of the Bank was the impact of the expansion of 
the Eurodollar market on the American economy. Europe’s dollar liquidity, bolstered by 
enormous sums from the OPEC countries in the early 1970s, was channelled through European 
branches of American banks back towards the US and onwards into the coffers of American 
multinationals. As expectations of future productivity growth were moderated, corporate cash 
holdings increased – and rising money market interest rates provided an opportunity to profit 
from the returns on financial instruments. US banks lobbied successfully for the deregulation 
of the New York Stock Exchange in order to allow them to compete with the market rates of 
interest paid on products offered by firms such as American Express and other unregulated 
securities companies which had begun to offer cash management accounts, competing directly 
with banks for deposits.323 The profitability of financial assets drew funds not only from banks, 
but, in the context of the decline in industrial profitability which plagued Western economies 
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in the course of the later 1960s and 1970s (falling well below the 1975 level by 1981324), from 
corporations. Incentivised in their turn by the size of potential returns, small-scale financial 
institutions such as mutual funds contributed to the trend by pooling their savers’ funds for 
investment in securities. The expansion of credit which banks’ Eurodollar fundraising activities 
had allowed was a major driver of inflation in the US economy. 
This had a direct effect on the fortunes of the IDA. As Michael Hudson has illustrated, 
the extent to which the inflation which the Fed and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
struggled with at home supported the power of the US state in the global political economy, as 
dollar-denominated credit expanded in the un-regulated Euromarkets, was not immediately 
understood until after the break between the dollar and gold.325  This meant that the US 
sought to minimise the drain on the balance of payments attributable to their overseas 
development aid budgets: as far as US policymakers were concerned, developing countries 
that were creditworthy should apply to the World Bank or seek financing in the private credit 
markets. 
The fact that the share of ODA in total financial flows to less developed countries fell 
from almost 40% to less than 30% between 1970 and 1981326 indicates that as donors cut aid 
budgets, borrowers did turn to private markets.  Foreign deposits from BIS-reporting banks 
rose from $55bn in 1965 to $650bn in 1975 and over $2,100bn by the end of financial 1984. 
Excluding loans to other banks in this group, net international bank credit rose from $260bn in 
1975 to $1265bn in 1984, considerably outstripping international inflation.327  
A third factor was innovation in banks’ lending practices, incentivised by high borrower 
demand and driven by the necessity to spread the risk of exposure to  less creditworthy 
sovereign borrowers among private investors. This practice was the root of the self-sustaining 
dynamic of the inflation of the Eurodollar market, as it promoted a buoyant assessment of risk. 
The product which was developed to meet the demand – on the part of sovereign borrowers 
for larger loans, and on the part of the increasing number of internationally active banks for a 
piece of the profit – was the syndicated loan. This product enabled borrowers to contract 
bigger loans: ‘jumbo loans’ (over $500m) and ‘mammoth loans’ (over $1bn) entered the 
lexicon of international banking, and the average size of international bank loans increased 
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across the period.328 Theoretically, syndication meant that banks were able to purchase pieces 
of a large number of different loans to different countries, which meant that they were not 
overly exposed to the default of a single debtor. What this meant was that the risk posed by 
the rising short and medium-term debt-to-GDP ratios of less developed borrowers was 
systemic. 
Precisely because of this, private investors’ attitude towards this feature of the 
landscape of the international capital market was cavalier; reflecting the infamous ‘sovereign 
risk hypothesis’ posited by Citibank’s Walter Wriston. According to Wriston, it was impossible 
that a country would go bankrupt, unlike an individual debtor. Debts did not get paid – they 
were rolled over. Problems of cash flow would be cured through sound policy, and in the 
meantime more debt would be required.329  
The innovation and expansion of American, European, and Asian banks in an effort to 
capitalise on this was a self-sustaining dynamic of the Eurodollar markets, in the absence of 
state regulation. The so-called petro-dollar glut was, although an enormous multiplier, not the 
only source of liquidity in the international money markets. European and Japanese banks 
activities were bolstered by their balance of payments surpluses, reflected in their 
predominance in this market: of the 50 largest global banks in the 1970s, 21 were European, 
16 were Japanese, and only 6 were American.330 The only check on a bank’s lending was its 
own capital adequacy, and this was dependent on the individual bank’s own assessment of the 
risk posed by its assets. Among US banks, capital adequacy ratios dropped to only 3.5% of 
assets in 1979.331  
Where did this liquidity go? Primarily to the middle-income countries – precisely the 
group which had previously been the Bank’s biggest borrowers. $348bn was owed by all 
developing countries in the BIS reporting area to foreign banks in 1982. 21 countries 
accounted for 84% of the total, of which the ten largest accounted for 70% – and the five 
largest for 55%. Amongst American banks, 70% of lending went to Latin American countries, 
with the remaining 30% to East and South Asia, and Israel. The total outstanding from 
developing countries to US banks was worth 36% of total obligations to private banks in 1982, 
40% of which was owed by Latin American governments. Of this debt, 23% of it was owed to 
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just nine of the largest US banks. Venezuela and Ecuador, for example, owed a total of $13.5bn 
in 1982 – or 68% of outstanding loans to American bankers.332  
By contrast, almost 90% of the total debt of low-income African countries was owed to 
official bilateral and multilateral agencies. 60% was bilateral, 52% of which was non-
concessional. Here, increases in American prime interest rates were less of a factor than in 
middle–income countries, and crisis came earlier. The exposure of international private banks 
in low-income Africa was less than $10bn – and the majority of this was owed to, or 
guaranteed by official external creditors. The largest borrowers in terms of face value were, as 
in South America, middle-income economies such as Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. As Fryer has 
pointed out, this directly contradicts the notion that the most important dynamic in the 
development of the debt balances of the developing world was simply the recycling of OPEC 
surplus to non-OPEC countries to support their deficits and oil imports.333 The majority of 
private commercial lending to these countries was short-term debt, undertaken to finance 
interest arrears on longer-term borrowings.334 Although African debts were smaller, 
borrowers’ debt-GDP ratios were still high. This led to the rescheduling of official claims on ten 
low-income African countries on nineteen occasions, and private debts on five occasions 
before the famed Mexican default of 1982, beginning with Zaire in 1976.  
Although ODA flows increased in 1967 due to previously committed disbursements, 
the level of new commitments stagnated. Developing countries were not only suffering due to 
their dependence on primary commodity exports in the context of global slowdown from 1967 
onwards, but there was no prospect that aid from the developed countries could bridge the 
gap.  
What was the impact of these dynamics? While aid flows declined, debt service 
payments of the surveyed group of 92 developing countries increased at an alarming rate – by 
approximately $185m in 1967. Taken together with an increase of $400m in 1966, this was a 
major addition to the burden of public and publicly guaranteed external debt. The greatest 
increases in 1966 and 1967 had occurred in Africa, and Southern and Eastern Asia – while Latin 
American and European countries had begun borrowing heavily earlier in the 1960s and large 
debtors such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Turkey had already undertaken a round of 
rescheduling.  
In 1968 it had already become an article of common sense that these dynamics posed 
a serious threat to the viability of the international financial system. An UNCTAD agreement 
                                                          
332 Fryer, D.W., in Corbridge, S.E. (ed), Vol.1, 1999. Pg.113 
333 Ibid. 
334 Humphries, C., and Underwood, J., ‘The External Debt Difficulties of Low-Income Africa’, in Corbridge, 
S.E., 1999. Pg.345-54. 
143 
 
 
was met that the economically developed countries should offer a minimum aid commitment 
equal to 1% of their GNP.335 Yet data reported by the OECD’s Development Action Committee 
(DAC) indicated a considerable hardening of average aid terms through 1967.336 Credit lines in 
private financial markets had been obtained on onerous terms, and the unfavourable market 
conditions of the end of the 1960s had begun to see debt service ratios rise to levels that were 
considered by the Bank to be potentially highly problematic.337  
The erosion of creditworthiness among eligible borrowers which remained engaged 
with the Bank was reflected in the decline in Bank Group lending. The Bank’s lending rate had 
been raised from 6% to 6.5% in early August 1968 as the Bank had found it difficult and 
expensive to raise funds in global capital markets due to strong competition and high rates 
paid on other tradable securities.338 The Bank and IDA had lent $953.5m in 1968 – a decrease 
of $176.8m from 1967 attributable to the exhaustion of IDA resources. The problem of 
creditworthiness among low-income and middle-income borrowers was a problem for the 
creditworthiness of the Bank.  
Creditworthiness was the central issue of the era. The drivers of the Bank’s 
marginalisation were simultaneously to be harnessed for its rejuvenation. Downward pressure 
on ODA flows caused by the inflation of the Euromarkets meant that any response from the 
Bank Group would have to be led by the IBRD. This entailed new borrowing. For this reason, 
financial imperatives were again a highly significant mediating factor in the Bank’s response to 
the latent threat of debt defaults in the developing world. 
 All these factors added up to an imperative to lend more - to prop up members, to 
offset the decline in ODA flows. However, from the Bank’s perspective the expansion of the 
lending programme which followed was the expression not of the moral imperative, but of the 
financial imperative to retain the capacity to exert financial discipline over borrowers. 
 
The Bank and Development Theory – Round 1: the Pearson Report and the 
Columbia Declaration. 
Accordingly, debate centred not on whether the Bank should lend more, but how it 
should be done and for what purpose. As lending ground to a halt in 1967-8, McNamara’s 
predecessor had called for a ‘grand assize’, a taking stock of the progress, character, and 
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direction of ‘development’ as a practice and concept with a view to revitalising the 
constituency for foreign aid among donors.339 The ultimate outcome of Woods’ final speech as 
President was that McNamara’s first act in the role in 1968 was the foundation of a blue-
riband commission on the revitalisation of international development, chaired by ex-Prime 
Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson and funded by the Bank.  
The Pearson Commission was comprised of leading US development practitioners –
Harvard’s Hollis Chenery had served in USAID, from which he recruited Ernest Stern to the 
commission; and leading economists including W. Arthur Lewis and Goran Ohlin.  
The commission’s report, entitled Partners in Development, was published in 
September 1969 to significant scholarly condemnation. It offered wearyingly familiar 
conclusions: a 6% rate of growth should be attained by the developing world in the 1970s,340 
while industrial protection should be reduced to enhance free trade and export orientation.341 
The free movement of private capital should be encouraged,342 and the role of the Bank and 
IDA should be expanded.343 One of the greatest impacts of the Pearson Commission itself, 
Stern later reflected, lay in its recommendation that program lending be increased to at least 
10% of total lending.344  
By contrast, McNamara was determined from the outset that the Bank was a 
‘Development Agency’. Its remit, he considered, was not simply to pursue growth, but should 
be concerned with the capacity to provide leadership in ‘development assistance’ to donors 
frustrated with the lack of progress and poor countries marginalised by the exuberant post-
war growth of the rich. Alongside financial assistance, technical assistance would be expanded 
in order to overcome the dearth of viable projects lamented by Woods, and a worldwide 
recruitment drive would be launched. The great ‘productive machine’ of capitalism which the 
world had created in ‘the past few generations’ could be directed by the Bank in such a way as 
to ‘abolish’ poverty.345  
McNamara and his advisors had already calculated that abolishing poverty would 
require that from 1968 to 1973 the Bank group should commit double the volume of funds 
loaned from 1963 to 1968.  
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McNamara’s early programme was based on the acknowledgement that although the 
headline goal of the ‘Development Decade’ – an increase in annual national incomes in poor 
countries of 5% by 1970 – was likely to be achieved, the statistics supporting this notion were, 
unless disaggregated, a ‘cosmetic’. Populous non-oil exporting countries had not seen the 
same growth as their oil-exporting counterparts, and growth was anyway skewed to urban 
industrial areas. Beyond these zones “...the peasant remains stuck in his immemorial poverty, 
living on the bare margin of subsistence.”  
The five year plan formulated with this in mind foresaw the greatest expansion of 
lending in Latin America (double) and Africa (triple). The sectoral makeup of lending would be 
altered: education and agriculture were singled out as the most important areas of expansion. 
The former would triple because “...it makes a more effective worker, a more creative 
manager, a better farmer, a more efficient administrator” and lastly “...a human being closer 
to self-fulfilment.” Agricultural lending would quadruple in volume because bad diet meant 
that many people in the developing world were dependent on food imports and due to 
shortages could not “...do an effective day’s work...” The single greatest problem, exacerbating 
all others, was the expansion in global population. Contemporary population trends would run 
down the per capita growth rates which development policy took as its objective to raise; to 
the extent that the benefits of consistent year on year growth would be imperceptible. Family 
planning programmes would be backed by research into the most effective methods of control 
and national administration. Lowering the birth rate would raise the standard of living , and 
prevent the ‘dangerous’ gap between rich and poor in developing countries from widening 
further.346 
McNamara’s programme had been developed prior to the publication of the Pearson 
Commission’s report, which, in view of its underwhelming conclusions was guaranteed a 
bruising encounter with academia. In response to the Pearson Report an academic conference 
was convened at two sites, Williamsburg, Virginia; and Columbia University in February 1970. 
The tenor of the report was considered by the Institute of Development Studies’ Richard Jolly 
to have been too optimistic, offering projections about the likelihood of success in closing the 
gap in output between rich and poor countries which were unrealistic – indeed, the policies 
advocated by the report would, he considered, see it widen further. The effort to  integrate 
concepts of self-sustaining growth with export-orientation and import substitution while 
simultaneously raising domestic savings rates was conflicted and contradictory, and suggested 
that the report was “a soft-sell of aid to the enlightened interest of the developed countries.” 
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Rapid self-sustaining growth, to a target of 6%, would not deliver the results required: large 
scale transfers of income and development assistance were required.347 For Samir Amin, its 
recommendations were nothing more than hasty conclusions and self-serving and pious 
wishes expressing the “...solutions that have been applied over the last two decades, even 
though their failure is evident.”348 Rather than representing a new start, the Pearson 
Commission’s report simply argued that the international organisations should be doing more 
of what they had been doing before: pursuing growth above all else. 
The Columbia conference was McNamara’s first significant encounter with 
development economists from outside the modernisation theory mainstream. As a response 
to the Pearson Commission, the ‘Columbia Declaration’ made at the close of the conference 
was defining moment of the first McNamara presidency. McNamara was substantially 
impressed with the emphasis on targeting lending towards the poorest by academics such as 
IDS’ Dudley Seers, Hans Singer, and Richard Jolly.349 The declaration was of significant impact 
on McNamara’s views on the orientation of the Bank.350  
Influenced in particular by Jolly and Columbia’s Barbara Ward, it argued that the 
targets set by the Pearson Commission and the means by which they would be attained, were 
designed simply to render minor increases in aid budgets acceptable and reasonable to public 
opinion in the developed world on the basis of a specious and illusory notion of developed-
developing world partnership. Ultimately, it argued, “Dependence in the modern world must be 
ended and give way to a framework which will allow genuine interdependence and 
partnership.” (13)This required massive increases in aid above defence budgets, the 
foundation of a special fund for social objectives, significant restructuring of trade 
relationships, and flexibility on credit and debt – all of which should be organised through the 
UN and affiliated international institutions.  
The primary conclusion of the academic opprobrium directed at the Commission’s 
report dovetailed with McNamara’s own conviction that the Bank should radically expand its 
operations. A number of the Columbia delegates would go on to shape the strategy of the 
Bank in achieving the objectives of the McNamara era – particularly by impressing upon 
management the need to dramatically increase transfers, and incorporate redistributive 
objectives into development policy. Ernest Stern would subsequently become Senior Vice 
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President for Operations, while Paul Streeten of Oxford would go on to develop the ‘Basic 
Needs’ approach with Mahbub ul Haq. Appointed during McNamara’s second term to the role 
of Chief Economist, Hollis Chenery drew upon the work of Singer and Jolly with the ILO in 
conceptualising ‘development’ as a problem of employment – and orienting Bank 
development policy around the concept of ‘Redistribution with Growth’. 
From 1969 to 1973, Bank lending commitments increased by 131% in constant 
dollars.351 This is a striking reversal of fortune given the stagnation of the lending programme 
in 1968. In the following section, I will show that the precise way in which management was 
able to implement the ideas of development economists such as Singer, Jolly, Seers, and 
Streeten as Bank policy was shaped by the requirement to make them comprehensible to 
financiers who invested in Bank paper in search of a steady return.  
Rejuvenating the Bank in its ability to lend on the scale set out in the first five year plan 
would require that the Bank would obtain significantly greater volumes of finance in the global 
capital markets. 
Support amongst the banking community was hard to come by. In order to meet 
McNamara’s goals, the Bank had to find new ways to demonstrate – as ever - to financiers that 
although it was increasingly lending for non-cash-flow purposes it was still doing so prudently. 
In the context of the declining creditworthiness of the Bank’s biggest client groups and the 
threat this posed to the creditworthiness of the Bank itself, this involved transforming the 
Bank’s ability to quantify its impact. The implementation of the ‘basic needs’ agenda would be 
directly mediated by these imperatives. 
Before the increase in lending could be achieved, McNamara had to demonstrate that 
the Bank as an organisation was under management control, and that the projects in which it 
was involved were financially sound. The first step which had to be taken was to demonstrate 
the probity of the Bank’s practices of lending and operational control. The ‘development 
agency’ would only be able to attain the required capital to abolish poverty through the 
introduction of techniques of scientific management which had been pioneered in conjunction 
with the RAND Corporation at the US Department of Defense. 
 
2: Quantifying Development and Managing the ‘Development Agency’. 
The objective of undertaking progressive steps towards redistributive development 
strategies and simultaneously retaining the support of the Bank’s private investors entailed 
improving the economic research standing of the Bank, while demonstrating that the 
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institution was scientifically managed and non-cash-flow or program lending would be 
rigorously controlled. From the outset, McNamara was at pains to emphasise that although 
this constituted a change in degree, it was not a change in kind: “...we can carry out these 
operations within the high standards of careful evaluation and sound financing that my 
predecessors have made synonymous with the name of the World Bank.” Sound development 
financing entailed seeking out the projects which would contribute ‘most fundamentally’ to 
the development of the ‘total national economy’. 352  
There were significant obstacles to these goals. Long term project lending became 
problematic in the light of the damage done to the creditworthiness of sovereigns seeking to 
repay longer-term debts with short-term private borrowing in Eurodollar markets. As member 
creditworthiness declined, the perceived likelihood of a default could threaten the Bank’s own 
creditworthiness, making it more expensive to borrow and resulting in higher charges to 
borrowing members. Lending more was therefore an imperative – to prevent the exacerbation 
of this vicious circle. McNamara’s first task would be to find a way to make lending to the poor 
acceptable to bankers. 
Ultimately, the Bank would have to be re-arranged so that its structure facilitated a 
high degree of centralised control on the basis of decisions made by a small group of senior 
managers whose understanding of operations was derived from comprehensive data fed 
upwards from individual departments to divisional vice-presidencies. Adopting a structure of 
control which was common to the world of business, finance, and increasingly to government 
in the advanced capitalist countries was a key step in making ‘progressive’ lending objectives 
legible to private investors. 
 The scientific management practices of the McNamara era would become the 
foundations for the transition to the neoliberal political economy of structural adjustment in 
the Bank considerably before its return to centrality in international liquidity provision in 1982. 
Financiers as Obstacle and Solution 
McNamara had a clear set of objectives from the outset regarding what needed to be 
done to obtain the financing with which to back the increased lending programme. Borrowings 
from foreign central banks should increase, the Bank should break in to the European pension 
trust market, and borrow more in Switzerland, Kuwait, and Italy. According to Kraske et al, the 
objective of the further internationalisation and diversification of the Bank’s borrowing was to 
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“achieve greater autonomy for the Bank” from the requirement that it turn to an increasingly 
truculent US Treasury in order to tap the markets of New York.353 
Such ‘autonomy’ from political vicissitudes of access to major markets could only ever 
be relative and contingent. The interests of financiers and their perceptions of risk were of 
paramount importance. 354 The discussion of the five year plan, increased borrowing, and 
technical assistance at the annual meeting had not improved the Bank’s standing in financial 
circles. 
This rapidly became evident. Following the 1968 annual meetings, a bond issue was 
made in Switzerland in November that year. It was a failure the like of which the Bank had 
never seen: almost half the issue remained unsold, in a debacle which forced the Treasurer, 
Robert Cavanaugh, to resign.355 In practical terms, the failure was due to the underwriting 
practices of the Swiss – the offering was not priced and placed in the market for a period of 
approximately fifteen days. Shortly beforehand, an issue had been made in Deutschmarks and 
while the Swiss issue was held by the underwriters, the exchange relationship altered in such a 
way as to make it more attractive to purchase the German issue.356 However, McNamara 
noted that the Swiss bankers blamed the way in which he had spoken about the Bank as a 
‘development agency’, casting him as a ‘red eyed socialist’ and causing “...a tremendous 
undercurrent that, ‘McNamara is going to screw this thing up. We’re going to throw money 
away and you better be careful in buying Bank securities because they won’t do well.”357 The 
financial press, particularly Barron’s in the US, ran enthusiastically with this story.358 
While Cavanaugh’s successor Eugene Rotberg was aware of the disquiet within the 
Bank359 and among the world’s money managers, he did not share his predecessor’s qualms 
about ramping up the Bank’s borrowing strategy. On the contrary, he shared McNamara’s view 
that the Bank was massively under-leveraged. The speculation surrounding the non-cash-flow 
lending which had contributed to the failure of the Swiss issue could be countered with a 
marketing campaign based on the financial structure of the Bank as an institution. 
Rotberg embarked on an intensive round of presentations to financiers on purely 
financial matters – emphasising the liquidity of the Bank as derived from the steady and 
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increasing stream of cash flow from borrowers, the diversity of its borrowings, and its credit 
standing. At first, no reference was to be made to McNamara’s objective to increase lending to 
the poor, and the non-cash-flow projects were to be underplayed. McNamara was similarly 
engaged, and began to return to the notion that the Bank had undertaken a change – but 
stressing that it would retain the financial probity which had characterised it to date. He 
assured the Bond Club of New York in 1969 that while the Bank was a development agency “...I 
must make equally clear that the World Bank is a development investment institution, not a 
philanthropic organisation and not a social welfare agency.”360  
Their campaign was a significant success. Bankers’ concerns were assuaged that with 
the strategy sketched out by Rotberg - spreading the risk to the Bank across sectors and around 
the globe, with tight supervision and macroeconomic guidance - the Bank would not transform 
itself into a welfare institution.  
Across the first five year period, to 1973, the Bank was able to borrow an average of 
$780m net of repayments.361 By the end of fiscal 1969, 60% of the IBRD’s funded debt was held 
abroad. In 1970, the Bank borrowed in Japan for the first time: two issues of serial bonds 
denominated in yen at the value of $100m each, yielding 7.14%, were followed by two further 
issues at the same value paying an even higher rate of 7.43%, both purchased by the Bank of 
Japan. Across 1970 and 1971, Japanese purchases of Bank paper added approximately $600m 
to the Bank’s loanable funds. In the US, the Bank made its first intermediate borrowings, 
issuing $200m in five-year notes, paying 6.5% - in significant contrast to the Swiss issue of 1968, 
these bonds sold out rapidly, in spite of the fact that they were priced at par.362 By 1973, less 
than one-sixth of the Bank’s borrowing for the first five year plan had taken place on Wall 
Street.363 
Appealing to the financiers in this way had significant implications for the Bank. 
Rotberg and McNamara considered that driving their programme to increase lending while 
retaining essential financial support would require more than simply building a  “...a financial 
structure in the early 1970s with lots of liquidity, diversity of loans and sectors, quality of 
lending, etc.” 364  
In order to really expand its programs into education, population control, and 
subsistence agriculture, it would have to undertake major structural reforms which would help 
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to quantify the impact and effectiveness of each dollar lent. Modifying the project strategy 
towards a sectoral focus allied to a country-wide program in such a way as not to undermine 
the revitalised relationship with financiers, or in Rotberg’s words, make it “difficult for the 
Swiss”365, entailed drawing upon the managerial strategies McNamara had learned and taught 
at Harvard Business School –and refined at the Ford Motor Company and the Pentagon.  
Importing Managerial Technology 
 The ability to quantify the inputs and outputs of Bank activity was one of McNamara’s 
initial concerns on his accession to the Presidency. This lay at the core of his skillset as a 
manager, and had delivered his greatest successes with Ford and the Pentagon – as well as his 
greatest failures in Vietnam and with the troubled US Air Force jet, the F-111. He had gained 
his MBA from Harvard Business School at a time when methods of quantitative decision-
making were at the cutting edge of management studies in the ‘Business Statistics’ course of 
Professor Edmund Learned and the ‘Aspects of Budgetary Control’ course of Professor Ross 
Walker. The techniques of cost accounting, control systems and ‘decision science’ learned at 
Harvard Business School were honed in the Army’s Department of Statistical control where he 
developed a system for the tracking of materiel and men, before joining Ford with a small 
group of his Army colleagues – known as the Whiz Kids.366  
The application of these control strategies at Ford drew not only on McNamara’s 
expertise, but on the recruitment of senior managers from General Motors who had witnessed 
Alfred P. Sloan’s rescue of the company – and its transformation into a model of scientific 
management frequently used as an example to students at Harvard Business School. This kind 
of change was also wrought at Ford: through the exertion of absolute control and the 
deployment of a defined statistical methodology, the loss-making manufacturer was 
rationalised and rejuvenated as costs were ground down through efficiencies found in the 
scheduling of production lines and in the use of resources throughout the company. 
A major enhancement to this set of practices was the development of the ‘Planning 
Programming Budgeting System’ (PPBS), undertaken at the Pentagon with Charles Hitch of the 
RAND corporation, famed for its application of scientific methodologies to strategic bombing 
campaigns and the US nuclear posture. Hitch was a figure seen as a guru of modern 
management and was in charge of a highly unpopular team of statisticians hired to overhaul 
the American military budget, force posture, and strategy. While unpopular in the Pentagon, 
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PPBS was deemed exceptionally effective – and was extended to all federal agencies by 
President Johnson in August 1965.367 
The method which had been developed by Hitch and his team in the Office of Systems 
Analysis was designed to produce explicit objective criteria for decisionmaking which excluded 
tradition, habit, and the institutional proclivities of individual services or agencies. This was 
achieved on the basis of an investigation of the objectives and processes of each department, 
generating a set of statements of their requirements and costs, which could be projected into 
the future. Once these data had been produced and analysed, highly rational decisions could 
be made about how to maximise capability at the lowest cost.368 
The use of statistical data was a mechanism through which he would gain oversight of 
Bank operations, and enhance the ability of senior management to control policy. Due to the 
small size of the organisation on his arrival, McNamara felt that “...hell, I can control 3,000 
people almost by myself...it’s easy to control once you’ve set up measures.”369 The institutional 
basis of these ‘measures’ was twofold: firstly, a core of intellectual staff, who would perform a 
similar function to that of the Office of Systems Analysis, organised around Chenery, Mahbub 
ul Haq, and Ernest Stern.  The second aspect of this was the foundation of a Program and 
Budgeting (P&B) department under Siem Aldewereld to operate as the practical control centre 
in terms of ‘input and output’. Chenery reflected that: 
 “The real model for the Bank probably came out of his policy group in 
the Pentagon in which several very competent people from the Rand 
Corporation and elsewhere developed this kind of framework which could be 
applied to the analysis of weapon systems, to procurement, to budgeting, and 
so forth.”370   
P&B was intended as the vehicle for the quantitative analysis which would give the 
president greater insight into operations. This was the precursor to the foundation in 1970 of 
the Operations Evaluation Unit, which would audit loans after implementation – enabling 
McNamara to personally issue and police directives relating to the impact of lending.371  The 
P&B department had an immediate impact through the systems-analysis derived design of 
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McNamara’s first five year plan, developed though analysis of relative priorities among 
countries and within sectors of each economy, to be ‘directed from the top’372. As at the 
Pentagon, this was the central objective: to remove the politics from decisionmaking through a 
hierarchical and centralised apparatus which facilitated the production and control of large 
volumes of detailed quantitative data.373 
The result of this was the introduction of the ‘Country Program Paper’ as a framework 
for Bank lending strategy in 1969. These confidential documents were not available to 
borrowers or Board members, and were to be prepared annually by regional departments, and 
would provide a comprehensive overview of a borrowers’ politics, economic situation, their 
external financing, and a proposal for a five year lending program.374 This innovation took 
place in the context of the abolition of the ‘country working party’, the ad-hoc groups which 
had their origins in a bid during the Bank’s earliest years to improve communication between 
the Loan and Economics departments.375 These had been partially formalised under the terms 
of the 1952 reorganisation as ‘Loan Working Parties’ to facilitate liaison between Aldewereld’s 
Technical Operations Department (TOD) and the Area Departments.376 
  The objective in ending this practice was to extend presidential and senior 
management control over operations, while responding to economists’ concerns about the 
relationship of project-based interventions to macroeconomic policy. The collegiate 
management style of the McCloy, Black, and Woods years was considered inappropriate to the 
new demands of accountability to higher management and transparency of process: there had 
to be a single individual who could be considered responsible for Bank strategy in a particular 
country.  
In McNamara’s view, the ability to derive quantitative information from Bank 
operations needed to be extended throughout the Bank’s processes and systems in order to 
streamline the relationship between country programs, sectoral strategies, and individual 
projects. This imperative was complicated by the recruitment drive that had been set in train, 
and the opening of new departments and overseas offices. Between 1968 and 1971 staff 
numbers had increased by 75%. Therefore, a reorganisation of the entire institution was 
warranted, and in order to retain the confidence of the investment community and ensure that 
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it was implemented with the principles of scientific management in mind, McNamara would 
call in McKinsey & Co. in 1972.  
Their report would not contain any surprises: he had already explained to them what 
he wanted to do. The outcome he sought was the creation of an organisational structure which 
reflected systems he had controlled at the Ford corporation, and was intended to give the 
office of the president what McNamara described as ‘functional control’ over area 
departments which would be run by vice presidents with ‘administrative control’ of their 
divisions. This would enable technical objectives, procedures, and standards to be set at the 
highest managerial level and enforced across the organisation by general managers. Should a 
manager in a particular area deviate from these procedures and standards, McNamara would 
be able to enforce discipline.377 
The new structure created the position of ‘Senior Vice President Operations’, which 
was filled by Burke Knapp, who presided over six Vice Presidents. Five of these were the heads 
of regional departments: these posts were responsible for lending and technical assistance in 
their regions. The regional departments would operate in a similar way to the old pre-1952 
Loan Department: they were responsible for their own project work, as well as assessment of 
creditworthiness and project supervision. The Central Projects Staff was the sixth VP position, 
to which Warren Baum was appointed; responsible for developing Bank Group-wide project 
policies, and providing operational guidance and support to the regions. The Central Projects 
group also contained those units which were too small to decentralise – and which were those 
targeted for expansion under McNamara: population and nutrition, agriculture, education, and 
environmental affairs; as well as further specialist departments in industry, tourism, urban 
project, utilities, and transport, which absorbed many technical and engineering staff from the 
disbanded TOD. Alongside the operational departments overseen by Knapp were a further six 
Vice Presidencies which reported directly to the President – in finance, general counsel, 
planning and personnel management, external relations, overseas offices, and internal 
auditing. Most importantly for the new direction of the Bank, a seventh VP position in 
Development Policy was created.378 Organised under this VP, the Bank’s economists were 
returned to the position of power that they had lost in 1952, perhaps even gaining – each 
regional office also had a chief economist on its management team. 
The objective – simultaneously centralising functional authority in the office of the 
president, and decentralising administrative authority among operational divisions – was 
common to the US’ largest multinational corporations. It was designed to render the great 
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complexity of function which the increasing diversity of Bank operations entailed legible to the 
economists and managers in Washington.379 The legibility of this structure of control was also 
extremely important to the Bank’s investors, whose money was tied up for twenty years in 
Bank paper. McNamara’s usage of the tools of quantification, econometric modelling, and 
regression analyses in order to reach a point at which a decision could be made reassured 
investors that the changes to the Bank’s staffing and strategy were allied to a set of policies 
which would offer longstanding security and control that prevent the financial standing of the 
Bank and the price of its paper from being undermined by concerns over the quality of its 
credit.380  
This was the broader objective – to support the extension of Bank borrowing in order 
to enable it to expand its lending operations among members who, thanks to their increasingly 
risky debt profiles, were less and less creditworthy.  
The transformation of the Bank in this way was a key piece of the puzzle which would, 
once the debt crisis had struck, become known as the Washington Consensus. By 1973, 
McNamara could operate the institution as a highly centralised and hierarchical bureaucracy 
functionally controlled by a small team of senior management on the basis of detailed 
quantitative data concerning day-to-day operations. The broad oversight and tight control over 
operations exercised in this institutional form promoted the consideration of the individual 
productive projects the Bank was funding as ‘programmes of projects’, to be considered on a 
country-by-country basis under the Country Program Paper approach. During the second 
presidency from 1973-78, this would be an important aspect of the ‘basic needs’ approach: 
lending for purposes that were not directly productive and aimed to develop the agricultural 
base of the economy required greater insight into macroeconomic performance in order to 
ensure that the benefits of investment in education and technical training would be 
subsequently realised and offset by increases in productivity elsewhere. 
McNamara’s ability to remain in post for a second term as president and implement 
the second five year plan, with its focus on ‘basic needs’ as unveiled at the annual meeting in 
Nairobi in 1973, was predicated entirely on this foundation. 
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 3: ‘Basic Needs’ and the Consequences of Quantification 
For Kraske, the ‘Basic Needs’ approach represented the Bank’s most progressive 
moment, as it strove to attack the “root causes of poverty and backwardness”. This coincided 
with the relaxation of IFC strictures prohibiting investment in firms that were publically owned, 
spoke to a concern about the disparity in incomes in the developing world, and saw the Bank 
enter into relations with countries such as Sri Lanka and Tanzania – which required the 
acceptance of ‘socialist-type’ premises such as Nyere’s ‘Ujaama’ collectivisation scheme.381  
Yet, as Kapur et al acknowledge, this was hardly a case of significant intellectual 
originality on the part of Bank management: the wider development policy world for some 
years had been arguing that concerns of distribution and equity had been neglected in a drive 
for growth which had anyway yielded unimpressive results.382 
This ‘progressive’ moment would yield a second important step in the direction of 
structural adjustment. Quantification was not only important in terms of the control of the 
Bank as an institution – it would also make non-productive lending legible to financiers. 
Conceptualising development as an employment problem required the direction of Bank 
interventions at improving the productivity of the poor. These tenets of the ‘basic needs’ 
agenda would tie the performance of the Bank ever more closely to the performance of 
borrowers – necessitating a degree of leverage which the project model simply could not 
provide. Deploying ‘basic needs’ entailed macroeconomic reform – and the return to 
programme lending. 
The Bank and Development Theory: Round 2 – Basic Needs and ‘Redistribution with 
Growth’ 
 McNamara’s address to the governors at the 1973 annual general meeting in Nairobi 
drew heavily upon the work of the group of development economists McNamara had 
encountered at the Williamsburg Conference during the post-mortem of the Pearson Report:  
Dudley Seers, Hans Singer, Richard Jolly, and Paul Streeten, who were affiliated with the ILO 
and Sussex’s IDS. It was profoundly shaped by Hollis Chenery, already appointed from Harvard 
to act as Economic Advisor and from 1972 promoted to the new VP Development Policy. 
Chenery’s work in particular had attracted the President, as immediately prior to his 
appointment to the Bank, he had been running a research project at Harvard entitled 
‘Quantitative Research in Economic Development’.  
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The use of quantification processes as a way to link research and policy had been 
deployed by McNamara’s policy group at the Pentagon, drawing on Rand Corporation 
expertise and applying it to the analysis of weapons systems, procurement and budgeting.383 
Hiring Chenery meant that McNamara was able to demonstrate that the development policy 
research behind his lending programme was as robust as the scientific techniques he 
personally applied to the managerial transformation of the Bank. 
Whereas early theorisation of the dynamics of late development had been essentially 
qualitative, at the close of the 1960s, efforts were made to create rigorous positive models of 
the process of rural-urban migration which accounted for widespread and chronic urban 
unemployment in the context of growth.384 This had been an aspect of the research agendas 
which had followed from the ILO’s Employment Policy Convention. 
 Drafted in 1964, it had committed signatory governments to adopt activist policies 
aimed at full employment. This agenda had gained momentum in the later 1960s and in 1967 
the ILO initiated its World Employment Programme, under which a series of case studies were 
undertaken in an effort to provide guidance for the governments concerned, as well as for aid 
and trade policies among donors and international organisations. Specialists participating in 
the programme were drawn from UNCTAD, the ILO, the WHO, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), and the Organisation of American States (OAS); a number of UN 
agencies including ECLA, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), UNESCO amongst 
others; the IDS at the University of Sussex; and the World Bank.385  
The ‘Basic Needs’ agenda which McNamara outlined in Nairobi was predicated on the 
Bank’s achievement of a 100% increase in lending in real terms across 1964-8. This had been 
delivered through a four-fold increase in borrowing, which had increased the Bank’s liquid 
reserves by 170%. For McNamara, it was a moral imperative to deploy these resources to 
target ‘absolute’ poverty, a phenomenon which he depicted as to a “...condition of life so 
limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes with which one is born”, in 
contrast to the simple observation of ‘relative’ poverty – the simple observation that some 
societies were more prosperous than others.386 The ‘absolute’ poor were the large minority of 
the rural poor, who had seen no benefits from the productivity and income growth 
                                                          
383 Asher, R., Transcript of Interview with Hollis Chenery, January 27th 1983. Pg. 3. 
384 An example of this is Todaro, M.P., ‘A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries’, The American Economic Review, Vol.59, No.1, 1969.  
385 ILO, Towards Full Employment: a Programme for Colombia Prepared by an Inter-agency Team 
organised by the ILO, ILO, Geneva, 1970. Pg.1-6. 
386 McNamara, R.S., ‘Annual Address by Robert S. McNamara, President of the Bank and its Affiliates’, in 
IBRD, IFC, IDA, 1973 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors: Summary Proceedings, Washington 
D.C., 1973. Pg.17. 
158 
 
 
experienced by developing members had seen across the 1960s. Solving the problems of 
‘absolute’ poverty in rural areas would require targeting lending towards small farmers, and 
encouraging redistributive policies which could assist in meeting the basic needs of the rural 
poor and the growth of the wider economy. 387 
The central tenet of this approach was that there was no trade-off between 
redistributive policies and growth. There was, in fact, a tight linkage: if the rest of the economy 
did not grow, farmers would anyway lack the required inputs or demand for their output.388 
Therefore, the Bank would increase its lending to $4.4bn in agriculture from $3.1bn in ’69-’73, 
and advocate strongly that the governments of developing countries undertake the necessary 
redistributive reform in their spending policies in order to stave off the risk of revolution.389 
While the Rostowian modernisation theory lineage is clear, by the early 1970s the 
‘trickle-down’ approach to modernisation derived from the work of Arthur Lewis390 and Simon 
Kuznets391 - in which long-term equality was traded off for growth - had been comprehensively 
displaced.392 
For the Bank, the most important feature of contemporary development theory was 
the way in which it reformulated ‘development’ as a problem of employment, not of growth 
alone. This followed directly from the work of IDS’ Dudley Seers and Hans Singer. The ILO’s 
research in Colombia and Kenya emphasised the inability of the ‘modern’ sector to create jobs. 
The policy implication of this was that rural-urban migration should be discouraged through 
public investment in rural areas with a view to raising rural wages and fostering small-scale 
entrepreneurialism in the ‘traditional’ sector.393 The ILO argued that tax revenues derived from 
income growth of the top 1% of the population should be transferred to the bottom third of 
income recipients through crop technologies, rural credit institutions, and labour intensive 
technology in agricultural product processing.394 The post-independence policies of growth and 
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nationalisation within the inherited economic structure would have to be replaced with 
spending on programmes to absorb the rural labour force and promote investment in 
education, health services, and housing. Neither growth nor redistribution alone would 
suffice.395 
The involvement of the Bank with this group of scholars had heavily influenced 
McNamara: the conclusions of the ILO projects, as well as the vehement denunciations of the 
highly conservative Pearson Commission and the highly popular (and populist) work of E.F. 
Schumacher,396 had led him to task Chenery with supporting or rejecting the thesis that the 
productivity of the poor could be raised by focusing investment on them without reducing the 
growth rate of the economy as a whole.397 
The ILO’s approach, and endorsement of quantitative targets dovetailed with the 
Bank’s own research project, organised by Hollis Chenery in collaboration with IDS and the 
Centre for International Affairs at Harvard, with the financial and logistical support of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. The Bank’s report on these matters, Redistribution with Growth, 
appeared in 1974 and originated from discussions which arose from the involvement of Bank 
staff in the ILO studies, and Hollis Chenery’s engagement with the academic research of Singer, 
Jolly, and Seers at Sussex’s IDS. Orienting growth measures towards the enhancement of the 
productivity of the poor was selected as the mechanism through which it would be possible to 
“...make poverty...acceptable to the bankers.”398 
Bankers’ acceptance of poverty-oriented lending was thus not only predicated upon 
the transformation of the institution and the introduction of quantitative methods into 
operational control. The Bank’s development policy also had to be transformed to ensure that 
it drew upon the most cutting-edge positivist methodology. Positioning ‘development’ as a 
problem of employment facilitated a move away from the Bank’s traditional exclusive focus on 
growth: the conventional requirement that each project should be self-amortising would not 
be dropped, but would be considered in terms of its contribution to the productivity of the 
wider economy. The reforms which Chenery’s research advocated were not project-specific – 
they required large-scale macro-economic transformation of both inherited colonial economic 
structures and the nationalist programmes of post-independence governments.  
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The most important implication of this strategy was that the performance of the Bank, 
and its ongoing ability to borrow and lend, was ever more tightly bound to the macroeconomic 
performance of borrowers. This was a second important step towards structural adjustment 
lending: the oversight and discipline which was required could only be had through the 
‘Country Program Paper’ system with extreme difficulty. The project approach was reaching its 
limits. 
Operationalising ‘Basic Needs’: How the ‘Country Program Paper’ became the 
Structural Adjustment Loan. 
As a concept, structural adjustment lending was still some years from crystallisation. 
The project and productivity requirement stipulated by the articles of agreement remained. In 
the early 1970s, work was organised on the basis of projects which were productive on the 
basis of the ‘Country Program Paper’ approach, which had been introduced as one of 
McNamara’s first reforms, prior to the 1972 reorganisation. This sought to aggregate groups of 
projects within an individual borrower, in such a way as to at least rhetorically meet the 
objectives of ‘basic needs’. The object of this was to improve the Bank’s ability to enter into 
dialogue with borrowers and exercise greater influence over sectoral and macroeconomic 
policy.  
However, providing positive modelling to back up the redistribution-with-growth 
approach may have made the idea and rhetoric of ‘basic needs’ lending programmes 
acceptable to the bankers, but it did not necessarily feed in to Bank policy in the way in which 
had been anticipated. Further, the nature of the new lending programme and the turbulence 
of the international economy meant that it was extremely difficult to implement while holding 
strictly to the conditional project model. In the latter half of the 1970s it was rapidly eroded. 
Firstly, ‘basic needs’ objectives cut across agriculture, health, education, and 
employment – it was difficult to ‘projectise’ these objectives while targeting a specific 
vulnerable social group. Accordingly, the delivery of primary health care, nutrition, and 
education projects was allowed to become an ‘area’ project. Mahbub ul Haq, one of the 
architects of basic needs commented that: 
“The project became a looser and looser concept. We could call a whole 
village development a project, including a lot of various elements in it. We 
brought in integrated rural development programs which included about ten 
different activities in a spatial sense, focusing on a certain vulnerable group. So 
that was continuing the previous process of loosening the project definition.”399 
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The proportion of ‘project’ costs which were financed locally rose to 60 or 70% - 
permitting the borrowing government greater flexibility in utilising the foreign exchange 
provided by the loan. This gave loans under the rubric of ‘basic needs’ the character of program 
lending in many cases.400 The Bank began to embrace the fungibility of development lending. 
Secondly, the ‘loosening of the project definition’ was accelerated by trends in the 
international economy. The ability of clients to hire foreign exchange easily in international 
capital markets reduced the Bank’s ability to enforce conditionality on its loans. Further, the 
Bank was forced to offer relatively soft program loans to countries whose ability to repay 
private creditors was jeopardised by inflation and declining terms of trade following the steep 
oil price increase in 1974.In this environment, it was impossible to utilise project lending to 
enforce conditionality. The essentially macroeconomic reforms required by the ‘basic needs’ 
and ‘redistribution with growth’ concepts demanded programme-level conditionality. 
Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, and Zaire provided object lessons. Following McNamara’s speech 
in Nairobi the Bank made a highly determined effort to influence the government’s policies in 
relation to poverty and inequality. Although a raft of projects were agreed in areas from 
hydroelectric power to agricultural research, the Bank considered that the government was 
not making a concerted effort to aim its policies at the rural poor, and McNamara argued that 
it was no longer justifiable to continue to lend. However, the extent to which the Bank had 
invested in Brazil meant that by 1975 the interest payments to the Bank had outstripped the 
Bank’s total annual net income. Efforts to influence government policy were reduced to 
praising any activities with ‘social objectives’ as a concern, rather than substantive critique.401 
Stopping lending to Brazil was not an option – a default would have been catastrophic. 
In Cote d’Ivoire the Bank had sought to engage with policymakers from the mid-1960s, 
financing a series of highway and agricultural projects from 1968 onwards,402 and had 
produced a series of reports in the later 1970s which praised an ‘Ivorian Miracle’ in executing 
an export-oriented strategy with redistributive features.403 The Bank suggested that greater 
development of the local private sector was required, with particular reference to the rural 
areas and the promotion of the ‘informal sector’ – a structural transformation of the income 
and incentive structure. Cost recovery was to be considered in services such as secondary 
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education.404 Yet on the basis of record export receipts, Cote d’Ivoire was highly credit-worthy 
in Eurodollar markets, and a Bank official employed there at the time noted somewhat 
peevishly that commercial banks were virtually queuing outside the Ministry of Finance to lend 
almost any sum on almost any terms – without asking what the money would be spent on.405 
The Bank’s prescriptions went unheeded – until the defaults of 1982. 
For high income countries such as Brazil and middle income countries such as Cote 
d’Ivoire, the unexpected interest rate hikes engineered by Volcker at the Fed from 1979 to 
1983 were a major factor in their debt defaults and rescheduling. For low income countries, 
particularly in Africa, the majority of debt was fixed or lower rate and either owed directly to 
or guaranteed by official creditors. Although the sums outstanding were smaller than in other 
regions, indebtedness was both more severe than among middle income defaulters and low-
income Asian countries measured by servicing ratios, and reached crisis proportions earlier. 406 
Practices which would later fall under the rubric of structural adjustment have the longest 
history amongst these countries. 
Indeed, Chenery comments that in terms of Bank policy “...I would not say that we ever 
adopted a basic needs approach in our project lending.”407 Nor did its missions attempt to 
either persuade those countries which did not hold the basic needs concept as an objective of 
policy, or try and dissuade those which did already deploy some form of it. Further, the Bank’s 
traditional cost-benefit analysis would not have captured enough of the benefits of ‘basic 
needs’-style lending as expressed by it advocates, who did not seek to stress making a 
calculation of a return as there were significant external economies which could not be 
measured. Among the wealthier borrowers, ‘basic needs’ was a chimera. Among the poorest, 
the outcome of the combination of quantification and ‘redistribution with growth’ necessarily 
looked much more like ‘structural adjustment’ than ‘basic needs’. 
The Bank’s engagement with Zaire throughout the 1970s exemplified both the 
shortcomings of the project-lending ‘country program’ approach, and a cautionary tale  
regarding the inability to move beyond the project approach to implement a coherent ‘basic 
needs’ programme due to the discipline demanded by financiers – having started down this 
route, the Bank was locked in. Although Zaire was an ideal candidate for ‘basic needs’ lending, 
it proved impossible to implement for two reasons – both of which are intimately related to 
the Bank’s reliance on private finance. Firstly, abandoning the raft of existing projects would 
have damaged the Bank’s AAA credit rating. Secondly, the extent of Zaire’s private sector 
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indebtedness required the Bank to act in conjunction with the IMF and the Paris and London 
creditor ‘clubs’ to enforce financial discipline in order to retain financiers’ support for its 
increased lending programme. 
Across the period 1973-88, the composition of Zairian debt would change dramatically. 
In 1973, the borrowing of Mobutu’s CIA-supported regime in private capital markets peaked: 
private long-term external debt represented 78% of the total. This changed as world copper 
prices collapsed and a foreign exchange crisis ensued in 1975 and Zaire could no longer service 
its foreign obligations. By 1979, debts owed to bilateral creditors increased and private 
external debt had fallen to 44% of the total. Although Bank memoranda show that 
management were aware that the regime was siphoning the proceeds of loans and exports 
into personal accounts408 and undertaking off-balance-sheet sales of natural resources, the 
level of Bank lending increased steadily.409 
Following an agreement on a comprehensive ‘Stabilisation Programme’ with the IMF 
and a rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club of creditors and commercial bankers of 
London and New York, the Bank undertook a wide range of projects designed to support a 
‘basic needs’ agenda. These included IDA financing for: development financing corporations; 
training primary teachers and agricultural technicians; promoting livestock farming, and 
smallholder maize production; and rail projects linking to major port rehabilitation projects to 
facilitate the export of the fruits of further projects to increase agricultural production in 
export crops such as sugar and cotton.410 These did not yield significant fruit: By 1979, GDP had 
contracted by around 10% on 1972-4 levels, as inflation topped 100% and the economy saw 
chronic shortages of fuel and essential consumer goods.411 
More significantly, following the IMF bailout, the Bank had founded the Office of Public 
Debt Management designed to oversee the spending of public funds. As an integral part of the 
surveillance of the public finances on behalf of multilateral donors, this new government 
                                                          
408 Blumenthal, E.M., ‘Zaire: Rapport Sur la Credibilite Financiere Internationale’ in Dungia, E., Mobutu et 
l’Argent du Zaire: Les Revelations d’un Diplomate Ex-Agent des Services Secrets (annex 2), L’Harmattan, 
Paris, 1982.  Also Kwitny, J., Endless Enemies: the Making of an Unfriendly World, New York, Penguin, 
1984. Both cited in Ndikumana, L., and Boyce, J.K, ‘Congo’s Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital 
Flight in Zaire’, Development and Change, Vol29, 1998. Pg.207. Blumenthal was a West German central 
bank official working in Zaire for the IMF. 
409 Ndikumana, L., and Boyce, J.K., 1998. Pg.197-99 
410 IDA credit numbers, in non-chronological order as above: 710 ZR (August 1977); 624 ZR (December 
1978); 627 ZR (August 1977); 1040 ZR (October 1980); 571 ZR (July 1975); 1089 ZR (January 1981); 660 
ZR (October 1980). 
411 World Bank, Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development 
Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Development Credit in an Amount of SDR $42.2 
million, and a Proposed African Facility Credit in an Amount of $72.2 million to the Republic of Zaire for a 
Structural Adjustment Program, May 29th 1987. Pg2 
164 
 
 
department would define borrowing policy and have direct responsibility for recording and 
servicing all projects financed with public and governmentally guaranteed debt.412 World Bank 
officials also sat alongside IMF experts in the Bank of Zaire, the Finance Ministry, Customs 
Office, and Planning Ministry. Ultimately, the Bank was unable to exercise the leverage and 
political control which was required in order to effect the structural transformation of the 
economy. Ensuring that existing single-project interventions attained the productivity required 
to fund Zaire’s debt to the Bank meant that these extensive interventions in the governance of 
the economy had little impact as a coherent programme.413 
While the exigencies of default made it impossible for the Bank to overcome the 
project approach in Zaire, the case of the 1974 loan to Kenya provides an example of the step-
wise incorporation of practices which would become familiar as structural adjustment loans 
after 1980. A programme loan was made conditional on the acceptance of an overall macro- 
and micro-economic plan within the ‘basic needs’ framework. Although Kenya’s debt burden 
was comparatively light, the Bank was able to exercise considerable leverage as terms of trade 
deteriorated. The Bank was responsible for approximately 36% of its total external debt in 
1974, and its debt service ratio (including members of the East African Community for which 
Kenya was responsible) was only 6%.414 Without the hard constraint of default, in lending to 
Kenya the Bank was able to engage in ‘structural adjustment’ in all but name, in support of the 
‘basic needs’ agenda, from 1975. 
As in the case of Zaire, the Bank’s intervention in Kenya took place alongside 
interventions from the IMF. However the differences in approach, which relate primarily to 
conditionality, are of signal importance here. As I noted in Chapter 1, Sarah Babb has pointed 
out that although the IMF is usually seen as the lead agency in terms of conditionality upon 
structural adjustment lending, the Bank has longer experience of the application of a wider 
range of conditionalities.415 During the 1970s, the Fund had experienced a surge in lending to 
developing countries. Yet from 1975-1979, this lending was dwarfed by its disbursements in 
industrial countries. From 1974-1976 it made a short burst of lending to developing countries – 
of a specifically low-conditionality variety through its various specialised funds.416 In respect of 
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Kenya, the Fund undertook a series of low-conditionality credits from 1974-1981, totalling 
$190m, far outstripping the contribution of the Bank. But the Fund’s involvement expressed 
hard conditionality only from 1981, when it insisted on a series of ineffective devaluations 
which signally failed to influence Kenyan monetary and fiscal policy.417Although the volume of 
lending was much lower, the Bank engaged much more deeply with Kenyan economic 
planning, in an effort to shape the macroeconomic policy environment so as to maintain its 
ability to negotiate its imperatives as an institution. 
Within the framework of the ‘basic needs’ and ‘redistribution with growth’ strategies, 
the Bank had begun to build a policy-oriented ‘dialogue’ with the Kenyatta government from 
1974, undertaking a series of reports and studies on the basis of a mission in February that 
year. As growth had begun to drop – falling to 3.4% (1999 pg.15) in 1973-6 due in large part to 
the OPEC price increase, the Bank was keen to prevent the ‘momentum of development’ from 
being lost. It considered that “Kenya does not really have the option to continue the past 
pattern of growth, however successful it may have been, and that a material change in the 
structure or development would be required if Kenya’s own development goals are to be 
achieved.”418 
The programme loan of $30 million which was agreed with the Kenyan government on 
May 30th 1975 was designed to offer support for increased expenditure on agricultural 
production and planning, and for the financing of essential imports.419 It was envisaged that as 
urban employment levels fell, smallholder agriculture was to be emphasised: investment was 
to be increased, and consumer and producer prices were to be raised to reflect the increased 
cost of production. Wage increases were to be limited to 75% of price increases, with the 
poorest (mostly agricultural workers) granted full compensation for inflation and the richest 
(mostly urban sector workers) subject to wage freezes. Infrastructural projects and ‘rural 
works programs’ were designed to be labour intensive, and tax increases were aimed at the 
wealthy and on luxury consumption.420  
Unlike in the Brazilian and Ivorian cases in which both borrowers were able to evade 
Bank conditionality in the private credit market, and without the complications posed by the 
crisis in Zaire, the Bank was able to deploy significant leverage upon Kenya. The Kenyan loan 
exemplified the McNamara Bank’s adoption of the ILO’s conception of development as an 
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employment and distribution problem. The operationalisation of this redistributive ‘basic 
needs’ package of reforms required Kenya’s structural transformation into an agricultural 
export – oriented economy. It required the use of hard conditionality in extracting 
commitments from the Kenyatta government to push through macroeconomic reforms in the 
form of politically unpalatable spending cuts which negatively impacted the popular standard 
of living.  
In a 1975 report, the Bank noted that Kenya was faced with deteriorating terms of 
trade for its main plantation crop exports. Projections suggested that this would hinder the 
capital investment required to produce for export at sufficient volume to offset the 
deterioration in prices, and to absorb the expanding labour force – unless Kenya obtained 
increased external financing.421 Accordingly, the Bank advised the Kenyan government that it 
would need to demonstrate its commitment to bringing its balance of payments under control 
before a loan could be agreed.  
The outcome of this was evident in the budget presented for financial year 1975 – 
which aimed to curtail demand through new taxes, stringent credit restraint, increased 
interest and deposit rates, and a freeze on public expenditure. In the program which it 
subsequently presented to the National Assembly in 1975 as an official policy statement, the 
rate of expenditure growth in the development budget would be cut from 12 % to 8% per 
annum in the 1974-8 plan, and would be reallocated from infrastructure to agriculture and 
water.422 It acknowledged that not only would this create conditions of real hardship as 
incomes would fall and unemployment would rise, but that these measures would not close 
the balance of payments gap – and increased ODA flows would be required, along with new 
types of assistance such as the Bank’s program loan.423 
The depth of political involvement which the Bank required was the greatest stumbling 
block to the expansion of this mode of lending: while opposition from the Board was strong in 
view of concerns about overlapping with the mandate of the Fund, or the legal mandate in the 
Articles – the greatest problem was the lack of interest on the part of the targeted high and 
middle-income borrowers. 
 The trend among these borrowers exemplified by Brazil and the Cote d’Ivoire followed 
more generally: borrowings – even at high rates - in private international capital markets 
covered the cost of imports and paid down existing producer credits. While official credit grew 
across the decade, it was outstripped as a shift occurred to direct borrowing in capital markets 
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through the issue of bonds and from private banks.424 The Bank was not slow to apprehend 
that its falling share of financing equated to a limitation of its policy leverage, particularly in 
the case of middle income borrowers. 
Structural adjustment was initially conceived of - in the words of Ernest Stern, 
McNamara’s VP Operations – as a ‘prophylactic’, which could prevent such balance of 
payments problems.425 The Kenyan loan of 1975 precedes the first officially designated 
structural adjustment loan by fully five years, and the decision to formally adopt develop 
‘structural adjustment lending’ strategy as a Bank policy by three years.  
The most important point to emerge from these case studies is not simply that the 
roots of structural adjustment are longer than generally conceived. The character of ‘basic 
needs’ and ‘redistribution with growth’ demanded macro-economic programming, in order to 
ensure that the elements of the agenda which were not directly productive were situated in a 
fiscally sound framework. Financial imperatives caused the adoption of the progressive agenda 
of the ILO and IDS to stretch the project approach beyond its limits. The security demanded by 
investors, without which the extension of Bank lending would not have been possible, bound 
the performance of the Bank to the performance of borrowers. 
At the outset, it was a deliberately and carefully technicised mode of political 
engagement, designed to assist management regain the policy leverage which had become so 
precarious that, to paraphrase Stern once again, tougher conditionality was the only available 
tool through which the Bank could get a seat at the table for major sectoral and 
macroeconomic policy issues.426 
That the macroeconomic analyses which the Bank staff had long carried out as 
background studies were transformed in the course of the 1970s into specifically structural 
analyses aimed at programmatic economic reorganisation – from balance of payments and 
capital flows to structural aspects of production, employment, spending, and the profile of 
sovereign debt – was a consequence of the strategy of introducing the principles of scientific 
management to the Bank in order to reassure financiers that ‘basic needs’ would not see the 
institution dabble in ‘philanthropy’. 
This problem was duly made the focal point the speech in which McNamara presented 
the policy to the Governors in Belgrade in 1979. The developing countries of the world, he 
noted, were increasingly looking to the Bank as the principal source of development 
assistance. The responsibility of the Bank would be to offer targeted assistance through 
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programs aimed at raising the productivity of the poor on the basis of comprehensive analysis 
of the situations of individual borrowers – providing external support on a program basis to 
countries willing to take ‘hard decisions’ to achieve internal structural adjustment before 
balance of payments problems arose.427  
 Those countries, he argued, had to implement effective policies to accelerate 
agricultural growth rates, and rates of saving and reinvestment. Growth was a basic essential, 
and developing countries should make every effort to increase it, but they must also develop 
“...their own plans of action to provide specific improvements in the standard of life of the 
absolute poor...” The major effort would come from developing countries themselves as “...no 
amount of outside assistance from the international community can substitute for determined 
internal efforts by individual developing societies.” 428  
The development decades had failed, even though growth targets had been met. It 
was time, McNamara argued, that the developing world acknowledged responsibility for this 
failure. The Bank could offer quantitative targets for the assessment of progress, and a 
framework for national programmes of action – but the primary responsibility for the 
governance of the international order should be taken on by the developing world in ensuring 
that their own policy frameworks reflected their comparative advantage.429  
Opening the age of ‘structural adjustment’ with this claim appears paradoxical in view 
of the extent to which the political economy of borrowing members would be shaped by 
acceptance of the Bank’s strictures. Gaining the ability to influence policy had long been 
considered the most important objective in the relationship between Bank and applicant, as 
far as McNamara had been concerned. This was due entirely to the necessity of making ‘basic 
needs’ lending for activities which were not directly productive legible to the Bank’s financial 
backers. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that like the foundation of the Bretton Woods order, the 
development of neoliberal strategies was not a radical break from previous practices. It was 
not exclusively driven from outside the Bank, nor was it driven solely from within by a 
powerful figure on a moral crusade. McNamara’s Bank was not a philanthropic organisation, as 
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he was keen to demonstrate. The transformation of the Bank and its strategies were the 
outcome of the application of quantitative techniques of scientific management to 
redistributive ‘basic needs’ lending programmes, in order to make non-productive lending 
legible to financiers. The technology of the 1960s was no longer functional: it did not give the 
Bank the capacity to govern which executing its new programme while continuing to meet the 
institutional imperatives which followed from its social anchoring in US finance. This is clear 
from the cases of Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, and most dramatically in Mobutu’s Zaire. Rehabilitating 
the program loan furnished the Bank with the capacity to apply its conditionalities at the 
macro-economic level. Among the poorest borrowers, ‘Basic Needs’ had looked like ‘structural 
adjustment’ from the outset. From this perspective, the Bank emerges as more than the 
vehicle for the operationalisation of the political interests of dominant class fractions or 
ascendant epistemic communities. 
While the Bank’s reliance on financial capital did afford it a degree of autonomy from 
the US, drawing capital from these sources required adopting managerial practices that were 
derived from elite academia, and were common to large TNCs and the US government. This 
also tied it ever more closely to a commercial lending model, which required tougher 
conditionalities.  
The rapid growth of the Euromarkets and the release of the dollar from its gold 
standard constraints had enormous implications for individuals, firms, and sovereign 
borrowers. Through their pension funds and bank deposits as well as the bond issues of 
national states and the World Bank, the financial affairs of ordinary savers and pensioners 
were linked to a globalising network of commercial and investment banks, multinational 
corporations, sovereign debtors, and international financial institutions. As the crisis of the 
1980s unfolded, private financiers faced huge losses in the developing world, and the US 
government faced the collapse of the international banking system upon which its position in 
the monetary and financial order depended. To preserve this deep set of linkages, in 1985, the 
US government was able to seize upon the legible strategies and powerful tools for political 
intervention with which the Bank had redeveloped its capacity to meet its institutional 
imperatives and contribute to the governance of the international order across the preceding 
decade. 
The defining techniques of neoliberal governance were not developed via institutional 
capture by the Wall Street-Treasury Nexus or the generation of a neoliberal culture by internal 
norm entrepreneurs. The novel technology of governance which McNamara brought with him 
was not a direct product of the needs of ‘the market’, but it spoke clearly to the Bank’s 
investors. Neoliberal governance was a development of an institutional order. It was the 
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agency of Bank management, which, in managing these requirements while simultaneously 
meeting its own organisational imperatives, enabled the World Bank Group of the 1980s to 
step back into the liquidity-providing and financial discipline-enforcing role of the IBRD of the 
1940s.  
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Conclusion 
 
The central claim of this thesis is that the Bank has never been a passive recipient of 
the American hegemonic agenda. Its ability to express the ideological preferences and 
strategic governance objectives of the US in a straightforward fashion is often taken for 
granted. In particular, the development of the structural adjustment loan is presented as 
emblematic of the ability of the US to use the Bank to meet its objectives: the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ is persistently interpreted as a product of US hegemony. Yet Bank management 
has charted a pragmatic course of its own. What this thesis shows is that US hegemony cannot 
be understood without the agency of the Bank.  
 There are two levels at which I articulate this claim. Firstly, anchoring the Bank in 
private American finance means that the relationship between the Bank and the US is defined 
by the growing reliance of the World Bank on access to US capital markets. The imperatives of 
financiers shape the strategy of the bank, and thereby frame the limits of its capacity to act on 
the US agenda. The second relates to the managerial practices of the Bank. The agency of Bank 
management emerges through the pragmatic negotiation of the institutional imperatives 
which follow from its social anchoring. While in pursuit of the Bank’s institutional imperatives, 
management agency has been crucial in designing the tools through which American 
hegemony has historically been realised.  
In respect of the first of these claims, it is clear that financiers did not attend Bretton 
Woods in the quasi-official capacity in which they attended the Brussels and Genoa 
conferences of the 1920s. But as I have shown, the outcome of the Bretton Woods conference 
was very vague and highly conservative. This was in line with the Roosevelt administration’s 
vision of how the Bank should work in practice – which was far removed from what the 
institution would become. I argue that the development of the Bank can only be understood in 
terms of its reliance upon US financial markets. It should be considered an attempt to 
capitalise upon the deeply socially embedded infrastructure of financial relationships which 
were unique to the American political economy of the era. Yet this observation is frequently 
obscured by the mythology of the Bretton Woods conference. The achievements of the 
delegates at the conference itself have been widely overstated in support of a narrative that 
insists that the creation of new institutions through which the US would govern the 
international order expressed a social-democratic political vision, in which financial capital was 
subordinated to the needs of the real economy. As I have illustrated, in the 1940s, while 
financiers were displaced from the quasi-official roles they had held during the international 
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conferences of the 1920s and in the development of the Dawes plan; it was neither possible 
nor strategically desirable for the New Deal administration to negate the infrastructural power 
of finance. Drawing upon the deep reserves of liquidity created by mass participation in 
financial relations was explicitly envisaged from the outset.  
The only question was how. The nuts and bolts of the new international order were 
not worked out at Bretton Woods. Understandings of what would actually be done to re-
inflate the international economy remained fluid throughout the period of the negotiation of 
the Act, its ratification and even after the first annual meeting in Savannah. The ‘blueprint’ for 
the Bank, such as it was, drew upon the heritage of private financial planning which had 
shaped the 1920s - and recognised that American private financial capital would play a central 
role in the development and operation of the new dollar-based international order. But the 
specific practices of lending and structure of the Bank’s governance had still to be worked out 
after the first annual meeting. 
The way in which these questions were answered reflected the gradual apprehension 
of the practical implications of anchoring the Bank in the infrastructure of American finance. 
The limits of the Bank’s capacity to act on the basis of state capital alone were rapidly made 
clear: European members were unable and unwilling to pay in the capital they had committed. 
Further, the Truman administration’s objectives in relation to the Bank were far more 
ambitious than Roosevelt’s. Linking American security and development, the Truman doctrine 
demanded that the Bank expand its operations rapidly beyond the borders of Europe. But the 
American contribution, though famously large enough to pay for a veto, would soon be 
exhausted. The illiquidity of the immediate post-war context would require, as in the 1920s, 
the enlistment of American financiers and through them, access to the liquidity of the unique 
infrastructure of the American financial system. 
Making the machinery of Bretton Woods actually work towards the Truman Doctrine 
depended on the direct involvement of financiers in capitalising the Bank. The impact of this 
was visible immediately, in the transfer of operational control to the Bank’s own management 
team during the struggle over the Chilean loan. With the operation of the Bank predicated 
upon its ability to access private capital, its viability as an organ of governance was predicated 
upon its creditworthiness. Affirming this required the Executive Directors to submit to the shift 
of control of day-to-day operations from their hands to the Bank’s own newly-appointed 
management team of Wall Street lawyers and bankers. With this move, the infrastructural 
power of American finance was institutionalised at the international level. 
From this point, the imperatives of American financiers became an important 
constitutive element of the imperatives of the Bank. The hegemonic agenda of the US during 
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the Truman and Eisenhower era required the Bank to expand its operations in support of 
security and anti-communist objectives. This required the Bank to borrow more – and in order 
to achieve this, it had to remain creditworthy. Therefore, the second claim I make in this thesis 
is that the technologies of management which the Bank deployed were designed by 
management in response to the imperative to render the Bank’s agenda legible to the financial 
interests in which the institution was socially anchored. 
We may be tempted to assume that the Bank’s reliance on private US financial capital 
that this enabled financiers to direct the Bank’s strategy. Although management were 
concerned to tap financial markets, they had to work hard to overcome the reluctance of 
financiers to invest. While the major representative organs of the financial community such as 
the American Bankers’ Association had backed the Bank during the Congressional hearings on 
the Bretton Woods act, management had to undertake an intensive public relations campaign, 
lobbying to change the law to permit commercial banks to hold the IBRD’s paper on a state-by-
state basis. Although the Bank saw enthusiasm for its paper gradually build, even after 
obtaining the AAA rating in 1958 management still had to work to keep financiers engaged. I 
argue that this is a crucial causative factor in McNamara’s experimentation with techniques of 
scientific management. Developing the quantitative data gathering mechanisms was designed 
to render every aspect of the Bank’s activities transparent and legible to the mathematical 
modellers of Wall Street. As I have shown, these were crucial steps in the direction of 
structural adjustment lending. 
The two major shifts which the Bank has made in this respect – from ‘programme’ to 
‘project’ model during the 1950s, and from ‘project’ to ‘structural adjustment’ in the 1970s – 
should both be understood in terms of management’s agency toward this end. The 
requirements placed upon the Bank to act in support of US hegemony had to be met within 
the parameters of financial imperatives. The impact of this was that the forms which the 
practices of lending took were not simply one choice from a number of possible options in this 
regard. This is particularly clear in the case of structural adjustment lending, but it may also be 
claimed to hold for the project approach. 
The project model became by far the dominant mode of lending after 1958 once the 
twin objectives of achieving the AAA credit rating and diversifying the Bank’s sources of 
borrowing had been achieved, until the development of structural adjustment lending during 
the 1970s. The purpose of the project approach was specifically to appeal to financiers – since 
it was a familiar model which evaluated potential investments in the same way as commercial 
banks. Prior to 1958, the strategic interests of the Bank, its financial backers, and the US, 
converged around the achievement of multilateral convertibility. Bank management was able 
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to satisfy the US agenda through strategic project lending to Yugoslavia, and financial interests 
by strategic-non lending to enforce financial discipline on Greece, while offering lax 
programme lending to Australia in order to help re-orient it toward the dollar and hasten the 
demise of the sterling bloc.  
The Bank’s imperative, underlying all of these, was the ability to unlock the 
subscriptions it was owed by its members which were outstanding due to the cumbersome 
monetary arrangements of the pre-’58 order. Although its contribution toward the 
achievement of multilateral convertibility should not be overstated, the Bank had a further 
strong interest in its achievement. With the re-opening of European capital markets, it was 
able to market its bonds outside the US for the first time – diversifying its potential sources of 
liquidity and safeguarding its operating capital in the event of the closure of the New York 
markets. Bank management did not only design the Bank’s practice in response to the strategic 
concerns of financiers, but it also deployed its lending strategies pragmatically in order to meet 
financial imperatives and those of the Truman doctrine. 
During this period we are able to see the interrelation of financial imperatives and the 
structure and practice of the Bank clearly. As I have shown, the Bank’s role in the governance 
of the post-war international order was threatened in this period by the potential foundation 
of a competitor under the auspices of the UN. As this had the potential to subvert the anti-
communist objectives of US foreign economic policy, the Bank was required to find a way to 
respond, within the parameters of the imperatives set by financiers. Management were able 
support the US agenda by founding two affiliates to offer lending on a more concessional 
basis. Concessional lending would have damaged the Bank’s creditworthiness, and thereby 
potentially derailed its pursuit of its major strategic objective, the diversification of its capital 
base. The most important feature of these was that they were legally distinct entities, whose 
operations were funded through direct contributions by member states. This was not a ‘turn to 
development’. It was a defensive action by management aimed at securing the apparatus of 
governance in support of US hegemony while maintaining the Bank’s creditworthiness. 
The limits to the project approach were exposed in the later 1960s and early 1970s by 
the same dynamics which had enabled the Bank to expand its borrowing and diversify its 
creditor base following the attainment of multilateral convertibility. The Bank’s imperatives 
remained the same – but the changing political economic context demanded that 
management develop new tools with which to meet them. As in the 1950s, the Bank’s 
centrality to the international governance apparatus was threatened – but in this case, by the 
ability of members to bypass the Bank and borrow directly in the Eurocurrency markets on 
their own account.  
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It is McNamara’s response to the dynamics of the declining Bretton Woods system that 
enables us to reconceptualise the Washington Consensus. In arguing this point, I am not 
attempting to deny the nature of the political shift which was beginning to become visible in 
this era. But the Bank’s response to the problems posed to the institution by the dynamics of 
the expansion of the Eurocurrency markets opened the way to the development of new 
institutional capacities – and ultimately laid the foundations for the possibility of the forms of 
governance which have become familiar as the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
In order to return the Bank to a central position in the governance apparatus, 
McNamara’s intention was to expand the Bank’s borrowing in order to facilitate a massively 
enlarged lending campaign in rural agriculture and education. The ‘basic needs’ was 
programme was designed to reinvigorate ‘development lending’, and foster redistributive 
spending on education and agriculture projects that were not directly productive. Here, the 
Bank ran up against the limits posed by its basis in private financial capital – in the most clearly 
communicable way possible, through a disastrous bond issue.  
The transformations which McNamara made to the Bank in order to make these 
indirectly productive investments legible to the Bank’s financial backers as safe and profitable 
required management to effect two major transformations. These transformations were 
significant steps in the direction of structural adjustment. Firstly, the Bank had to be 
reorganised. To this end, McNamara deployed the tools of the RAND corporation, which he 
had learned at the Pentagon: systems analysis, and the foundation of a programming and 
budgeting unit which would generate large volumes of statistical data about the Bank’s 
operations in the field and in Washington. These tools, as the cutting edge of American 
management science, allied to the transformation of the Bank into the structure of a standard 
multidivisional corporation, would make the new model legible to investors. Secondly, the 
enhanced ability to control the Bank’s operations had to be reflected in the leverage the Bank 
could project over the macroeconomic policy settings of the borrower. Essentially, the ‘basic 
needs’ model and the project model were incompatible with the Bank’s requirements.  The 
primary criterion for its replacement was that it would facilitate the sectoral restructuring that 
‘basic needs’ and ‘redistribution with growth’ demanded, and communicate the overall 
soundness of the investment to financiers. The only technology which could meet these 
criteria within the parameters set by the financial community in which the Bank was anchored, 
was conditional programme lending. Rehabilitating the programme model which the Bank had 
discarded as its principal lending strategy in the 1950s was essential, as it was the only 
technology which offered the scope for macroeconomic conditionality which the Bank’s 
creditworthiness demanded. With these steps, McNamara had established the structure of 
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organisational control and the macroeconomic conditionalities which would become familiar 
as structural adjustment lending after 1980.  
At each point in this transition, the limits to the Bank’s capacity to pursue the agenda 
of governance are clearly visible, as are the limits to the agency of management in defining the 
nature of the tools through which the agenda of governance could be pursued. However, it 
should be clear that the turn to structural adjustment was not, any more than the project 
model, an extension of American ideology or policy. It is clear that the norm entrepreneurs of 
the 1970s behind the turn to structural adjustment espoused an agenda which was pro-free 
trade, pro-free capital movement, pro-private sector, and anti-state in general - in a way which 
coincided with the Washington Consensus agenda of the 1980s and 1990s. Structural 
adjustment lending was a practice which McNamara’s VP Ernie Stern - who would remain a 
defining figure of the Washington Consensus era during the Clausen, Conable, and Preston 
presidencies - advocated strongly. But however well-suited it was for enforcing the austerity 
programmes the Baker Plan demanded, structural adjustment was not an off-the-shelf market-
oriented US imposition. 
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